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ABSTRACT
TRADING TECHNOLOGY WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
U.S.S.R.: POWER, INTRESTS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND DISCOURSE AMONG ALLIES
SEPTEMBER, 1991
J. TIMOTHY CLOYD, B.A., EMORY AND HENRY COLLEGE
M.A.
, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor James Der Derian
This dissertation analyses export control programs in
the Western state system. The main focus is Western
alliance collaboration on East-West technology transfer
controls through COCOM. It examines post-1945 intra-
alliance and intra-national perspectives on the relationship
between East-West trade and Western security. Within four
historical periods (1949-1964, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-
1991) four questions are addressed: a) How dees the
structural distribution of power and the nature of United
States leadership affect collaboration on the form, the
nature, and the enforcement of controls?; b) How does the
nature of global economic competition affect Western
alliance states' collaboration on and Western firms'
compliance with export controls?; c) How does the nature and
the distribution of power in intra-national politics on this
issue affect United States policy and multilateral
vii
collaboration?; d) How does the nature of changing images
and representations of security and threats to security
affect United States policy and the nature of collaboration?
The project thesis is that a multi-factor analysis is
necessary for an appropriate understanding of the dynamics
of discord and consensus over the terms of the Western
alliance export control program. To conduct such an analysis
the project draws on four theoretical frameworks: modified
structural realism, a market explanation, institutionalism
and discourse analysis.
The study is a contribution to the literature on
international relations theory, particularly the role of
ideas in international policy collaboration. It draws on
work in theories of language and discourse and micro-
economic theories of contested exchange.
The dissertaton concludes that emerging opportunities
regarding overall global security will result in a
transformation of Western collaboration from East-West
export control to a multi-directional technology transfer
management system. The problems with this transformation
and issues that must be addressed in a broader-based program
(such as: the proliferation of missile, nuclear, and
chemical weapons and environmental management) are
considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology,
whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are
delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we
regard it as something neutral; for this conception of
it, to which today we particularly like to do homage,
makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology
.
Martin Heidegger "The Question Concerning Technology"
Collaboration on Export Controls
Since 1949 the United States and its NATO partners
have regulated East-West trade through an institution called
The Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM). 1
COCOM has served four main functions in coordinating Western
export control efforts. It has been the organization
through which criteria are established for export controls.
Secondly, COCOM working groups have compiled detailed lists
of items and technologies subject to control. Since the
late 1950s this included three lists: the international
atomic list (IAL) , the international munitions list (IML)
,
and the international industrial list (IIL) . Thirdly, COCOM
has been the forum in which enforcement efforts have been
coordinated between states. Finally, COCOM has been the
body responsible for evaluating member states applications
for particular exceptions to the agreed upon controls.
1 COCOM includes all NATO countries except Iceland, plus
Japan and Australia.
l
2United States-Western European collaboration on
multilateral export controls in COCOM has been a sea of
mixed currents. Over the past forty five years a general
consensus existed on the need to maintain some form of
strategic controls on the transfer of technology to the
East. Historically, however, there have been recurrent
conflicts over the appropriate nature and function of export
controls and, more particularly, over the specification of
items subject to regulation. Western European governments
generally maintained a minimalist position on the extent of
technology transfer regulations and on the substance of such
controls. The United States government, the leader in the
founding of COCOM, generally pursued a maximalist strategy
on these issues, embodied in its complex unilateral export
control administration.
Conflicts over this issue have been recurrent at the
domestic as well as inter-allied level. In the United
States, protracted domestic disputes surrounded passage of
the 1979 and 1985 revisions of the Export Administration
Act, and the "battle of the branches" over implementation of
export controls in the 1980s has been particularly intense.
While less visible, tensions have also appeared at times in
some Western European states. At the inter-allied level
there have been numerous disputes over specific transfers of
high technology by COCOM member states to the Eastern Bloc.
3The United States has used several means in its occasional
attempts to halt some of these transfers. since 1949 the
United States has turned at points from a preferred
diplomatic persuasion strategy to an economic coercion
strategy to try to bring alliance states and firms into line
with a more restrictive policy. This economic coercion
strategy has depended on a surveillance system including an
array of intelligence networks that monitor global high
technology transfers and that gauge compliance by states and
firms with export control agreements. The system also
includes a broader arrangement of institutionalized and
standardized practices, such as the United States export
licensing program, that have helped to maintain vigilance on
East-West technology trade.
There are several reasons why an inquiry into the past
and present dynamics of Western alliance collaboration in
this area is justified. First, as the radical
transformations in the Eastern bloc since 1989 altered the
terrain and the horizons of the East-West strategic balance,
and Western states and firms scrambled to take advantage of
new economic opportunities, the United States found itself
in a precarious position. The United States, seeing itself
as the main guardian of Western security, has been the
leader of the COCOM program. The United States has led in
maintaining the integrity of the multilateral program by
4establishing criteria, parameters, and procedures of
control, by attempting to get member states to enforce
effectively controls; and by obtaining control compliance
from firms in both COCOM and non-COCOM states. in the midst
of allied governments' demands for broad and immediate cuts
in the list of items subject to control and for a
restructuring of COCOM, the United States faced the problem
of finding a balance between responding to these demands and
maintaining an effective strategic embargo in the interest
of Western security. In an attempt to reconcile these
cross-cutting and conflicting demands, policy makers and
policy analysts in the United States and Western Europe
began to examine the strategic, economic, and political
aspects of this issue. The difficulty and complexity of
finding acceptable compromises and a stable ground for
consensus on this issue has been exacerbated by the fluidity
of the situation in the East.
Secondly, in the mid 1980s this issue had already
acquired significant economic and political salience in the
United States. Business interest groups and some members of
Congress became increasingly concerned with the cost of the
United States more restrictive unilateral export control
program, particularly in West-West trade. In 1986 and 1988
Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to
conduct extensive studies of both the United States
5unilateral and COCOM export control systems. The studies of
the unilateral program involved an assessment of the
administrative and competitive costs to United States firms,
the bureaucratic costs to the government, and the
inter-allied political costs.
Third, the history of United States-Western European
collaboration in the multilateral export control program
offers a rich case study of cooperation. This cooperation
occurs at an intersection between security, economic, and
diplomatic issues in international relations. Assessing
this history will enrich our understanding of the dynamics
of collaboration in the international political economy.
Finally, there are also broader reasons for such an
inquiry. The regulation and control of the diffusion of
technology through institutionalized state mechanisms,
administrative codes, licensing programs, monitoring
organizations, surveillance systems, and legal statutes for
rewards and punishments has a lineage in the state system.
This state practice, however, has experienced shifts and
transformations. The objects of control, the methods of
categorizing items and classes of goods subject to control,
the techniques used for surveillance, and the magnitude of
the apparatuses of enforcement have changed over time.
These past efforts at regulating the diffusion of items and
technology that were seen to offer advantages in rivalry
6between states provide the material for an interpretive
history of the present raison d'etre of the multilateral
export control program. In placing the present case in
historical context we can examine the differences between
eras. That is, such an investigation will expose
discontinuities by contrasting structures of power and
knowledge that helped give rise to, maintain, and transform
this practice at particular points in history. I will
compare and contrast the rationale and administrative
structure of the nineteenth century British export control
system with the post-1945 multilateral export control
system. In that sense this inguiry into the dynamics of
United States-Western European collaboration on technology
transfer controls allows for a reconsideration of the
history of a state practice. A reconsideration of this
practice is significant because it demonstrates the
difficulty of establishing and maintaining a collaborative
program of export controls between states with divergent
administrative histories and political cultures.
The Questions
In light of these issues this project examines the
following sets of general guestions: First, what have been
the goals and the structure of post-1945 multilateral export
control collaboration? How do they differ in rationale and
form from past examples of export control programs in the
7Western state system? Secondly, what specific factors
account for the historical periods of greater, or lesser,
conflict and consensus in United States-Western European
collaborative policy in this area? What have been the
significant factors in determining the policy stands of
alliance states on this issue? Thirdly, what effect will
transformations in the Eastern bloc have on this area of
alliance collaboration? How will intensified international
economic competition affect the fragile consensus that has
supported post-1945 policy coordination on East-West
strategic technology transfer controls?
In order to address the broader guestions this project
contrasts the post-1945 control program with past examples
of systematic efforts by governments to regulate the
diffusion of particular technologies. The project includes
an analysis of the nineteenth century British export control
program and then examines the past dynamics of United
States-Western European collaboration in COCOM. This is
done from the vantage points of a variety of theoretical
perspectives that have been used in other studies to explain
the sources of conflict and cooperation in the international
political economy.
Chapter one defines key terms of reference for the
project, reviews the literature on the topic and demarcates
the scope of the project. This chapter lays out four
8theoretical perspectives and explains how each can be used
to interpret the history of the post-1945 multilateral
export control program.
Chapter two investigates the question of whether or
not, governments have attempted to maintain military,
strategic, or economic advantage by controlling the
diffusion of particular items and technologies. One of the
central issues that is analyzed deals with the factors that
determine the nature and scope of such programs. This
includes an assessment of how such programs have been shaped
by both the material basis of these states' preponderance
and by the understandings and representations of the sources
of power accepted by these states' policy elites. The main
historical analysis in this chapter is a comparison and
contrast of nineteenth century British regulations on the
transfer of certain technologies with the post-1945 United
States control system. The last part of the chapter is an
analysis of the elements in technology transfer regulations
unique to the post-1945 period.
Chapters three through six are a periodized analysis
of the history of the COCOM multilateral control program.
The periodization used in these chapters corresponds to
shifts in United States-Western European collaboration in
this area. This analysis focuses primarily on interactions
among the United States, Great Britain, France, and West
9Germany. Within each of these historical periods (1949-
1963, 1964-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1991) the project addresses
the following specific questions:
a) How does the structural distribution of power
among allied states and the nature of United
States leadership affect collaboration?
b) How does the nature of global economic
competition
—
particularly among firms and within
sectors most affected by controls—affect
collaboration?
c) How does the nature, structure, and distribution
of power in domestic intra-governmental politics
on this issue affect collaboration?
d) How does the power, authority, and nature of
representations of the Soviet threat and of the
role of strategically significant technology in
guarding Western security accepted by allied
government officials, affect policy and
collaboration within the alliance?
Chapter three runs from the formation of COCOM through
the transformations in the program during the 1950s. The
chapter explores the roots of the East-West export control
program and analyzes the factors behind changes and
conflicts in the program within the United States, within
Western European states, and at the inter-allied level.
10
Chapter four runs from 1964 to 1979. it analyzes
changes in the multilateral program in the context of
intensified West-West economic competition and in the
context of detente. Chapter five runs from 1979-1989. It
assesses domestic level and inter-allied factors in the move
to fortify the multilateral export control program after the
invasion of Afghanistan. Chapter six provides a history of
the transformation of COCOM during 1989, assesses the
outcome of the June 1990 COCOM talks, and then considers the
challenges to the future of COCOM given the transformations
in the East bloc.
The concluding chapter offers, first, a re-
consideration of the contrast between the post-1945
technology transfer control program and past examples of
such practices. Secondly, the chapter offers an overall
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various
approaches to explaining the dynamics of inter-allied
conflict and consensus in this area. One goal of this study
then is to refine some theoretical perspectives by testing
the strength of a variety of approaches to account for the
dynamics of United States-Western European collaboration on
multilateral export controls. I will argue, however, that
no one theoretical perspective is sufficient to account for
the diverse array of factors that have given rise to
conflict or that have helped to produce cooperation in this
11
area of alliance policy collaboration. My thesis is that a
multi-factor analysis provides a full and adequate
understanding of the complex dynamics of alliance
collaboration in this area. I conduct such an analysis by
drawing on four theoretical perspectives: modified
structural realism, a market explanation, institutionalism,
and discourse analysis. Taken together these perspectives
allow us to assess the factors that interact to produce
cooperation and discord over multilateral export control
policy.
CHAPTER I
THE DYNAMICS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE COLLABORATION
ON EXPORT CONTROLS: FOUR MODES OF
INTERPRETATION
Introducing the Concepts and the Theories
There have been a number of recent efforts to bring
theoretical considerations and analytical paradigms to bear
on the history of West-West collaboration on East-West
export control policy (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1983; Crawford
and Lenway, 1985; Rode and Jacobsen, 1985; Parrot, 1985;
Mastanduno, 1985, 1988, and 1989; Jentleson, 1986;
Lowenfeld, 1987; Bertsch et. al., 1988; Long, 1989). This
area of alliance collaboration lies at a point of
intersection between security, economic, and diplomatic
questions. It has thus attracted the attention of
scholars from divergent backgrounds, who often "speak
different languages." The state of attempts to theorize
about or to explain the history of collaboration in this
area mirrors the complexity of the multiple factors that
have produced both cooperation and discord in the Western
alliance over East-West trade policy. Recent work has
thus directed our attention to the conditions under
which collaboration has been created and transformed
by assessing economic, political, and perceptual
12
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factors and by evaluating the role of system and domestic
influences. This chapter will review some commonly accepted
approaches and explanations. It will also introduce some
previously under utilized theoretical perspectives as
potentially powerful approaches to interpreting the dynamics
of United States-Western European post-1945 collaboration on
East-West trade policy.
The Scope of the Project
This project does not attempt to analyze the impact of
access to Western technology in general on Soviet or Eastern
European industrial and military development; nor does it
assess the impact of COCOM controls on Eastern Bloc military
capability or on Western strategic technology advantage
(U.S. DOD, 1981 and 1985; Perle, 1987; Vorona, 1987). While
answers to such questions influence policy and thus must be
considered in broad terms, the focus of this project is more
narrowly on the political, economic, and perceptual factors
in inter-allied multilateral collaboration and in the United
States unilateral export control program. In that sense
then the project's central concern is with factors that form
the context and determine the direction of United
States-Western European negotiations on export control
collaboration. The aim of the project is to contribute to
the work that has been done in the study of cooperation and
conflict in the international political economy. In
14
particular, the project aim is to complement recent efforts
by Gray Bertsch (1983, 1985, and 1988), Michael Mastanduno
(1985, 1988, and 1989), Bruce Jentleson (1986) and Beverly
Crawford (1985 and 1988) to bring theoretical considerations
and analytical paradigms to bear on collaboration in this
area. It is designed to shed light on the broader issue of
the conditions under which collaboration in international
relations is created and maintained. Before turning to
review past literature on this topic, however, I lay out key
definitions and points of reference for the project.
Terminology
"Cooperation, 11 "discord," and "collaboration" have
often attained the status of shibboleths in the study of
international institutions. All three, however, are
contested terms. The notion of collaboration is used here
to characterize a situation in which the actions of states
are brought into conformity with one another through some
form of joint policy determination. Within the context of
collaboration, however, conflict, disagreement, and
divergence of perception persist at various levels. While
these conflicts might not result in discord (a situation in
which one state's policies actually hinder the realization
of other states' goals), collaboration as a concept is
intended to accentuate the tension present between those
elements that produce cooperation and those that produce
15
discord in any coordinate policy endeavor. Collaboration,
then allows us to avoid conceiving of cooperation and
discord as a binary opposition.
The central focus of the export control collaboration
has been on restricting the export of strategically
significant technology. As we will see, the designation of
items as militarily or strategically significant technology
has been controversial. However, one of the more intriguing
elements in the control program is the place and role that
the image of technology has assumed in relation to
conceptions of strategic and economic advantage.
The etymological roots of the word technology are only
obliquely reflected in contemporary connotations and
significations of the word. "Techno," from the Greek tekhne
meaning a craft or an art, has become an omnibus prefix
connoting all that has to do with a scientifically advanced
industrialized society. The first edition of the Oxford
English Dictionary (1888) lists seven words with the prefix
"techno." The second edition (1988) lists twenty-seven and
no doubt the list could be expanded given the industry of
proliferating "technologisms. " For example, we live in a
"technopolis, 11 or a "technosociety" inhabited by
"technocentric" "technomaniacs" who communicate in
"technospeak. " This has lead to "technophobia" and
"technostress. " The point of this word game is that
16
contemporary Western society has often been defined in terms
of a notion of a technology.
There has been disagreement not only over the
consequences of this development, but also over the actual
definition of technology. This means by stepping out to
define "technology" one quickly finds oneself in a
mine-field. For now let us define technology as applied
science, or the design and manufacturing know-how required
to produce advanced industrialized goods (Mastanduno, 1985) .
This know-how or technology exists in "disembodied" form as
data (e.g., blueprints, operating manuals) and in "embodied"
form as items, equipment, and machinery. Technology
transfer is the acquisition by one country from another of
embodied or disembodied technology that directly or
indirectly allows a qualitative or quantitative upgrading of
industrial or military systems. The transfer of disembodied
technology can take a number of forms including sales of
licenses, subscriptions to technical periodicals, word of
mouth, and industrial espionage. The transfer of embodied
technology involves imports of actual products, particularly
capital goods. There is also a distinction between active
and passive technology transfer. Active transfers involve
ongoing interactions between the seller and the buyer in the
form of training personnel and upgrading systems. Passive
transfers are one-time exchange transactions.
17
Technologies can also be classified by end-use, that
is, actual application. It is common to use a threefold
classification of civilian, military and dual-use
technology. A dual-use technology can be employed in both
the civilian and the military sector. The notion of
military significance refers to the effect of a technology
on the military balance between states. Usually
technologies with military significance are considered to be
"strategic technologies" designed especially or used
principally and directly for the development, production,
and utilization of arms, ammunition, and military systems.
In the broadest sense the transfer of any technology can be
said to be militarily significant because economic or
industrial gains can be used to increase military power
(Mastanduno, 1985; Schaffer, 1985; National Academy of
Science, 1987) . The narrower definition of military
significance refers to technologies with specific and direct
military applications. The question of what constitutes a
militarily significant technology, particularly in the
dual-use area and concerning items that might make an
"indirect contribution" to a military system, has been a
major issue in United States-Western European debates over
the scope of technology transfer controls. The United
States policy position on export controls has historically
incorporated a broader definition of military significance,
18
while Western European states, in varying degrees, have
advocated narrower definitions.
Review of Past Literature
Until recently works on the post-1945 Western alliance
and unilateral United States export control programs lacked
a theoretical framework of analysis. The existence of COCOM
was initially kept highly secret and multilateral
negotiations are still conducted under much stealth. This
has been due to the informal nature of the organization and
to the fact that Western alliance leaders have always been
cautious about raising the profile of the organization
because of the conflicts it would generate. As a result
most early works on this topic were noble attempts, in the
face of sparse information, to document the history of the
Western multilateral and United States unilateral export
control programs. In addition some works have attempted to
assess the role of Western technology in Soviet industrial
and military development or to assess the impact of export
controls
.
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1Work that has been done on the role of Western
technology in Soviet and Eastern European economic development
and on the contribution of Western technology to Eastern Bloc
military capability is important, while at the same time
complex and controversial. Evaluating the precise impact of
Western technology on Eastern bloc states industrial or
economic development is difficult and doing so for the
military sector is almost impossible. This is due not only to
the difficulties of obtaining data, but because of the
difficulties of constructing methods to measure in detail its
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When scholars have turned to analytical frameworks and
theoretical considerations, the focus has usually been on
the characteristics of and the debates over forms of what
impact. This holds true for the West as well as the East.
Nevertheless, there have been some noteworthy attempts.
Anthony Sutton's three volume study Western Technology and
Soviet Economic Development traces the impact of Western
technology in industrial development from 1917 to 1965. Sutton
argues that Western technology was a decisive factor in Soviet
economic development from 1917 to 1930 (Sutton, 1968-1973). In
an attempt to assess the impact of Western technology on
Soviet economic development and in assessing the ability of
the Soviet Union to integrate this technology scholars have
also used case-study approaches mostly tracing the development
of a single sector. Philip Hanson's work Trade and Technology
in Soviet-Western Relations and his analysis of the Soviet
mineral fertilizer industry, S.E. Goodman's analysis of the
Soviet computer industry, Robert W. Campbell's study of the
Soviet energy sector, George D. Holliday's work on the Soviet
automotive industry, and Elizabeth Ann Goldstein's study of
the Soviet ferrous metal industry are all examples of the case
study approach (Hanson, 1981; Goldstein, 1984; Goodman, 1985;
Campbell, 1985; Holliday, 1985). Most of the compiled volumes
on East-West trade and technology transfer incorporate such
case studies (Becker, 1983; B'ergson and Levine, 1983 ; Smith,
1984; Parrot, 1985; Schaffer, 1985; Perry and Pfaltzgraff,
1987) These case studies are important for showing the
relationship between indigenous technology and the
assimilation and diffusion of transferred Western technology.
In many instances these studies have shown the difficulty
Eastern Bloc states have had with applying and
operationalizing Western technology (Gustafson, 1981) . There
have also been some creative econometric studies of the impact
of Western technology on Soviet industrial output (Green and
Levine, 1977; Thomas and Kruse-Vaucienne, 1977; Weitzman,
1979) . Determining the effectiveness of technology transfer
regulations and export controls in preserving Western alliance
lead time over the Eastern Bloc in the application of
technology to military systems is also beyond the scope of
this project (Costick, 1978). Even if sufficient data were
available to show a technology gap across a number of weapon
systems over time, the effectiveness of the multilateral
export control program would not thereby be proven to be
effective. Nor would it be proven to be ineffective if this
gap grew smaller. As Julian Cooper, David Holloway, and others
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David Baldwin calls economic statecraft (Baldwin, 1985).
Adler-Karlsson's (1968) excellent work on the early period
of Western alliance export controls and on the formation of
COCOM includes an analysis of the objectives of the Western
alliance economic statecraft. Drawing inspiration from
Albert Hirschman's National Power and the Structure of
Foreign Trade (1945) Adler-Karlsson showed the relationship
between the economic warfare and the economic defense
objectives in the early cold-war Western alliance export
control program. Economic warfare is an offensive imposition
of sanctions in an attempt to inflict disruption and harm on
a target state's economy. Economic defense sanctions,
usually called strategic embargoes or national security
export controls, are imposed with the goal of limiting
exports that have a direct military significance so as not
to enhance a rival state's military capability (Jentleson,
1986)
.
The use of economic statecraft in inter-state
relations is quite old. Pericles 's Megarian Decree, which
excluded a Spartan ally from access to ports in the Athenian
have shown, factors such as the Soviet Union's ability to
absorb and diffuse Western technology, Soviet indigenous
technological capability and the ability to apply it, and
the efficiency of the United States weapons procurement
system must be considered in assessing lead time in the
application of technology to military systems (Amann,
Cooper, and Davies, 1977; Amann and Cooper, 1982; Bertsch
and Maclntyre, 1983; Cooper, 1985; Holloway, 1987).
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empire and to the market of Athens is an early example of
economic statecraft (Baldwin, 1985). Contemporary
literature on this instrument of politics has clarified the
characteristics and analyzed the effectiveness of economic
statecraft. In this regard an important distinction has
been made between foreign policy export controls and narrow
strategic export controls (Hirschman, 1945; Baldwin, 1985).
Foreign policy export controls can be broken down into
policies of economic warfare, policies with particular
instrumental objectives, and policies with
symbolic-expressive objectives (Galtung, 1967) . An economic
warfare strategy as outlined above is designed to inflict
maximum cost on and to disrupt the economy of a target
state. The goals of foreign policy export controls with
instrumental objectives, sometimes referred to as a
tactical-linkage export control strategy (trade denial or
trade inducement) , include the following: a) compellence,
forcing a state to change a particular domestic or foreign
policy; b) deterrence, discouraging future aggressive
actions by a rival state by signaling resolve; and c)
containment, limiting potential economic and political
influence by isolating a state through restrictions on
economic interaction; and d) inducement, offering
concessions in exchange for desired actions (Schelling,
1966; Baldwin, 1985; Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986).
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Foreign policy export controls with instrumental objectives
can also be designed to affect the allocation of resources
in a "target state" (Mastanduno, 1985). The difficulties of
operationalizing foreign policy export controls with these
sorts of instrumental objectives has been demonstrated in
both the theoretical literature (Baldwin, 1985; Mastanduno,
1985) and in particular case studies (e.g., Knorr, 1975; a.
Lake, 1977). Irrespective of the actual substantive impact
of controls, foreign policy export controls can also be used
for symbolic and expressive purposes. Such controls can be
used to express disapproval of an action of a target state
and, in the tradition of American idealism, they can be used
as symbols of moral sanction in the society of states
(Galtung, 1967; Jentleson, 1986). These types of controls
can be distinguished from narrow strategic export controls
where the sole purpose is to deny or delay improvements in
the military capabilities of an adversary. Such controls
prohibit the export of items that make a direct and specific
contribution to a target states' military capabilities.
Debates over issues such as the conceptual
distinction, characteristics, substance, and legitimacy of
foreign policy export controls and strategic export controls
are germane to this project. As we will see these issues
are important for understanding the lines of disagreement
over export controls and over technology transfer
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regulations on both the inter-allied and domestic levels.
Some scholars have argued that the alliance collaborative
policy program has taken various forms over time from
foreign policy controls to strategic controls. Some of
these scholars have done work explaining the rise and
decline of these various forms of export control policy and
contrasting the policy strategy advocated by each of the
allied states (Mastanduno, 1985) .
The Lacuna
Recent research has attempted to explain and assess
the political, economic, and perceptual factors influencing
Western alliance collaboration on export control policy.
While this past work can be categorized in a number of ways,
for the present purposes of analytical clarity, I will argue
that three theoretical approaches are articulated. The
first approach is a modified structuralist explanation. To
account for the dynamics of collaboration, this approach
focuses mainly on the distribution of power in the
international system. This approach also assesses the
factors in the structural distribution of power that
determine the United States policy preference and analyzes
the willingness of the United States to exercise leadership
in the multilateral export control program (Mastanduno, 1985
and 1988; Crawford and Lenway, 1985).
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The second approach is a market explanation. This
approach focuses on Western competition for Eastern European
markets as the main explanatory factor of the dynamics of
conflict on multilateral export controls. It is a type of
interest group theory approach in that it accounts for
policy formation and change and alliance cooperation and
discord in reference to the role and interests of particular
societal groups in domestic level power games (Vernon, 1979;
Bertsch, 1985 and 1988; Jentleson, 1986).
The third approach is an institutionalist explanation.
This view focuses on the interests, position, and role of
players in intra-governmental and transgovernmental power
games to account for the dynamics of policy formation and
change and inter-allied collaboration (Bertsch, 1983, 1985
and 1988; Crawford, 1982 and 1988; Mclntyre, 1988; Elliott,
1988; Long, 1988 and 1989).
Some of the work done on alliance collaboration on
this issue and recent developments in international
relations theory offer evidence to support the use of a
fourth approach: discourse analysis (Adler-Karlsson, 1968;
Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984; Jentleson, 1986; National
Academy of Sciences, 1987; Nau, 1987; Hillenbrand, 1988).
Discourse analysis allows us to analyze the impact of what
Martin Hillenbrand calls the "cultural lag" that has lead t
conflicts over this issue between the United States and its
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European allies. Discourse analysis is an examination of
the production, circulation, and acceptance of
representations - symbols, language, images - that
constitute meaning and that frame policy makers'
understandings of international relations (Foucault, 1972,
1979, 1980; Ashley, 1989; Der Derian, 1987; Der Derian and
Shapiro, 1989; Lapid, 1989). The approach focuses on the
role of contrasting meaning-constitutive representations of
the Soviet Union, of technology, and of the relationship
between technology and security among policymakers at the
domestic and alliance level (Yergin, 1978; Hoffmann, 1981;
Bertsch and Mclntyre 1984 ; Jentleson, 1986; Nau, 1987;
Hillenbrand, 1988; Root, 1988). Yet the relative lack of
attention to the insights of discourse analysis, a branch of
what Robert Keohane calls the "reflective" approach, has
meant ignoring significant factors in United States-Western
European collaboration over export controls (Keohane, 1988;
Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989) . This view assesses United
States-Western European collaboration on technology transfer
controls in terms of how shared understandings, reigning
ideas, and meaning-constitutive representations have framed
the possibilities and the limits of collaboration.
The vast majority of studies that have been done on
post-194 5 United States-Western European technology transfer
regulations have also failed to consider the history of such
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practices in the Western state system. An investigation of
the history of such practices and the discourses that
sustained such practices will allow us to analyze the
relationship between technology transfer control practices
and how policy makers have conceptualized and represented
the relationship between technology, regulations on its
diffusion, and advantage in the state system. In addition,
tracing the history of practices designed to control the
diffusion of technology uncovers the background on which
present cooperation and conflict occurs.
Each of the four approaches, in various forms, have
been drawn upon in isolated studies. This is, however, the
first attempt to consider simultaneously and systematically
the merits of the modified structuralist, market,
institutionalist
, and discourse analysis explanations of
Western alliance collaboration on technology transfer
regulations. A comparison of these perspectives on this
issue will advance our knowledge of elements that underlie
collaboration in this, and possibly other, policy areas
within the Western alliance.
Secondly, this study represents an attempt to employ
discourse analysis in an empirical case study of
international political economy (Keohane, 1987; Biersteker,
1989) . The goal is not to delineate a concrete discourse
analysis research program that can in turn be placed
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alongside rationalist research programs for the purpose of a
definitive adjudication. Discourse analysis is not offered
as a powerful new theory that can surpass all others in its
ability to answer questions about cases of international
collaboration. As Richard Ashley points out, this
perspective in fact eschews such a promise and in that sense
problematizes the search for such a theory. Discourse
analysis shows the problems with explanations of
international collaboration "that arrest ambiguity and
control the proliferation of meaning by imposing a standard
and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed
and independent of the time it represents" (Ashley, 1989)
.
This approach should be seen then as a mode of
interpretation that resists the move to arrest ambiguity in
the name of parsimony. Discourse analysis acknowledges the
complexity of accounting for the factors that have given
rise to conflict and cooperation in this area of
international relations. One of the aims of this project is
to contrast this approach, informed by recent work in
continental philosophy and literary theory, with some
research programs that have dominated the field of
international political economy. Comparing these approaches
will test their relative merit in explaining and elucidating
significant elements in United States-Western European
interactions on export control policy. This will not only
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illuminate important elements in this particular case, but
it aims to raise theoretical issues concerning approaches
employed in the study of world politics.
Security. A11i.es and Technology Transfer;
Four Modes of Interpretation
Modified Structuralism
Modified structuralism rests on three basic
assumptions: the international system is anarchic rather
than hierarchic; it is characterized by interaction among
units with similar functions; and the distribution of
capabilities across the states in the system varies over
time (Waltz, 1979). Simply put, states are seen as unitary
rational actors that are guided by their interests in
determining strategies to gain desired ends on the basis of
calculations about their relative position in the
international system.
The most parsimonious version of this approach views
the distribution of capability as the principle determinant
of outcomes in state interactions at the system level
(Waltz, 1979). Resources are fungible (Wolfers, 1962;
Knorr, 1970) in that "they can be used to achieve results on
any of a variety of issues without significant loss of
efficacy" (Keohane, p. 147, 1986). Adherents to this
paradigm split over the relationship between system
stability and the distribution of capability. One
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hypothesis holds that hegemony - disproportionate advantage
in capability combined with the willingness and ability to
exercise leadership
- on the part of one state results in a
more stable international system than a system with a
roughly balanced distribution of power among several
first-rank states (Organski, 1968; Kindleberger
,
1973;
Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1981; Gilpin, 1982). This high
structuralism is modified by scholars who move away from the
system level to account for how actors acquire preferences
or perceptions of interest. Cooperation in the formation
and maintenance of international regimes requires leadership
(a willingness as well as an ability to act) on the part of
one preponderant state in the form of setting standards of
conduct, getting other states to observe such standards
through the use of punishments and rewards, and assuming a
disproportionate cost in defending regimes in times of
crisis (Krasner, 1983). A shift in the distribution of
capability, away from hegemony, can set off changes in
states' policies leading to regime instability. According to
high structuralism, Western alliance collaboration on export
controls waxes and wanes in response to the distribution of
these structural determinants. According to a modified view,
changes in the system distribution of relative power, along
with changes in the United States' role and willingness to
provide leadership, can explain whether or not cooperation
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or discord will obtain on multilateral export controls
(Mastanduno, 1988). It can also explain the strength or
weakness of alliance states' commitments to the COCOM
program.
Michael Mastanduno of the modified structuralist
school has argued that the key factor influencing alliance
states' collaboration on technology transfer controls in
COCOM is the willingness of the United States to: a)
maintain the integrity of the control process; b) set a
domestic example; c) minimize the administrative burden of
controls; and d) obtain the cooperation of key non-COCOM
suppliers of controlled technologies (Mastanduno, 1988) . He
evaluates the willingness and ability of the United States
to provide these elements of leadership in several
historical periods of alliance collaboration. He claims
that COCOM strength, defined in terms of the commitment of
alliance states to maintain a collaborative strategic
embargo, is a function of United States leadership. COCOM
strength is assessed in terms of four factors: a) embargo
exception requests; b) enforcement of the embargo, meaning
the willingness of states to devote resources and effort to
prevent, or hamper the illegal diversion of controlled
items; c) the degree of shared interpretation of items that
should belong on the control list; and d) the general
attitude of member governments regarding the COCOM effort as
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an integral part of a national security strategy
(Mastanduno, 1988). He takes these factors and attempts to
show that COCOM was weak in the 1970s, but that it gained
renewed strength in the 1980s. These turns, Mastanduno
argues, were the result of the nature of United States
leadership. His argument deserves a reappraisal in this
project because it is an attempt to account for the dynamics
of collaboration through a type of modified structuralist
interpretation. His argument modifies high structuralism in
that he contends that despite relative shifts in the system
distribution of power the United States had the ability, but
not the willingness, to provide leadership in the 1970s; in
the 1980s it had both. According to Mastanduno a congruence
of interests in the alliance along with United States
leadership are essential to maintain the strength of the
multilateral export control program.
A subset of this approach distinguishes between the
overall interstate power distribution and the distribution
of power within particular issue areas (Keohane and Nye,
1977) . The distribution of power within particular areas
may vary independently from the system level distribution.
In addition, power may not be fungible across areas. Shifts
in the issue-specific relative power structure can,
according to this view, set off policy changes regarding the
particular regime (Odell, 1982). According to this view the
32
-on are
dynamics of United States-Western European collaborate
explained by changes in the United States' relative position
in the distribution of the development and production of
high technology with dual-use potential. The decline of the
United States government's resources in this area alters the
terms of collaboration as states and firms recalculate their
interests and hence, the costs of compliance with East-West
export controls in high technology areas.
Recent work in micro-economic theories of contested
exchange complements the modified structuralist perspective.
A micro-economic model of contested exchange provides unique
insights into the instruments by which a preponderant state
attempts to extract compliance from states and firms for a
preferred policy strategy. This is particularly helpful for
understanding the strategy of preponderant states in a
program that requires a coordinate policy endeavor. Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis have constructed a model that
demonstrates the relationship between the instruments by
which buyers induce proper seller behavior in the exchange
of goods that are subject to contested exchange (Bowles,
1987; Bowles and Gintis, 1988). An exchange is considered
contested when there is some form of conflict of interest
between agents and when some aspect of the goods exchanged
possesses an attribute that is valuable to the buyer and is
at the same time difficult to measure or otherwise not
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subject to determinate contractual specification (Bowles and
Gintis, 1988 : 147) .
Bowles and Gintis have shown that buyers ensure
desired seller behavior, or determine the ex post terms of
an exchange of a contested good, by offering the seller a
strategic rent. This rent is a strategy of claim
enforcement on the part of the buyer because it increases
the cost of contract termination for the seller. Thus in
the case of labor, where an employer offers a wage in
exchange for which the employee offers not some fully
specifiable pro quo
, but only a promise to perform at an
adequate level of intensity and care, the strategic rent
along with contingent contract renewal acts as a discipline
mechanism (Bowles and Gintis, 1988). The strategic rent in
this case can take a number of forms, such as a wage higher
than the competitive equilibrium. In addition to the
strategic rent and the threat of contract non-renewal the
agent-buyer develops surveillance systems to determine
whether or not the good, in this case labor, has been
delivered with the promised level of intensity and care.
Bowles and Gintis set out to demonstrate that in liberal
societies, where political instruments for the enforcement
of the terms of an economic transaction available to
economic agents are limited, an economic cost-minimizing
combination of surveillance systems and contingent contract
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renewal, made effective by strategic rents, serve as
strategies of claim enforcement for agents such as employers
and financial investors (Bowles and Gintis, 1988).
Strategic rents persist in competitive equilibrium because
they result from the competitive optimizing behavior of
agent-buyers (Bowles and Gintis p. 147, 1988).
The fact that issues of power are bound up in economic
relations is not a revelation to scholars of international
political economy. Economists have begun to apply this
model to international trade. Kiaran Honderich, for
example, has applied this model to international trade by
showing how Japan used strategic rents to reduce the
possibility of United States protectionism (Honderich,
1989). What is important about Bowles and Gintis' model for
this project is what it can demonstrate about the dynamics
of United States-Western European collaboration on
technology transfer controls.
This model can provide a framework for analyzing the
relationship between the instruments that United States
policy elites have used to attempt to extract compliance for
preferred policy positions in the multilateral program. If
we recognize that COCOM is an informal organization
affording no recourse to formal measures to ensure
compliance in agreements or to sanction defectors, then we
can demonstrate how a combination of surveillance systems,
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contingent contract renewal, and rents serves as a strategy
to extract and ensure compliance on agreements and to obtain
concessions on particular issues in COCOM negotiations.
Based on this theory we could tell the story of the
history of this collaboration in the following way. Limiting
Eastern Bloc access to Western technology required Western
European collaboration. With a preponderance of resources
at the outset, the United States was able to offer
participation or enforcement rents to Western European
states. Enforcement rents in this case could have taken a
number of forms: access to relatively inexpensive advanced
technological goods and know-how, Marshall Plan aid,
government contracts for firms whose governments agreed to
prevent the sale of technology to the East. While political
consensus, on some level, has existed on the need to have a
multilateral strategic export control program, there has
always been a "control threshold" beyond which alliance
states resisted what they considered to be excessive
controls (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988) . There have also been
costs, forgoing trade with the East in certain areas, to
following the United States lead in this program. At the
outset of the multilateral program the provisions of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle
Act)
,
formalized contingent contract renewal in that it
required the termination of economic assistance and other
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privileges to allied states found exporting controlled
technologies to the Eastern Bloc. The United States also
set up the Office of Export Control in 1949 with a system of
export licenses and used its intelligence networks for
surveillance to gauge compliance in this instance of
contested exchange. The agencies charged with oversight on
export controls developed lists of known and suspected
violators of these regulations. These instruments remain
embedded in the United States export control administration.
The diffusion of technological production capability
and know-how among industrialized states and firms has
altered the international distribution of high technology
goods production. This has transformed the efficiency of
the initial United States governments' mix of surveillance
mechanisms, enforcement rents, and "contingent contract
renewal" as instruments used to ensure compliance from
states and firms on export control agreements. Enforcement
rents offered for compliance have become more costly and the
possibility of sanctions for defection has become over time
relatively less effective. 2
2Beverly Crawford and Stefanie Lenway have attempted to
identify the conditions under which stable cooperation occurs
by combining regime theory and organizational theory
(Crawford, 1982; Crawford and Lenway, 1985). They argue that
the erosion of United States preponderance and a relatively
more equal distribution of power undermines compliance
strategies and produces a shared compromise approach to the
construction of policy collaboration in this area. Their case
study is the 1982 pipeline dispute. Instruments for a
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In the early 1980s compliance rents available to the
United States were disappearing or were becomming more
costly. in this context the Reagan Administration moved to
invigorate the unilateral surveillance program with the
intention of extracting compliance from the allies on a
refortif ication of the multilateral control program. As the
distribution of capability in this issue area shifted, the
United States attempts to refortify its relatively eroded
enforcement rent system by invigorating its surveillance
program. This serves to increase the possibility of
detecting defectors from agreements or firms diverting
controlled items to actors subject to regulation. The
enforcement rent system could have functioned effectively
with a somewhat less vigilant surveillance system in the
past because of United States preponderance and because
Western European firms and states did not have alternative
suppliers or effective replacement rents. The intensity and
extent of United States vigilance on technology transfers
becomes a function of the cost and effectiveness of rents
and the vulnerability of states and firms to the sanction of
compliance extraction strategy are, however, still at the
disposal of the United States through the structure and
statues of the unilateral export administration program. This
model can help to explain the dynamics and the consequences of
the use of these instruments by the United States in the
1980s.
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rent withdrawal for non-compliance or defection from the
agreement
.
As will be discussed below the response of the United
States in this situation of decline might be regarded as
counter-intuitive or non-optimizing. The reconstitution of
these instruments in the early 1980s, however, is a
continuation of the overall compliance extraction strategy
embedded in the United States unilateral export control
program. Moreover the level of compliance that the United
States desired from the allies in the early 1980s was
determined not by optimizing calculations, but the level of
desired compliance was established in terms of what we will
describe as the absolutist discourse.
In the "absolutist model" set out below (figure 1)
compliance (C)
,
defined in terms of the willingness of
actors to conform to the United States policy position on
technology transfer controls and to expend resources and
devote effort to prevent the illegal transfer of controlled
technologies, is a function of the threat of contract
non-renewal and a combination of enforcement rents (r) and
surveillance (s)
. As shown in the graph below, enforcement
rent effectiveness is eroded over time (t) producing a shift
in the optimal combination of surveillance and rents to
extract compliance. The result is a shift out on the Y axis.
This means that the cost and intensity of surveillance
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Fig. 1:1. "The Absolutist Model": Contested exchanged
model and the dynamics of compliance extraction on
multilateral export controls.
Note: In the model set out above compliance (c)
, defined in
terms of the "willingness" of actors to conform to the
United States policy position on particular controls, to
comply with agreements on controls, and to expend resources
and devote effort to prevent the diversion of controlled
technologies, is a function of enforcement rents (r) , the
threat of their withdrawal and surveillance (s) . In the
graph above, enforcement rents are eroded over time (t)
producing a shift in the combination of surveillance and
rents to extract compliance. The result is a shift out on
the axes. The United States attempts to extract compliance
at a level determined in absilute terms with greater
resource outlays and increased vigilance on surveillance.
As discussed in the chapter this acts as an endogenous
factor accelerating (l) the erosion of enforcement rents as
firms and states (rent-takers) turn to alternative suppliers
and their next best alternative. Underlying problem = c
(r,s); minimize B(udget) subject to C > CA . (B = P
s
S + P
r
R) . Pr = Price of imposing a rent of a given amount. P
s
=
Price of surveillance (ri = > st).
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increases in relation to the decline of the effectiveness of
rents and in relation to an increase in the price of
imposing a rent.
This "abolutist model" shows the consequences of using
these instruments in a compliance extraction strategy.
While the effectiveness of enforcement rents has been
undermined exogenously, attempts to strengthen the
compliance extraction system by increasing the intensity and
extent of surveillance-which can make withdrawal threats
more creditable-acts as an endogenous factor accelerating
the erosion of available rents and increasing the cost of
imposing a rent. This is the case because the costs of
being exposed to the United States intensified surveillance
system and the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal, for
foreign firms and states, begins to outweigh the benefit of
accepting rents. This becomes the case as alternative
sources of supply arise and as Eastern European markets
present more opportunities. Western European states in this
case attempt to reassert autonomy by encouraging the
development of indigenous technology, by passing laws to
protect against the United States legal authority to
withdraw rents and by moving to collective intra-European
bargaining positions on East-West trade and export control
policy. Firms attempt to reduce exposure by turning to
alternative suppliers and by designing products around
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United States technology (National Academy of Sciences,
1987). What this means is that where enforcement rent
being eroded exogenously, relying on this coercive system
may bring about compliance from actors in the short term; in
the long term it accelerates the decline of the original
basis of power in multilateral negotiations on export
control policy and risks serious damage to United States
commercial interests.
In contrast to the "absolutist model" (Figure 1:1) the
"optimizing model" (Figure 1:2) depicts a cost minimizing
strategy. in this case the United States would maxamize the
net benefits of these instruments by extracting compliance
at a level determined by an optimal combination of available
rents and surveillance. The level of desired compliance is
set exogenously under the terms of the absolutist discourse.
In order to empirically verify the applicability of
this model we would have to be able to identify the
enforcement rents and their recipients. We would have to
specify who will be hurt and how much by their withdrawal
and whether or not they have an attractive next best
alternative. If enforcement rents could be reduced to
inter-governmental aid transfers then the equation would be
rather simple. They cannot, however, because enforcement
rents can take a number of forms (access to military
technology, to defense department contracts, to supplies of
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Fig 1:2 "The Optimizing Model": In this model the level
of compliance (C & CJ shifts in proportion to the optimal
combination of rents (r) and surveillance (s) . Reduced
rents lowers the marginal effect of surveillance on
compliance thereby reducting optimal surveillance from s o
to
(r = > s )
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specific products and technologies) and can be directed at
both firms and governments. Beyond that, acquiring this data
is made difficult by the fact that the dynamics of
negotiations on multilateral policy are not made public.
Measuring the extent and consequences of an enforcement rent
system on West-West trade is also made more difficult by the
fact that Western firms, tend to avoid public discussions of
its impact due to the importance of the United States market
and technology (National Academy of Sciences, 1987)
.
There is an abundance of suggestive evidence showing
that this model has explanatory power in terms of the
dynamics of United States attempts to enforce its preferred
position with COCOM and non-COCOM states and firms. The
first Reagan Administration tried to bring allied states in
line with the United States position on increasing the
restrictiveness of multilateral export controls. The
Administration intensified surveillance programs to gauge
compliance; and there were allegations that the United
States used the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal in an
attempt to enforce its position with Western firms. For
example, in 1982 Richard Perle indicated that United States
military technology was withheld from certain allies until
they agreed to strengthen their domestic export control
programs (Mastanduno, 1985) . In addition, several scholars
as well as the 1987 study by the National Academy of
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Sciences have indicated that Western European policy makers
and business executives are cognizant of and resistant to
the threat of enforcement rent withdrawal and the costs of
being subject to the United States surveillance system
(Crawford and Lenway, 1985; Jacobsen, 1985; Bertsch, 1988).
According to Bertsch and Elliott, for example, during the
1982-1984 COCOM list review in which a compromise was struck
on computer hardware, computer software, and
telecommunications equipment, the United States nad
threatened to cut Britain off from supplies of United States
technology unless Britain tightened its export control
enforcement practices. In addition, the compromise Britain
and other COCOM states made with the United States meant
that a number of Western European firms were forced to scrap
East-West trade deals. Bertsch and Elliott say that Britain
agreed to the compromise "not only for the sake of alliance
unity, but also for more pragmatic economic reasons that
transcended the interests of any particular firms, no matter
what their resources" (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988) . There
have been a number of other allegations that the compromises
worked out in the 1982-1984 talks were made possible in part
by United States threats to deny technology and defense
contracts to COCOM states and firms who resisted the
refortification of controls (Woolcock, 1983; Schaffer,
1985) . Contrary to the view that these compromises
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represented an alliance consensus to strengthen the program
no matter what the economic costs, this model demonstrates
the instruments that were available to the United States to
attempt to extract concessions on particular issues. This
model also demonstrates instruments that the United States
has used to enforce Western firms' compliance with export
controls
.
This enforcement rent system can also be applied to
explain the United States approach to extracting compliance
on export controls from non-COCOM states and firms. As
Mastanduno points out, when diversions of controlled
technology to the East through Austria in the early 1980s
were identified, United States officials said that Austrians
would be left with only "pastries and 1950s machinery" if
they did not tighten restrictions on technology transfer
controls (Mastanduno, 1985) . As a direct result of United
States threats to withdraw enforcement rents, the Austrians,
out of what they referred to as economic necessity, agreed
not only to cooperate with U.S. Customs Service surveillance
programs, but also passed domestic legislation that
established more effective domestic controls on technology
transfers to the East. The United States has also turned to
this enforcement rent system to extract compliance from
other non-COCOM states and firms. The United States has
used this type of strategy to assure COCOM member states
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that the trade their firms would forego by complying with
multilateral controls would not be filled by non-COCOM
suppliers (Interview, Paris, November, 1990)
.
A number of studies have demonstrated the costs of
coercion strategies in extracting compliance on broadening
the multilateral export control program (Mastanduno, 1985;
Jentleson, 1986) . These studies have shown how allied
political resolve and domestic resistance have helped to
undermine such strategies, particularly in the case of the
Siberian gas pipeline dispute. The contested exchange model
shows the potential detrimental long-term consequences of a
compliance extraction strategy. It also demonstrates in a
broader and more parsimonious way the inter-relationship of
instruments that have been used in an attempt to extract and
to enforce compliance with multilateral export control
agreements from COCOM and non-COCOM states and firms. In
addition, the model offers a conceptual framework for
analyzing instruments available to the United States for
attempting to extract concessions on particular issues in
COCOM negotiations. This framework allows us then to make
sense of the move to refortify United States surveillance
programs in the early 1980s as an integral part of a broader
enforcement rent system that had served to lace multilateral
control collaboration together in the past.
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The Market. Fvpianatinn
The market perspective focuses on Western competition
for Eastern European markets as the primary factor
explaining the dynamics of United States-Western European
conflict and cooperation on East-West export controls. This
approach will be developed as essentially a group theory
perspective that emphasizes domestic interest-group
configurations as the decisive element in explaining the
limits to cooperation and the source of conflict at the
international level (Truman, 1951; Macridis, 1977; George,
1980; Hall, 1988)
.
The political process, according to this view, is
dominated by interest group activities. This perspective
downplays the role of central state actors and sees
government policy as the result of bargaining and
competition among interest groups. According to this view
the line between domestic and international politics is
blurred; foreign policy has domestic roots and conseguences
(Gourevitch, 1986; Hall, 1987; Putnam, 1988). The emphasis
here, then, is on the constellation of domestic actors
standing to benefit from either cooperation in or defection
from alliance coordination of technology transfer and export
control policy. This approach thus considers which groups
are affected, how these groups are affected, and what they
do to advance their interests in terms of these policies.
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Changes in the mix of group interests converging on alliance
governments from the domestic political scene are expected
to bring about pressures to change policies if these new
groups stand to benefit from such changes. Outcomes are
thus explicated by showing how these groups entered into
political coalitions, at various times, to influence
officials and alter policy (Katzenstein
,
1976).
Gary Bertsch argues that pluralism accounts for the
politics of United States export control policy (Bertsch,
1985)
.
Like others dealing with economic foreign policy
issues he argues that in the last two decades, with the
"weakening of presidential power after Vietnam and
Watergate," the political process on export control policy
has become increasingly pluralistic; "marked by more
political actors and centers of power with access to the
making and implementation of U.S. foreign economic policy"
(Bertsch, 1985; Odell, 1982; Destler and Odell, 1989; Long,
1989)
.
Scholars of comparative foreign and economic policy
have pointed out that among advanced industrialized states
there are significant differences in terms of the strength
of the state, the porousness of state institutions and the
role of societal interest groups in the policy process
(Katzenstein, 1976; Krasner, 1978; Evans, Rueschemeyer , and
Skocpol, 1985; Hall, 1988; Gourevitch, 1988). These
differences present problems for the generalizability of
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pluralist explanations of policy formation and change across
states in the West. Differences in the transparency of the
political processes of foreign economic policy formation in
these states also complicates the empirical verification of
the perspective. Nevertheless specific and identifiable
groups within each of these states are affected by and have
taken an active interest in export control and technology
transfer policy. In the past this has included a wide array
of groups from commercial interest groups to groups with
particular ideological agendas. What is often more
difficult than determining what groups are affected and how
is assessing the steps that these groups take to shore up
and protect their interests. The question is to what degree
is United States-Western European cooperation and conflict a
result of the convergence, or divergence, of the interest of
domestic groups with the capability and will to influence
government policy on East-West trade? In the past decade
societal level actors have become a much more significant
force in helping to determine the scope of the multilateral
export control program and in constraining the ability of
officials to negotiate inter-allied agreements.
Institutional ism
As the classical theorists Martin Wright and Hedly
Bull and some later regime theorists have pointed out,
institutions in the international society of states can
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encompass more than explicit organizations. We can
conceptualize institutions as taking a number of forms and
existing on a number of levels. There are system-wide
international institutions inherited from the Western state
system, such as the balance of power or diplomacy. There
are subsystem institutions of various forms and functions,
such as military alliances and economic integration
programs. In addition, there are intra-state institutions
that interact with, affect, and are affected by the
subsystemic and systemic institutions.
The term institutionalism as used here subsumes a
variety of perspectives associated with both intra-
governmental politics models and theories of inter-
governmental relations. "Governments," according to one
variant of this approach, consist of conglomerates of
loosely allied organizations and individuals (Allison,
1971)
.
This perspective, however, also rejects the
pluralist view of the state as an epiphenomenal product of
civil society, simply reflecting a conglomeration of
societal characteristics or preferences (Krasner, 1978)
.
Individuals and institutions within the state, according to
this view, are able to resist societal pressures for policy
change that may run counter to their interests or
established understandings of the national interest. Some
scholars drawing on this framework have concluded that the
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executive branch has dominated the process of policy
formation in export control and technology transfer issues
(Long, 1988 and 1989; Elliott, 1988; Mclntyre, 1988).
The institutionalist and the pluralist perspectives
have been set up as two alternative explanations of the
formation and change of states' domestic and foreign policy
(Krasner, 1978; Odell, 1981; Gowa, 1983; Hall, 1988). in
this project I employ these perspectives to interpret the
dynamics of international collaboration, evaluating how
these domestic level factors affect inter-allied cooperation
and conflict. Bracketing out domestic level considerations
has been an accepted move among some international relations
scholars. This step is often justified for the sake of
parsimony. We do need to limit the field of possible
variables to explain an international event or the dynamics
and outcome of bargaining on an issue. As Hedly Bull (1968)
has pointed out, however, the demand for tidiness and
intellectual cleanliness often sacrifices a consideration of
the complexity and intractability of international
relations. In this project I open up the domestic level
black box, to a degree, recognizing that this move could
open a "pandora's box" of analytical and empirical puzzles.
The aim, however, is to provide a "thick description" of the
conditions and pressures that lead to cooperation and
discord in this area of alliance inter-action (Geertz, 1973;
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Ruggie, 1982 and 1990). I agree then with John Ruggie in
that I take thick description to be an essential tool of all
interpretive sciences (Ruggie, 1990). m this project I
provide a theoretically informed multilevel reconstruction
of the dynamics of collaboration.
The first variant of the institutionalist approach
sees governments as consisting of existing organizations,
each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and
programs. Existing organizational routines circumscribe the
effective options open to political leaders and can deflect
societal pressures for policy change. Policy orders are
ground through various apparatuses of government that may
distort or alter initial intentions by employing old
routines
.
Stephen Elliott (1988) and William Long (1989) have
demonstrated that in the United States the executive branch
has historically dominated the policy process on export
control and technology transfer policy. They also argue
that most of the agencies charged with responsibility for
these policies operate on principles that reflect the cold
war environment in which they were constructed. According
to this perspective each agency involved in the export
control and technology transfer policy process attempts to
push policy in the direction indicated by its own program
(Janis, 1968; Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1972; Stienbruner,
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1974; Art, 1974; Destler, 1980; Odell, 1981).
Responsibility for export control is often spread out among
several agencies. As a result, particularly in the case of
the United States, policy substance can appear self-
contradictory. This occurs when agencies charged with
carrying out the policy have divergent or conflicting
organizational routines that lead to inconsistent policy
outcomes. Such a situation imposes significant limits on
top policy makers' ability to effectively alter policy, or
to negotiate agreements (Nau, 1988). Alliance conflict over
export control policy is more likely the more policy
responsibility is spread out at the domestic level among
agencies with divergent organizational routines (National
Academy of Sciences, 1987; Root, 1988).
The second variant of this approach sees foreign
policy positions as outcomes of bargaining among players
positioned hierarchically within governments (Allison,
1971)
.
The decisions and actions of governments are
analyzed as intra-national bargains resulting from
compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion among
groups of officials who define and perceive export control
and technology transfer policy issues differently. The
individual players in this game are nested within various
agencies that compete with each other for resources and
prestige (Neustadt, 1970) . These players typically seek to
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guard and promote the interests of the agency that they
represent-
-where they stand often depends on where they
sit" (Allison, 1971 and 1975; Allison and Halperin, 1973 ;
Odell, 1981; Hardt, 1983; Freedenburg, 1987).
East-West technology transfer control policy,
according to this variant, represents the outcome of
bargaining among these divided officials (Jentleson, 1986;
National Academy of Science, 1987; Elliott, 1988; Mclntyre,
1988; Hillenbrand, 1988). The dynamics of alliance
collaboration on export controls is explained in reference
to intra-governmental bargaining. For example, the State
Department's ability to negotiate a community of common
controls is tied to the nature of intra-agency negotiations
with the Defense and the Commerce Departments (Root, 1988)
.
The Department of Defense has consistently advocated a more
restrictive approach to export controls. Intra-alliance
cooperation is easier to achieve and to maintain, when the
State Department or the Commerce Department, advocating a
less restrictive approach, have control over the nature and
scope of United States export control and technology
transfer policy. John Mclntyre has pointed out that for a
number of reasons over the past fifteen years the
bureaucratic balance of power on COCOM issues has shifted to
the Department of Defense. According to this perspective,
United States-Western European conflict occurs as a result
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of a situation in which agencies that hold a preponderance
of power in alliance states' intra-governmental politics
over export control are at variance over the form and
function of such controls.
The third variant of this approach focuses on
transgovernmental linkages between middle and lower-level
bureaucrats (Neustadt, 1970; Keohane and Nye, 1972 and
1977)
.
According to this view, government bureaucrats and
specialists in other areas working together in the same
functional issue context can develop common expertise and
consensual understandings in the process of addressing
policy coordination and problem solving (E. Haas, 1975,
1980, 1983; P. Haas, 1989). This type of interaction in
turn can lead to more flexible bargaining and more extensive
cooperation. Peter Haas has demonstrated how groups of
transnational specialists in the scientific community that
form what he calls epistimic communities can influence or
shape intra-governmental policy collaboration.
Transgovernmental links can thus affect national policies as
coalitions arise that turn consensual understandings back
into domestic policy processes in the form of knowledge,
information, and pressure (Keohane and Nye, 1977; E. Haas,
Williams, and Babai, 1977; Adler, 1986; P. Haas, 1989).
Western alliance cooperation on export controls might
be explained, according to this view, with reference to the
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nature and evolution of such transgovernmental linkages.
Therefore, the perspective raises the following questions:
Does ongoing policy collaboration within COCOM result in
more extensive consensual understandings and thus greater
cooperation among transgovernmental bureaucrats and
specialists? Have shifts in the locus of alliance states'
policy negotiations on export controls (away from
bureaucrats and specialists charged with responsibility for
ongoing collaboration in COCOM)
, resulted in greater United
States-Western European instability in the collaborative
program (Crawford, 1988; Hardt, 1988; Root, 1988;
Hillenbrand, 1988)?
Discourse Analysis
Calling discourse analysis an approach does not do
justice to the multiplicity of its variations and styles
(e.g., Foucault, 1972, 1979, 1980; Barthes, 1974; Ruggie,
1976, 1982 and 1989; Odell, 1981; Kartochwil and Ruggie,
1986; Ashley, 1986; Elshtain, 1986; Der Derian, 1987; Der
Derian and Shapiro, 1989; ISQ September 1990). Because
discourse analysis came late to the discipline I will
provide a detailed articulation of the perspective.
Discourse analysis, in a general sense, concerns the
significance of "modes of reality making" for understanding
international cooperation and conflict. It is also
examination of the circulation of influence between
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representations, perceptions, and policy prescriptions and
state practices. it also involves an examination of the
production, circulation, and acceptance of representations-
symbols, language, and images-that constitute meaning and
frame understandings of international relations. The
circulation and acceptance of "meaning constitutive
representations" makes possible, legitimates, and shapes
particular policies and precludes others (Shapiro, 1989).
The approach focuses on the role of contrasting
meaning-constitutive representations, among alliance states'
policy elites. This includes representation of the nature
of the Soviet threat, of strategic technology and Western
security and of the relationship between East-West trade and
Western security interests (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984 ;
Jentleson, 1986; Hillenbrand, 1988; Root, 1984 and 1988).
According to this view, meaning and value are imposed
on the world: "structured not by one's immediate
consciousness, or in correspondence to a reality, but by
various reality-making scripts one inherits, or acquires
from one's surrounding cultural, historical, and linguistic
condition" (Shapiro, p. 11, 1989) . Discourse analysis
places an emphasis on intertextuality . A text is a field in
which words, bits of codes, formulae, fragments of social
languages, and representations meet (Barthes, p. 32, 1981).
All texts are polysemic in that they are spaces where the
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paths of several possible meanings and several discourses
intersect. Any text is thus an intertext - a multi-
dimensional space in which a variety of discourses blend and
clash (Der Derian, 1989). International relations,
international theory, and the terrain on which debates occur
about export control policy, can all be read as such a space
- as a text. Understandings of international relations,
events, and situations are mediated through and contingent
upon representational practices. The various perspectives
deployed in relation to international relations, in order to
explain an international situation or in order to defend a
policy option do not always have a power outside of the
space or time they seek to represent. They are dependent
for their intelligibility, meaning, and power on the
structure and circulation of past discourses that construct
and mediate understandings of international relations.
The notion of discourse implies a concern with the
significance of how meaning and value producing
representations are bound up in language and with power. A
discourse is something more than language as a code. It is
a type of utterance that entails representational practices
that do not merely "reflect" its object, but organize it and
subject it to transformation (Todorov, 1984). Such
practices - styles, grammars, rhetorics, and narrativity -
entail systems of meaning and value that constitute and
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legitimate particular policies and collaborative endeavors
(Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989)
.
Discourses are reinforced and renewed by, and
reinforce and renew, a whole strata of institutional
supports such as pedagogy, organizational processes, and
administrative systems of categorization and standardized
procedures. In that sense then they function as systems of
inclusion and exclusion, and empowerment and disempowerment
.
The focus of this analysis is on the representational
practices of discourses within which the multilateral export
control program is embedded. United States-Western European
collaboration on export controls is thus assessed in terms
of how shared understandings, reigning ideas, and meaning-
constitutive representations frame the possibilities and
limits of cooperation (Habermas, 1971, 1987; Ruggie, 1975,
1982; Odell, 1981; Larson, 1985). This assessment can be
done by tracing representational practices that constitute
certain policies as legitimate for the protection of
national and alliance security. Significant elements of
United States- Western European conflict on this issue are
uncovered by analyzing how the boundaries of contrasting
outlooks on the appropriate nature and function of
multilateral export controls relate to various
representational practices found in the discourse of
alliance states' policy makers.
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These "modes of reality making- are bound up in
scripts or inherited in pre-texts of apprehension, such as
national and cultural histories, generational experiences,
and forms of professional education and training. They are
embedded in the various discourses of states'
representatives who engage in negotiations on policy
collaboration. The production, circulation, and acceptance
of certain dominant meaning-constitutive representational
practices establishes a common pre-text for shared notions
of legitimacy. The extent to which the diversity or
plurality of discourses is subordinated to a common or
dominate discourse establishes the permissive environment
and structures the nature and scope of a collaborative
policy effort.
United States-Western European conflict on this issue
is explained in reference to the boundaries of contrasting
outlooks, to various representational practices, and how
these relate to reality-making scripts inherited from
cultural, historical, and linguistic experiences (Foucault,
1972, 1979, 1980; Der Derian, 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro,
1989; Elshtain and Der Derian, 1987). Discourse analysis in
this case lays stress on the following: the influence of
Western Europe's geographical propinquity with Eastern
Europe; Western Europe's stronger traditional trade ties
with Eastern Europe; each ally's past experiences with
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practices of economic diplomacy; representational practices
relating to the image of the Enemy-Other; differences in the
conceptualization of the relationship between technology,
security, and power; and preconceptions regarding the nature
of Great Power competition. In this sense discourse
analysis complements and enriches the geo-political
perspective and studies of the role of perception.
The need for a discourse analysis is evident from
statements made by former State Department official Martin
Hillenbrand. He has argued that "American and Western
European officials have tended to have basically different
attitudes toward Eastern Europe" (Hillenbrand, p. 367,
1988)
.
He speculates on the source of these differences in
attitude citing Western Europe's historical heritage,
cultural links, and geographical propinquity with Eastern
Europe. Hillenbrand says that these "differences in
outlook" lay at the heart of the United States-Western
European disagreements over East-West trade and export
control policy and that a "cultural lag" exists. United
States attempts to pressure Western European states into
conformity with its perception of Eastern Europe, he argues,
have accentuated definitional and interpretation differences
regarding the function and substance of technology transfer
controls
.
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Henry Nau and William Root, both former United State
government officials involved in negotiations on allianc
technology transfer control collaboration, have also pointed
to the significance of divergences of perceptions in the
West over the nature of the Soviet threat and over the
relationship between East-West economic activities and the
East-West strategic conflict (Root, 1988; Nau, 1989). Nau
argues that consensus and turbulence in the inter-allied and
intra-national policy processes can be traced to contrasting
interpretations of these issues. Though not a discourse
analyst, Stanley Hoffmann has argued that apparent drifts
in Western alliance interpretations of the Soviet Union and
discord over policies to protect Western security, can be
traced to fundamental perceptual divergences. He says, for
example, that differences in historical experiences in the
conduct of the "game of nations" and differences in national
character and political culture are important factors in
explaining the dynamics of United States-Western European
collaboration on East-West economic and security policy
(Hoffmann, 1981) . Discourse analysis picks up where Hoffman
leaves off.
Gary Bertsch and John Mclntyre have also attempted to
provide more well-defined criteria for evaluating the impact
of the divergence of perceptions in alliance collaboration
on East-West export controls. They examine the divergence
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of perception over the Soviet threat and over the
appropriate relationship between trade and security concerns
on export control collaboration through a case study
(Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984). They take the state as the
unit of analysis and argue that there are national
approaches to these issues that can be associated with
governments conceived as unitary actors. Using Daniel
Yergin's nomenclature, they argue that the contrasting
perceptions can be grouped into two "ideal-types": a) Image
I, that posits the Soviet Union as a monolithic world
revolutionary state driven by a single-minded search for
expansion and hegemony with a clear sense of objectives;
and, b) Image II, that sees the Soviet Union as relentlessly
opportunistic, but more in terms of a conventional great
power (Daniel Yergin, 1977; Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984).
Bertsch and Mclntyre draw on several rounds of interviews
with United States and allied governments' officials and
business executives, a systematic canvassing the printed
media of key countries, and an analysis of government
documents (Bertsch and Mclntyre, 1984) . They attempt to
show the relationship between the United States' policy
positions on East-West trade and export control issues and
the acceptance of an Image I perception. They also show the
relationship between some key Western European states'
positions and the acceptance of Image II perception.
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The discourse analysis approach shares some concerns
with these studies. However, it provides a conceptual and
theoretical framework for evaluating the role of contrasting
"world views" in international collaboration. Discourse
analysis also moves beyond the potentially reductionists
features of the focus on the psychology of perception tc
broader analysis of the relationship between social
constructions, discourses, and policy. Despite the
contributions that have been made to our understanding of
the factors that can lead to conflict and collaboration in
international relations by scholars such as Jervis and
Larson, who use a psychological approach, there has been
little analysis of the role of socio- cultural symbols,
images, and language in the dynamics of international policy
conflict and cooperation.
For the purposes of this project and for the sake of
analytical clarity, I articulate a set of contrasting and
contending discourses in concrete terms. While none of
these have existed in a pure form, I argue that there have
been four contending and at points overlapping discourses in
the history of United States-Western European collaboration
on export controls on East-West trade. There are important
differences between and within each alliance state. I do
not assume, as do Bertsch and Mclntyre, that governments are
unitary rational actors, but rather I contend that the
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discourses outlined below operate at several levels, m
addition, the history of the alliance collaboration on this
issue does not represent a sequential, or teleological path
of discourses, but rather these discourses have been in
contention since the formation of collaboration on export
controls
.
The first is an absolutist discourse. The Soviet
Union is represented as the embodiment of the evil
Enemy-Other. In that sense it is an enchanted discourse.
The world is profoundly Manichean and there are no grounds
for peaceful coexistence or trust with the Soviet bloc.
Within this discourse strategically significant technology
holds a quasi- theological place. The original sense of the
term, technology is fetishized, held up as having magical
powers. Broad controls on the transfer of this high
technology are constructed as necessary for the survival of
the West. In this discourse the technological edge is
represented as the key to the strategic advantage, to
security, and to survival. Strategic advantage is not cast
in a language of geo-political position or in quantitative
terms, but in a lanquage and through images of the space and
speed of technological innovation and lead time gaps
(Virillio, 1986; Der Derian, 1990). These significations
are used in debates to argue for intense vigilance on
East-West technology transfers.
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In addition, trade with the Soviet bloc, in terms of
this discourse, is morally suspect, and non- participation
in the export control program or questioning this
perspective is cast as criminal culpability in undermining
the security of the Western alliance. Finally, this
discourse draws on a language that advocates waging and
winning superpower conflict through economic and
technological means. In that sense it legitimates a policy
of economic warfare: a comprehensive embargo designed to
inflict maximum cost on and to disrupt the Soviet economy.
The United States Department of Defense has most clearly
articulated this discourse at points in the past.
The second is an instrumentalist discourse. This is a
disenchanted technical and scientific discourse. The
discourse draws on representations of the Soviet Union as an
opportunistic great power interested in continuous
aggrandizement. It also draws on the image of
"enlightenment man" capable of engineering political and
social relations through policy instruments made efficient
by scientific techniques and methods. Thus it embodies the
belief that East-West relations can be managed through trade
policy instruments. The West, in other words, can use its
economic and technological advantages in East-West tactical
linkage strategies. Trade inducement can be a carrot, and
trade denial a stick, to obtain desired policies and to
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register approval or disapproval. The United States state
Department and the NSC have most clearly articulated this
discourse at points in the past.
The third and fourth are neo-kantian discourses (Kant,
1790; Bull, 1977), liberal and conservative perspectively
.
Both neo-kantian versions hold to a traditional liberal
enlightenment faith in the ultimate value of commerce. The
conservative neo-kantian discourse evokes images that equate
economic prosperity with the possibility of political
stability and moderation. Liberalizing trade with the East,
including the export of advanced technology and increasing
Eastern economic prosperity, according to this view has
value because it can reduce Soviet insecurity and can help
to stabilize East-West relations. Despite these potential
political side-payments from trade, the neo-kantian
discourse focuses more directly on the images of relative
gains from comparative advantage in liberalized trade. In
that sense then the discourse establishes a conceptual
separation, in East-West trade, of political or security
issues from economic issues. The conservative neo-kantian
discourse does, however, represent the Soviet Union as a
traditional great power in pursuit of its self interest.
Conflict of interest between Great Powers can never be fully
eradicated and thus the discourse legitimates a selective or
narrow strategic embargo of goods that would enhance Soviet
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military capability. The United states Commerce Department
has most clearly articulated this discourse at points in the
past
.
The liberal version of the discourse holds to a more
purely Kantian view in that it draws on images and symbols
of a convergence of East-West political and economic
interests through the "spirit of commerce." it can be an
anti-state discourse that draws on images of the world
economic citizen and a rhetoric that casts suspicion on any
form of intervention in economic interactions.
Each of these discourses can be identified in the past
debates over the nature and function of export and
technology transfer controls. They have framed the
parameters of the policy options on this issue. The
preponderance of any one of these discourses at a particular
point in time meant that more stable collaboration obtained.
The breakdown of the power of shared or common discourse
results in less stability in inter-allied collaboration and
more policy disarray and conflict at the domestic level.
Conclusion
This chapter has defined key terms of reference for
the project, reviewed the relevant literature, and set out
the four approaches that will be used to analyze the history
of Western alliance collaboration on multilateral export
controls. Within each of the chapters on the post-1945
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Western alliance export control program, the power of each
approach to account for the factors and the dynamics of
conflict and cooperation will be considered. The
theoretical approaches drawn on in this study have been used
separately in analyses of United States-Western European
collaboration on East-West export controls. There has not
been any attempt to draw these four approaches together in
assessing the history of this issue. In addition, there has
been no explicit attempt to draw upon or employ contemporary
theoretical work being done on discourses in the examination
of the nature of this collaborative policy area.
Finally, most studies of technology transfer controls
have analyzed the case of COCOM in isolation from the
history of state controls on the diffusion technology. it
is clear that there are unique elements in the post-1945
export control program. Placing this case within the
context of past examples, however, allows us to consider the
shifts that have occurred in the relationship between the
control over the diffusion of technology, state power, and
understandings and the representations of the sources of
state advantage and security in the international system.
Explaining the dynamics of United States-Western
European collaboration in this area no doubt requires a
multilevel analysis. Collaboration has been shaped and has
been transformed as a result of structural, interest group,
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and institutional factors. Conflicts in this area have also
emerged out of divergences in the meaning constitutive
representations embedded in the discourses of alliance
states policy elites charged with forming and negotiating
the terms of the multilateral program. The analysis of the
post-1945 program is designed not only to clarify these
factors, but also to refine the theoretical perspectives and
to test the explanatory strength of the approaches. Before
turning to the post-1945 case, however, we first must
provide the historical context.
CHAPTER II
EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM-THE FORMS AND THE FUNCTIONS OF VIGILANCE
'
An Introduction to Reading Fvpnrf
Control Systems
Reading through the "nitty-gritty" of export control
procedures and administration can have all of the appeal of
a Kafka nightmare. The subtext of debates over the nature
and goals of export control systems, however, can be more
stimulating. The debates can be read as a clash of views
over what gives a state military or economic advantage over
rivals. By analyzing those subtexts, this chapter is
designed, to raise questions about historical
conceptualizations of power and advantage in competition
between states.
The attempt to control the diffusion of material,
instruments, or technology viewed as giving one state
strategic or economic advantage over another is not new in
the international system. This chapter begins by reviewing
some past examples of attempts by states to control the
export of particular items. This includes an assessment of
the types of issues and difficulties raised in the formation
and enforcement of these controls.
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The main focus of the chapter is on nineteenth century
British controls because the administrative structure that
system most resembles the present one. The nineteenth
century British case and the post 1945 case might appear at
first to be dissimilar. The early nineteenth century
British control system was based on mercantilist notions and
was designed to give Britain ongoing economic advantage over
its competitors. The most revealing element of these
systems, however, is the symbolic value of the categories of
goods that are controlled: what they represent (ed) within
the context of competition between states. By looking at
the past in terms of both the language used to defend the
programs and the images and symbols evoked in debates over
the types of items that should be subject to control, it is
possible to assess con-ceptualizations of power and
advantage between states at particular historical junctures.
The Historical Legacy of Export Controls;
Various Forms and Functions
Many states have attempted to control the diffusion of
items, instruments, and know-how that were considered to
give them significant advantage in military or economic
competition with rival powers. There are no examples,
however, of systematic export control programs, with
elaborate administrative apparatuses and enforcement
programs, until the middle of the eighteenth century. The
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rather rudimentary nature of the state apparatus until the
late eighteenth century meant that enforcement of controls
was limited. The British control system, developed in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, was the first
attempt to construct a standardized and systematic export
control and enforcement program. It is useful to bear in
mind earlier examples as reminders that while states have
always attempted to control the export of some items,
systematic export control and enforcement programs could not
exist until the modern period.
One early example is the regulations that China placed
on the export of gun-making designs, guns, and cannons in
the fourteenth century (Pacey, p. 73, 1990; see Alvares,
1980)
.
The Chinese went to great lengths in efforts to
prevent such items or know-how from reaching neighboring
powers. In some cases, however, they were willing to export
these instruments to allies. After experiencing repeated
attacks by Japanese ships in 1370, for example, the Koreans
asked the Ming government to make an exception to their
controls (Pacey, p. 73, 1990). The Chinese refused at
first, but after being attacked by the Japanese themselves,
they agreed to the Korean reguest. The Chinese first sent
guns and material to produce such weapons; then they sent
technicians to Korea to help build ship-mounted guns used to
fire flaming arrows at Japanese vessels. Chinese attempts
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to restrict the diffusion of gun-making methods and designs
seems to have been effective; they apparently devised some
arrangement with Korea as no other countries are known to
have been able to obtain Chinese know-how (Alvares, 1980;
Gille, 1986; Pacey, p. 73, 1990).
The first export control programs in the West were
founded on and enforced by papal indications (Cipolla, p.
93, 1965). These indications emerged during the Crusades
and were designed to prevent items and material considered
to be significant in the ongoing conflicts from being sold
to the Moslem powers, particularly the "Other," the Ottoman-
Turks. Those who sold "strategic materials to the Turks" or
who aided them in the construction or use of implements of
war were subject to excommunication (Cipolla, p. 95, 1965;
see McNeill, 1982; Gille, 1986). This, of course, did not
dissuade the Turks from attempting to attract or to kidnap
skilled Christian workers and gun-founders who knew how to
produce and use cannon. The Ottomans' initial reluctance to
use artillery and their poor cannon production systems were
factors that kept them from being able to overrun
Constantinople for several years (McNeill, 1982). In the
early fourteenth century, however, a Hungarian gun-founder
named Orbanin ignored the papal export control orders and
helped the Turks to build up their cannon production systems
(Cipolla, p. 93, 1965; Pacey, p. 75, 1990). In a matter of
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two to three years the Turks were able to produce a number
of cannons of various caliber including the "Mahometta" that
threw 1,000 pound stoneballs and took 140 oxen to draw.
This increased capability allowed the Turks to complete
their siege of Constantinople and to expand further into
Europe (McNeill, 1982) .
The first of the more systematic efforts to control
the diffusion of items and production techniques emerged
during the intra-European dynastic state conflicts of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These controls focused
on those instruments and production methods regarded as
significant in maintaining military advantage over rival
powers. For example, during the long and intense conflicts
between the Spanish and the Dutch, the Spanish relied on the
gun and cannon design and production of the Low Countries
(McNeill, 1982). As conflicts intensified in the late
sixteenth century, however, the Spanish began to import
British guns and cannons and casting techniques (Kail, 1952;
Schuburt, 1957). Henry VII established an iron industry in
Sussex in Ashdown Forest, Sussex in the latter part of the
fifteenth century. By 1567 an export industry for cannon
and ordnance had emerqed. Better castinq techniques and
the type of iron used in the foundries made British quns
more reliable than those produced in the Low Countries
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(Cipolla, p. 44, 1965), and thus the Spanish attempted to
acquire British products.
The English Court became suspicious of this export
trade, particularly the Spanish purchases in the 1570s. sir
Walter Raleigh warned Queen Elizabeth that "British
technique and product in this area was a jewel of great
value" and asked why should the English "place such a jewel
in the hands of potential enemies?" (Cipolla, p. 44, 1965).
As a result the Queen issued an order in 1574 that
restricted the export of British guns and cannons, the
material used in the production of such instruments, and the
designs or methods of casting such items (Schuburt, p. 67,
1957; Cipolla, p. 45, 1965). The order restricted the
number of cannons and guns to be cast in England to those
"for only the use of the Realm" (Cipolla, p. 45, 1965). A
rudimentary licensing system seems to have been developed in
the latter part of the sixteenth century. The controls were
waived in certain cases, on permission of the Crown,
allowing founders to export ordnance to Protestant powers.
Other Protestant powers with sophisticated ordnance,
the Dutch and the Swedes, also established such controls
(McNeill, p. 147, 1982). In 1615 at the beginning of the
Thirty Years War, Gustavus Adolphus imposed controls on the
export of cannon and other material and production
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techniques to prevent the, from falling into the hands of
his Catholic-Spanish enemies (Cipolla, p. 67, 1965).
As conflicts between the Dutch and the French emerged
in the 1670s, these export controls posed problems for the
French. Following the intense internal conflicts of the
seventeenth century, Richelieu had been able to rebuild the
administrative, military, and political structures of France
(McNeill, 1982; Pacy, 1990). He had not, however, been able
to develop an effective base for the production of arms or
gunpowder (Cipolla, p. 56, 1965). Skilled labor had been
driven from France and the export controls of the other
European states prevented the French from acquiring arms
openly. As a result, the Marquis de Seignelay and Colbert
sent agents into Holland, England, and Sweden to acquire
arms illicitly. In addition, France sent agents into Sweden
to kidnap skilled workers and gun-founders (Cipolla, p. 60,
1965) .
All of the export control programs that existed prior
to the eighteenth century were unsystematic. Administrative
agencies and enforcement programs were minimal and there was
little attempt to rationalize or to standardize controls.
This is of course explained by the fact that the modern
bureaucratic state with its codes of efficiency and systems
of standardization did not emerge full blown there until the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For that reason that
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it is intriguing to look in more detail at the British
export control system of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century. The types of problems that concern us today can be
found in the context of the debates that occurred over the
establishment, enforcement, and continuation of that system.
The Construction o f British Export Pnnt-mi c
James Wheeler, the historian of Manchester, wrote that
the British "inventions and the developments in the woolen,
textile, and the iron and steel industries excited the
admiration and jealousy of all of Europe" (Wheeler, p. 170,
1836). Not only that, but they excited a British desire to
have a monopoly control of these goods. Controls on the
export of machines and tools and the know-how to produce
such instruments developed, as we will see, over time
beginning with the first decree in the seventh year of the
reign of William III in 1696 (7 & 8, William III, c. 20,
1696; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, 1825,
504, v 115) .
From 1696 to 1841 the English supplemented Elizabeth
I's controls with a comprehensive set of laws and sets of
administrative and enforcement systems to attempt to prevent
inventions and state-of-the-art machines and tools or a
knowledge of them from being transferred to military and
commercial rivals. Clearly the perceived economic interest
of the manufactures provided significant support for
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preventing these inventions from flowing out of England.
There, however, seems to have also been other factors
driving the development of these laws.
In some cases, as with innovations in the iron and
steel industry, the items placed under control had military
as well as civilian applications. in other cases, controls
were placed on items that would strengthen a competitors'
economic capabilities. Of course it is difficult in the
mercantilist period to find a clearly articulated conceptual
separation between the reasons for restricting the export of
goods that advanced a states military productive capability
as opposed to economic capability (see T.S. Ashton, 1924 and
W. Bowden, 1925). The more elementary issue was preventing
the transmission of any machine, tool or resource to a
competitor state that might increase its power capability,
quite broadly understood.
In this section I lay out the details of the
development of the British export control system and raise
questions about what such a system did in terms of the idea
of the power of a state. Tracing the establishment and
development of the British export control system only to the
economic interests that lay behind the programs does not go
far enough (Jeremy, 1983). For that reason I identify in a
suggestive, perhaps some might say interpretative, way
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articulations and explanations of the rationale of the
controls on the diffusion of these innovations.
This effort to control diffusions of innovations began
with the 1696 statue. It sought to protect the
"stocking-frame and the mechanisms used in the manufacture
of silk" (7 Wm. Ill, c. 20, 1696). The statute made it
unlawful for anyone to export these frames because this
"mystery increases his Majesty's glory and his Majesty's
customs because great guantities are wrought off in a little
time" (7 Wm. Ill, c. 20, 1696). The statute also goes on to
state that as a result of some of these instruments falling
into the hands of competitors, "several English families had
suffered impoverishment and inconveniences." By preventing
these items from falling into the hands of competitors, the
government stated it was protecting the interest of both the
Crown and the subjects.
The next law passed in an attempt to guard the secrets
of innovations and inventions was in 1750 (23 Geo. II, c.
13, 1750). This statute related to the woolen industry as
well as to the manufacture of silk. The woolen industry was
protected in England by having a monopoly in the home
market. There was also a natural supply of material, but
this statute stated that English subjects could be
disadvantaged by allowing "foreigners to obtain these new
instruments" and thus through such laws "His Majesty" was
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preserving as much as possible to "His subjects the benefits
arising from those great and valuable inventions" (23, Geo.
II, c. 13, 1750). Curiously, in this same statute "His
Majesty" also began "preserving the interest of the Kingdom
by preventing the outmigration of English artisans and
skilled craftsmen." The statute not only further extended
prohibitions on the export of machinery then, but it also
forbade skilled workers from leaving the country. Heavy
penalties were established for skilled workers who violated
the law. In addition, penalties were set out for individuals
who attempted to get British skilled workers to leave the
country.
The first offense for a skilled worker leaving the
country carried a penalty of six months in prison and 100
pounds fine. The second offense was one year in jail and an
unlimited fine. If a British artisan was discovered abroad
and did not return when directed by the British government,
then he ceased to be a British subject and all of his
property, and in some cases his family's property, was
confiscated (23 Geo. II, c. 13, 1750; Mantoux, 1961).
Individuals who aided artisans or skilled workers in an
attempt to emigrate were subject to five years in jail and
500 pound fines for the first offense.
In 1774 export controls were extended to the cotton
and linen industries (14 Geo. Ill, c. 71, 1774). Like the
82
laws for the woolen industry and silk manufacturing these
laws covered both the physical machines and the artisans
(Wheeler, p. 254, 1836; Bowden, p. 130, 1925). In 1781, a
law was passed that also made it illegal to export sketches,
miniature models, or the specifications that would "allow
foreigners to construct machines or instruments used in the
woolen, silk, cotton, and linen industries" (21 Geo. Ill c .
37, 1781). This statute also prohibited the transfer of
information on methods of application or production
processes (21 Geo. Ill, c. 37, 1781). This, along with the
controls placed on the emigration of artisans, represented
an attempt to control the outflow and exchange of the
intangible know-how.
In 1785 this system was expanded to include
innovations, machines, and tools used in the iron and steel
industry (25 Geo. Ill, c. 67, 1785). In this area a large
number of devices and processes had been developed that
improved the quality and the strength of metal products.
Many of these processes were essential to the refining of
steel used in the production of cannons and guns. Export
controls in this category of goods were intended to prevent
these innovations from falling into the hands of foreign
military rivals (see, Ashton, 1926). The 1785 statute was
much more extensive than the 1774 order. The passage of
this statute prohibiting the export of tools, utensils, and
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machines used in iron and steel manufactures was accompanied
by what may have been the first export control list (see
table 2:1; 25 Geo. Ill, c
. 67, 1785). Included on the list
of items subject to control were rollers, casting molds, and
lathes-all essential instruments in the manufacture of high
quality weapons of the period (Ashton, p. 143, 1926;
Beckman, 1846; Cunningham, 1895).
All of the above statutes were continued in force by
acts passed year to year until 1795 when a general and
perpetual law was passed. One of the more significant
features in the expansion of this system was the fact that
in 1781 the British had moved to control information on
production processes. Once this move is made the system
becomes that much more complex and requires that much more
vigilance for enforcement. The 1795 law was designed to
establish more permanent controls on the diffusion of any of
the machinery or tools unique to England or new innovations
that might bring productive advantages over competitors (35
Geo. Ill, c. 38, 1795). A magistrate from one of the new
and growing industrial centers published a statement of
support in a local paper stating that "the discoveries and
the improvements of the age diffuse a glory over this
country unattainable by conquest or dominion. And promise
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TABLE 2.1
Sample British Export Control List Established by the Statue
- 25th George III. chapter 67, 1785 (Partial Listf
52^,^?^^°' T°01 - Ut-sil hereafter
Hand Stamps
Doghead Stamps
Stamps of All Sorts
Screws for Stamps
Presses for all sorts of iron, steel, or other metal
Piercing Presses of all sorts
Iron and steel dies to be used in stamps or presses
Rollers of cast iron, wrought iron or steel, for rolling of
metal or frames
Casting Moulds
Lathes of all sorts for turning, burnishing, polishing
Lathe strings
Stocks for casting buckles, buttons, and rings
Cast-iron anvils for forging iron and copper
Pins or stocks for making screws
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to stamp a luster on His Majesty's reign to the latest
generations" (cited in Bowden, p. 127, 1925).
Enforcement of British Cnntrnic
Perhaps secretiveness in the conduct of a craft was a
posture inherited from the preindustrial apprenticeship
system. With the emergence of "technologies" of an
altogether different order in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, industry in Britain was conducted in an
overall atmosphere of secrecy (Musson and Robinson, p. 216,
1969; Jeremy p. 36, 1981). The export control system was
only one of the means by which Englishmen attempted to guard
their secrets from foreign competitors. The design of many
of the factories themselves was intended to maintain the
maximum amount of surveillance over workers and skilled
craftsmen and to ward off intruders. These factories
combined features of a medieval castle system and
panopticonic design (see Crump, 1931; Foucault, 1979;
Jeremy, 1981) . The main shops were open to quadrangle yards
with observation towers at each corner. It was impossible
to see into the shops from the outside as the windows facing
outward were small and high from the ground (see Tann,
1970) . Gateways and halls leading to the outside were
always narrow and well guarded. All workers were sworn to
secrecy and visitors were not permitted into shops or into
quadrangle areas. Rules were posted in many shops such as
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this one from the Taylor and Go's cotton mill at Halliwell,
Lancashire, in 1804: "if a stranger comes into the Factory,
the Spinner who spins next to the door [is] to send for the
Overlooker, but if he cannot be found, then the spinner who
came last in that room [is] to order him out" (Jeremy, p.
37, 1981).
Newspapers in Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, and
London particularly after 1795, contained frequent
references to foreign spies, not only French, who had come
to England to acquire machines and to entice artisans abroad
( see Manchester Mercury, June 14, June 24, and June 29, 1786
among others in Burney Collection Papers, British Museum,
London; Bowden, 1925; Musson and Robinson, p. 217, 1969).
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, England
particularly in the industrializing areas, became extremely
"spy-conscious." Local community members were told to be on
guard for "foreigners snooping around factories and
warehouses" (Mantoux, p. 258, 1964). Workers were urged on
the grounds of patriotism, as well as because of the legal
penalties, to refrain from taking their skills abroad and to
be vigilant for fellow workers who were tempted to leave or
who were involved in schemes to export controlled goods
(Bowden p. 127
,
1925)
.
In the industrial centers of Britain special
littees made up of machine producers, manufacturers, andcomm:
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loyal artisans were formed to police local communities.
There was close collaboration between these groups and the
government in the enterprise of "rooting out spies that had
come into England with ill intentions" (Musson and Robinson,
p. 220, 1969; Bowden, p. 128, 1925). Individuals who were
suspected of spying were summoned before these committees
and interrogated, warned, and threatened (Musson and
Robinson, p. 222, 1969). Because of these committees most
of the prosecutions under the export control laws and the
controls on artisans were carried out (Bowden, p. 122,
1925). in 1785, for example, a Prussian by the name of
Baden, after having been gone over by one of these
committees "was tried and fined 500 pounds for having
visited Manchester and (illegally) having tried to seduce
cotton operatives to Germany" (Wheeler, p. 240, 1836).
There were several other cases involving continental
Europeans who were fined or imprisoned for violating these
laws (see Wheeler, 1836 and Musson and Robinson, 1969).
Members of these committees seemed willing to go to
extreme lengths to enforce prohibitions on artisan
emigration and machinery exports. Various schemes were
advanced. Josiah Wedgwood, supported by some of these
committees, proposed developing extensive secret government
surveillance programs for "opening letters of workingmen in
order to secure evidence on which of the skilled workers
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were planning to emigrate- or were involved in spying
(Bowden, p. 129, 1925). In another case, James Kipping, an
industrialist of Liverpool, suggested that every emigrant be
required to produce papers signed by local authorities
attesting to the fact that the holder was not a prohibited
emigrant (Jeremy, p. 40, 1981). This call for a passport
system was rejected. The Passenger Act of 1803, however, was
in part designed to supplement the laws on the emigration of
artisans by reducing outmigration and creating a more
controlled and supervised system of passage (see MacDonagh,
1961)
.
This Act would then allow inspectors to uncover more
easily violators of the emigration law.
Many of the individuals involved in enforcing the
export control laws viewed their activity as a patriotic
duty (Bowden, p. 128, 1925; Musson and Robinson, 1969).
"Since it was considered a loss to a private producer if
someone knew his trade secrets, it seemed equally obvious at
the time that the country should also keep her trade secrets
from other nations" (Musson and Robinson, p. 265, 1969).
All of this British secrecy, however, only increased the
effects of foreign manufacturers and states to acquire or
secure knowledge of English inventions and innovations.
Continental powers offered large sums of money to induce
British artisans away from England. Some of these powers
formally offered to remove protectionist laws and to buy
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British goods in exchange for samples of the machines and
the technology used to produce those goods (Bowden, p. i 28
,
1925; Ashton, 1924). Continental states also offered special
subsidies to local manufacturers who succeeded in securing
English machines. in the early nineteenth century the
Prussians set up a special school in Berlin, called the
"Gewerbe Institut," to train individuals in engineering and
mechanics. The Prussian government financed the illicit
acquisition of British machinery and then trained and paid
these students to copy the prototypes (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, Second Report of the Select
Committee, VII, 1841). The continental states did in fact
send agents to England to set up spying and acquisition
networks
.
The Great Power competition among the continental
states perpetuated the complex networks of prohibitions on
the export of machinery and on emigration or foreign travel
by artisans. The possession of these industrial innovations
formed one element in the perception of the balance of
power. The commercial and competitive benefits they
afforded provided more tangible advantages. France,
Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Holland all were involved in
the attempt to acquire state of the art machinery and
know-how.
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Between 1824 and 1841 a succession of British
Parliament committees charged with inquiring "into the state
of the law in the United Kingdom, and its consequences,
respecting artisans leaving the Kingdom and residing abroad;
also into the state of the law and its consequences,
respecting the exportation of tools and machinery" (see
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons: V, 1824; VI,
1824; V, 1825; VII, 1841). in each of the reports one of
the central concerns is with establishing the consequences
of these laws in terms of the broader competition with the
other Great Powers.
The chief offender referred to in most of the reports
is France. Increases in the British perception of threat
from the French during the Napoleonic period may well have
increased the intensity of domestic surveillance on
compliance with export control laws. That, however, is
difficult to measure. The creation of surveillance
committees and other enforcement measures predates the
outbreak of open hostilities between France and Britain.
The British control system encompassed both civilian and
military items (see table 2.2). Thus security and
international economic motives were mixed in the
construction of the British export control system.
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TABLE 2.2
Sample British Export Control List - 26th George IIIChapter, 89, 1786 (Partial List)
Rollers, either plain, grooved, or of any other form or
denomination, of cast iron, wrought iron or steel, for the
rolling of iron, or any sort of metals or frames.
Presses of all sorts in iron, steel or other metals, which
are used with a screw, exceeding one inch and a half in
diameter, or any parts of these several articles; or any
model or models of any before mentioned Utensils, Implements
and Machines, or any parts thereof.
Engines or Machines used in the casting or boring of cannon,
or any sort of artillery, or parts thereof, or any model or
models of Tools, Utensils, Engines or Machines used in
casting or boring of cannon or any sort of artillery, or any
parts thereof.
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom, and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. V, p. 161, 1825.
In this list there is a clear attempt to clarify the
thresholds of the type of technology that is subject to
control
.
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British officials, however, did pay special attention
to the French and often expressed dismay at their ability,
both during and after the war, to acquire English
innovations. The French sometimes were able to acquire
state of the art cotton production machinery before it had
been fully integrated into English factories. They had also
been able to entice a number of British artisans to France.
There was a huge copper plate factory in France, "for
bottoming the ships of the French fleet - the whole of which
was a British colony" (Bowden, p. 129, 1925).
Aside from the more tangible factors that drove the
creation of the British prohibition statutes-economic
interests, notions of patriotism, and calculations of Great
Power competition-there were broader less tangible, but
nonetheless powerful forces at work. Notions of progress
and development were bound up in the emergence of mechanical
processes. The transition from hand methods of production
to mechanical processes of production had symbolic as well
as material significance. Possessing and controlling these
innovations was valued not only for the tangible advantage
they might bestow, but for an idea: that having them and
introducing these new devices was tantamount to being
"ahead" on a continuum of human progress. The possession of
them seems to have been at work in the distinction between
the more civilized and the less civilized in the Western
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state system (see Musson and Robinson, p. 216 -230
, 1969;
Mantoux, 1961). m that sense, then, the attempt to
maintain a monopoly possession of the innovations by the
state was bound up in a conceptualization of status and a
perception of power that such status accrued.
The prohibitions were by and large fairly ineffective
and economically irrational for a number of reasons,
particularly given competitors' ability to acquire English
inventions. The bulk of the eighteenth century statutes,
however, remained in place for almost a century, m
addition, several English firms apparently kept to strict
rules of secrecy and "stealthiest" practices even after the
items that they possessed were in wide circulation. When
former leading firms became "anxious about their
increasingly hollow reputations," they often maintained
their former practices to conceal their decline. m 1824
Alexander Galloway, a London engineer, stated that the
"uncommon degree of mystery" practiced by Boulton & Watt's,
formerly one of the leading firms in all of Britain, was a
result of the fact that they "have nothing to show beyond
what is well known in other places; they continue from pride
that exclusion which before was dictated by interest"
(Jeremy, p. 37, 1981). This "Wizard of OZ" feigning might
also have been driven by a belief that one could retain a
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Position of advantage by creating the perception that one
possesses mysteriously powerful instruments.
Not everyone was enamored by or shared this perception
of the symbolic value of the mechanical instrument or
process. The fairly widespread riots of machine busting
displaced laborers in England is well documented (see
Ashton, 1924 and Mantoux, 1961). After the Lancashire riots
of 1779, however, a cotton-spinning machine producer
articulated in clear terms the sentiment shared by most
industrialists and some skilled workers of the day.
Regarding the power and status bestowed by the mechanical
device, he wrote:
Read the history of mankind. Consider the gradualsteps of civilization from barbarism to refinement
and you will not fail to discover that the progress ofsociety from its lowest and worst to its highelt andmost perfect state has been uniformly accomplished andchiefly promoted by the happy exertions of man in thecharacter of a mechanic or engineer. Let all machinesbe lost or destroyed and we are reduced in a moment tothe condition of savages; and in that state men mayindeed exist a long time without the aid of curious
and complex machines, though without them they can
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Later in the nineteenth century social and political
thinkers would challenge this notion of progress and the
idea that liberation from the human condition of enslavement
to nature would come through the machine. Critiques and
lamentations over the cages of rationalization,
organization, and standardization that accompanied the
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introduction of machines and mechanical processes would also
give rise to counter conceptions of power and alternative
forms of economic organization. To argue that British
export controls and prohibitions arose only out of a simple
formula of economic interest giving rise to policy is then
to miss one of the more intriguing questions posed by the
emergence of these statutes: How were these controls and
their development bound up with broader conceptualizations
of status and power?
The Question of the Enforceability andthe Consequences of British Controls
A number of factors led to the dismantling of the
British system of controls on the emigration of artisans and
the export of machinery in the 1840s. Several of the issues
raised in debates over the effectiveness and consequences of
these controls, and many of the difficulties encountered in
enforcement have been present in the post-1945 United States
unilateral and the COCOM multilateral programs. The first
part of this section examines the problems encountered in
the nineteenth century British attempt to enforce controls.
The second part of the section will review some of the
issues raised in the debates over the prohibitions that
occurred in parliament between 1824 and 1841.
Administration of the prohibitions was the
responsibility of the Privy Council from the beginning of
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the war in 1795 until around 1820. The Board of Trade in
the Treasury thereafter became responsible for oversight
the prohibitions (Brown, p. 161, 1958). Officers with the
title, Controlling Searchers, were responsible for policing
ports and the coastline to enforce controls on both artisan
emigration and the export of machinery (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, 1824). By 1830 these
officers had at their disposal some 70 ships and 6,138
sailors to police the 7,000 mile coastline of England,
Scotland, and Ireland. There were additional personnel at
every port (Jeremy, p. 43, 1981).
Despite the requirement after 1795 that before
departure every vessel submit to Customs lists of all
passengers' names, ages, occupations, and nationalities,
enforcement was extremely difficult. The first problem with
enforcing this requirement was defining legally the term
artisan or skilled laborer . Customs officers were often
uncertain as to which workers in what industry with what
specialties should be considered skilled workers or
artisans. David Jeremy, who has done extensive work
analyzing the minutes of the Privy Council and the Board of
Trade on this issue, claims that there never really was an
agreed upon definition (Jeremy, p. 41, 1981) . The
technology was shifting rather quickly and thus
specializations and skills were being displaced at a pace
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that often outstripped a fixed definition of which
individuals had knowledge that should be subject tc
controls. Consequently, discretion in the enforcement of
this prohibition was often left in the hands of Customs
officials. Aside from the definition question the sheer
logistical issue of identifying skilled workers and artisans
at ports posed major problems. Customs officials seemed to
be inclined to try to root out violators by random searches
in hopes of discovering papers, letters, or tools that would
establish a passenger's occupation (Ashton, 1926; Mantoux,
1961; MacDonagh, 1961). Despite the enthusiasm of these
Customs agents, artisans were able to slip through fairly
easily
.
The most formidable threat seems to have been the loss
of nationality and property for not returning once
discovered abroad. This, however, was often negated by
inducements that competing powers offered to artisans who
would leave England to practice their trade. By the early
nineteenth century the magnitude of the difficulty of
enforcing the prohibition on the emigration of artisans
became apparent (Jeremy p. 40, 1981). The British
government tried various schemes to attract artisans back to
England. First, they offered to pay the return travel of
violators, but this was less than appealing given the fact
that they were still subject to penalties at home. By 1802
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rewards and amnesty were proposed as an inducement to
artisans and skilled workers who would return, but this too
had little effect. Even the invasion of the United States by
the British did not frighten immigrant artisans back to
England. in the end the problem of enforcement, and perhaps
the idea that this prohibition violated the right of free
born Englishmen, resulted in the 1824 revocation of the law
on the emigration of artisans. in addition, the development
of standardization in training and discipline in the use of
machines and the operation of mechanical processes reduced
to a degree the indispensability of any particular artisan
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, v, 1824).
The British also faced a number of problems similar to
those faced in the post-1945 Western alliance and United
States' export control program. The first complication that
Customs faced was the fact that after 1812 the government
set up a license system to allow for the export of
preindustrial tools, obsolete machinery, and some types of
finishing machines that were found to be widely available
among competitor states (Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers, Commons, V, p. 130, 1824; Jeremy, 1981; see table
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). Loopholes in this system were extensive
as the nature of the machinery to be exported was easily
misrepresented on export license application forms.
Smugglers also developed other techniques to confound
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Customs officials. Prohibited machines were broken down and
shipped with machines or tools that were not under controls.
Often these illicit machines were shipped from several
different ports over the course of an extended period of
time (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p.
HI, 1824). In addition the "parts of such prohibited
machinery not to mention the plans or models of such
machinery were small and concealed in ways that made
detection impossible" (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. no, 1824).
Further, Customs officials' often had difficulty
identifying prohibited machines. One Controlling Searcher of
The Customs stated: "There are a vast number of packages
which we open, where there are parts of Machinery packed
with other iron and steel articles from Birmingham,
purposely packed for deception; and it is almost an
impossibility for an officer to know whether they are or are
not prohibited, being only parts of Machinery
.
. .
It is a very rare occurrence indeed to meet with
prohibited Machinery which appears so" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. no, 1824). As one
Customs officer put it, in order to be effective or "to
decide the real character of a Machine on search reguires
the knowledge of a lawyer and the skill of an engineer"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, VII, p. 270,
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TABLE 2.3
Sample British Export License, 1841
FORM of License granted by the Trea^ii™ *w *-u r,
of Machinery Prohibited by Law
SUry for the Exportation
Gentlemen, TREASURY CHAMBERS,
The Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council for Tradehaving signified their opinion that M '
may be allowed to export the following articles ofmachinery
commanded by the Lords Commissioners of Her Maiestv's
**
Treasury, to desire that you will give directions forpermitting the exportation of the machinery in question;
To the Commissioners of Customs
I am, Gentlemen,
Your Obedient Servant
Whitehall Treasury Chambers
19 May 1841
All applications for permission to export machinery were
required to be submitted for the opinion of the Board of
Trade.
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons.
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. VII, p. 295, 1841.
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TABLE 2.4
Sample Customs
;
Re:port of Detentions and Seizures ofControlled Machinery (Partial)
A RETURN of the number of Detentions and Seizures of
mr.-aas Mrs
Port npf!°;.°
f No
:
of No
-
"N^ Penalty"Detentions Seizures Sold Returned Paid;
Pounds
London 84 93 76 101 198Beaumaris 1 1
Bristol 2 2Cardiff 1 1 500Deal 3 3
Dover 35 27 8 300Goole 7 5 5 7 12Hull 13 76 38 51 47
Liverpoll 9 70 50 29 424
Port Glasgow 2 2 2
Belfast 3 2 1
Customs House, London
15 May 1840
Source: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons.
Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee Appointed to
Inquire into the State of the Law in the United Kingdom and
its Consequences Respecting the Exportation of Tools and
Machinery, vol. VII, p. 295, 1841.
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TABLE 2.5
Applications Made to the Board of Trad^ for m w •Export Licenses and Proportion of Refta^ Ts?sTB ?i
Year Total
Applications ApplicationsRefused
No
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
10
24
37
52
48
67
52
69
85
124
124
124
135
204
178
186
200
244
135
1
2
13
10
13
14
10
8
11
26
15
14
9
19
10
11
7
17
4
10
8
35
20
27
21
19
11
12
21
12
11
6.
9
5
6
3
14
2 . 96
total 2, 098 218 10.4
Source: Daivd Jeremy. Transatlantic Industrial Revolution
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. p. 44
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1841). Even if a Customs officer was able to receive
instruction in what type of machines were subject to
prohibitions, it was extremely difficult for him to keep up
with the new innovations and inventions (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 112
, 1824) . customs
officers also complained that they were understaffed and
that there was inadequate coordination between port
officials. some customs officers who testified before the
House of Commons in 1824 stated that they doubted
enforcement could be effective while "any Tool or Machine
whatsoever was allowed to be exported" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 109, 1824).
The numerous smuggling routes and techniques of
illicit transfers made customs officers almost powerless,
particularly when it came to uncovering the transmission of
drawings and designs. Nevertheless, Customs officials did
make a number of machinery seizures and detentions. From
1824-1841 the number of such actions at major ports was 298
and between 1830-1839 an additional 289 seizures occurred as
a result of coastal searches (see table 2:5; Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, VII, p. 295, 1841). These
actions were, however, often fairly random in nature as
Customs officials seized what looked suspicious. Twenty
percent of the seizures made at Liverpool from 1830-1839
were of unidentified machine parts (Jeremy, p. 43, 1981).
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in one case prohibited machinery was confiscated, taken to a
Port Customs House and sold in auction back to the
individual from whom it had been confiscated (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, v, 1824).
These prohibitions were also undermined by the
expansion of the publication of technical journals and
exchanges among the growing scientific community. m the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century certain
international figures and inventors, such as Benjamin
Franklin and Matthew Boulton, were members of "almost every
scientific society in Europe" (Musson and Robinson, p. 223,
1969). To make the prohibition on the outflow of English
innovations and inventions effective would have no doubt
required the policing of the interactions of members of the
scientific community. This was something the British were
unwilling or perhaps unable to do.
There was, however, control and suppression of the
publication of technical information as a part of the
attempt to enforce the prohibitions on the transfer of
English technique (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. 112, 1824; Ashton, 1926; Jeremy, 1981). Some
authors engaged in self-policing as James Ogden admitted in
1783 when he said that he left technical information out of
his publications for fear the French would benefit (Ogden,
1783; Jeremy, p. 39, 1981). Other authors, however, were
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prevented from publishing technical data because as was
stated
-a knowledge may be acquired out of this country"
(Duncan, 1807 cited in Jeremy p. 39, 1981). The first major
publication to outline in detail the technical features of
British mechanical inventions and innovations was The
Universal Dictionary of Arts, Science, and Literature,
edited by Abraham Rees. This was a twenty-nine volume set
published between 1802 and 1820 (Rees, 1802; Ashton, 1926;
Jeremy, 1981). However, regulations on the publication of
technical information on British technological innovations
continued well into the mid-1800s.
The series of patent and trade journals that emerged
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century made it
even more difficult to prevent the transmission of knowledge
about English inventions. This included the Repertory of
Arts, Maufactures, and Agriculture which began in England in
1794. This journal published, in a rather random fashion,
patents for woolen cloth and textile manufacturing
inventions (Jeremy, p. 47, 1981). The French had their own
version of this journal called the French Repertory of Arts,
that reproduced apparently all of the material published in
the British publication. A British engineer named Henry
Maudslay told the Commons in 1825 that the type of exchange
that went on between the technical community in England and
Europe made the enforcement of British export controls
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clearly impossible. According to Maudslay:
"on the first o
every month, books are packed off to Hamburgh, and sent
through Holland to all parts of the Continent, and a friend
of mine has written to me within a week of their
publication, saying I understand you have obtained a patent
for so and so, and I hope it will turn out to your
advantage, and so on" (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, V, p. 13 l, 1825
, . what this meant, as Joseph Hume
questioning Mr. Maudslay put it, was that foreign
competitors "came into the possession of drawings, plans,
and information on every British invention or patent as soon
as they are published in England- (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 131, 1825). A century
and a quarter before the United States and the Western
alliance confronted the tension between the free exchange of
ideas and the maintenance of an effective export control
system, the British were at a loss as to how to police
information exchanges between technical communities that
were by today's standards slow and rudimentary.
Clashing Conceptions of the Source of
British Pow<=> r: Arguments for
Revocation of Export Controls
There were other factors that undermined and
eventually helped to end support for prohibitions on the
export of machinery and mechanical processes as a means of
maintaining British advantage over foreign powers. There
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were endless debates in the Colons from 1824 to 1841 Qver
the theoretical justifications and potential consequences of
these policies. These debates were, of course, bound up in
the broader issues and discussions about the benefits of
free trade versus the protectionist and mercantilist system.
It is no coincidence that James Deacon Hume, Secretary of
the Board of Trade and staunch free-trader, was called
before the Commons to testify as to the theoretical and
practical unworkability of export controls on machinery and
mechanical processes and know-how (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, 1824; V, 1825; Badham,
1859). There is a large well-studied literature on the
exchanges between Manchester manufacturers and the Board of
Trade on this issue. Leaving off the finer details of the
debates to the more knowledgeable, we focus here on some of
the points that seemed to recur throughout the Parliamentary
Reports. First, several of the witnesses stated that
"preventing the exportation of machinery to foreign powers
(France) has a tendency to force them to become machine-
makers themselves, and to rival us in a branch of industry,
into which, if they could get machines from England, they
would have no motive to come into competition" (Great
Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 126, 1824).
The issue, which the Commons Report said deserved the most
serious consideration, was that the export control system
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seemed to be self defeating over the long term because it
inspired foreign powers to develop their own indigenous
technological capability. This was seen, as stated above,
not only to create a source of commercial rivalry, but also
to reduce potential British influence on these rival powers
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, 1824).
This conflict, as we will see, parallels debates in the
post-1945 era as to whether or not Western controls lead to
Soviet bloc attempts to develop technological self-
sufficiency.
The second intriguing point made in the Commons
Reports was that the extensiveness of the British export
control laws inhibited and drove away inventors at the
expense of Britain (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers,
Commons, VII, p. 276, 1841). in some cases inventors and
machine designers left England for countries where fewer
controls existed and where there were thus potentially
greater opportunities to profit. British controls led
foreign powers to attempt to attract these individuals. The
point again was that by setting up control systems in an
attempt to maintain a lead time or monopoly possession of
particular types of knowledge or particular inventions, one
ran the risk of distorting the environment that encouraged
the development of such knowledge or the creation of such
inventions in the first place. This was particularly the
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case when other states were not playing by the same ^ Qf
prohibitory rules or at ieast were wining to waive them for
economic gain.
The final points raised in these debates involve more
complex economic arguments for the removal of controls on
the export of machines and mechanical processes. These
arguments run throughout the Parliamentary Reports from 1824
to 1841, and they are usually prefixed by references to "the
justly-celebrated work of the late Mr. Ricardo on the
Principles of Political Economy- (e.g., Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 127, 1824). Amidst
long discussions of price-wage theory, there are three
arguments set out in these Reports that we will consider.
The first two are fairly straightforward. The third,
however, is more complicated because it involves the
articulation of a conceptualization of power that is meant
to counter the conceptualization on which the export control
laws were said to have been based.
First, members of the Special Committees argue that
liberalization of controls would result in the exportation
of machinery that had already been surpassed by new
inventions (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, v,
p. 129, 1824; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
VII, 1841). By exporting this older machinery, that would
be integrated into the production systems of rival powers'
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industry, Britain would retain the technological lead time.
Secondly, with liberalization of controls, according to some
of the witnesses, "the ingenuity and skill of our workmen
would have greater scope, and that, important as the
improvements in Machinery have lately been, they might,
under such circumstances, be fairly expected to increase to
a degree beyond all precedent- (Great Britain, Parliamentary
Papers, Commons, V, p. 130, 1825). Increased foreign demand
and trade opportunities would, some argued, produce more
dynamism that would lead to even greater creativity and
increase Britains' lead in the long term.
Finally, some participants articulated a counter
discourse about the sources of Britain's advantage over its
rivals in the early nineteenth century. These debates over
export control policy can be read, then, at a broader level
as clashes between two divergent understandings of the
sources of British advantage. The members of the Special
Committee opposed to prohibitions argue first that the
export control laws are founded on old and "very erroneous
notions in regard to commerce." They then say that the
enactment of these laws was founded not on reasoned
principles, "but they were dictated by a mistaken jealousy
of permitting other nations to benefit from our
improvements" (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons,
V, p. 120, 1825). In addition, the Reports state that such
Ill
prohibitions
"cause jealousy „ f ^J ^ ... of other nations toward
us" and that "the members of every enlightened government
must necessarily wish to see such laws removed, and which
the Legislature appears to have had in view in the late
various important alterations in the commercial relations of
this Country (laws relating to artisans)" (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 124
, 1825). The
prohibitions to export tools and machinery the Reports state
are "calculated to perpetuate these jealousies."
These Special Committee members criticize the export
controls as being based on emotion not on reasoned argument.
The laws are construed as part of an unenlightened age that
did not understand, as Kant sought to explain and whose
ideas are reflected in the position of some Committee
members, the potential of free commerce to reduce jealousies
between nations (see I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace").
The Reports state at one point that "it is the opinion
of many of those who object to the exportation of Machinery
that Great Britain owes her present superiority [in
manufactures] solely to the excellence of her Machinery"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Paper, Commons, V, p. 129,
1825)
.
Three arguments are advanced to counter this
understanding of the source of British advantage. The first
is attributed to "the late Mr. Ricardo" and it is that this
power or position "is a result of the natural advantages
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England possesses." Among the particular factors listed as
natural advantages are: raw materials for producing
machinery and for manufacturing, better communications and
transportation systems throughout the country, a better
division of labor, and the advantage of trained workmen
habituated to all industrious employments (Great Britain,
Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 129, 1825; VII, p. 268
,
1841). some of these are, of course, only arguably "natural
advantages," but the overall articulation of the sources of
British advantage is broadened in two ways. First, in
response to the question of whether "the French would pose a
challenge to us if they were supplied with British machinery
or mechanical processes," one witness responds: "They will
be behind us until their general habits approximate ours"
(Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p. 129 and
153, 1825). This traditional or cultural source of
advantage then compliments the natural. The second way the
conceptualization of advantage is broadened is in terms of
the mode of knowledge or experience acquired. When asked
why a particular Continental power "would remain behind us"
a witness said: ».
. .a cotton manufacturer who left
Manchester seven years ago would be driven out of the market
by the men who are now living in it, provided his knowledge
had not kept pace with those who have been during that time
constantly profiting by the progressive improvements that
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have taken place in that period; tM^ax^i^J^^
^^^^^^ (emphasis
added: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Commons, V, p.
129, 1825). This is an articulation of the understanding of
the source of British power and advantage as the result of
an ongoing interactive process between natural endowment,
culture, experience, and knowledge.
The emphasis in these debates is always on the
progressive and the dynamic as characteristics necessary for
maintaining advantage over competitor nations and powers.
This articulation, with the images of pace and movement that
are evoked, is meant to counter the conceptualization of
advantage or power as a static or fixed condition. it is
also meant to counter the belief that advantage can be
retained by retreating behind the secrecy and the walls of a
medieval-castle-style factory or by attempting to retain
one's advantage by maintaining possession of any particular
machine, mechanical process, or technology. in this sense
we can say then that these particular debates brought
together two counter conceptions of power, and that perhaps
these reflected broader issues of self-understanding and
questions of the sources of state power that were present in
the societies of Western state systems.
We cannot leave a discussion of the factors that
undermined the nineteenth century British export control
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system without acknowledging the domestic economic interests
that clashed over the issue. The interests are fairly clear
cut in this case (Brown, 1958). The manufacturers for the
most part continued to support export controls on machinery
and mechanical processes. in some branches of the textile
industry there was vertical integration of the industry and
thus there was little conflict. Machine producers did not
actively oppose the prohibitions until the economy slowed
during the 1830s. Their views were well received by the
Board of Trade where the overall system of protectionism,
particularly in agriculture, had come under attack. There
is an extensive literature on the politics of the Board of
Trade (Ashton, 1924 and 1933; Cheyney, 1921; Henderson,
1958)
.
The power of these interest groups in their
endeavors to see the export control system dismantled can
not be understated. The sorts of critiques of the
presuppositions on which the export control system was based
articulated in the Commons Reports, however, pre-dates the
rise of a united and strong opposition by machine producers
to the laws. This is explained by the emergence and growing
acceptance of the ideas of economic liberalism at the turn
of the century. Members of this rising industrial class
that had the most to gain from free trade were no doubt the
more serious readers of Ricardo and Smith. Their growing
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power in government eventually held sway and the early
export control laws were largely dismantled by 1343.
Conclusinnc
The nineteenth century British government faced an
ultimately insurmountable set of logistical and theoretical
puzzles in its attempt to establish and maintain an export
control system. Thus one can imagine the difficulties that
the United States and the Western powers have faced in their
attempt to construct, maintain, and enforce a much more
complex multilateral export control system over the past
fifty years. Defining the rationale for an export control
program acceptable among a number of states or among a
number of groups at the domestic level has posed problems in
the past. This has particularly been the case when there
were divergences in perceptions of economic interests
between states or groups or when there was a perception that
some states or groups were less vigilant in abiding by
control arrangements.
The issue of what items to control is in part decided
by the resolution of the issue of the rationale adopted for
the program, but questions of the form of the item that
should be controlled remain. Post-1945 export control
officials have faced the same question that eighteenth
century British officials faced. Can an effective export
control system be maintained by simply prohibiting the
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or
transfer of deviroc ny~ +- • * -,1C6S
°
r tan9 lbl * goods? or is information
know-how the key factor in technology transfer? (Se
chapter 5 on the Bucy Report.) As British officials
discovered more than one hundred years ago, once the
exchange of models, designs, information, and know-how
become subject to prohibitions one confronts not only more
complicated enforcement problems, but also a much more
significant set of theoretical issues. These issues include
questions about the role of the free exchange of information
in liberal societies. Finally, in the contemporary period
the methods and avenues available to acquire illicitly or to
sell illicitly controlled items are infinitely more
sophisticated than in the nineteenth century. The
construction of a bureaucracy with surveillance and
intelligence capabilities extensive enough to enforce a
broad embargo again raises a series of problems. These
include not only questions of governmental and economic
cost, but also more fundamental questions about civil
liberties
.
The way in which the goal of guarding "high technology
secrets" has been represented in the press and by political
leaders, however, often seems to silence discussions of
these broader social and political issues. High technology
and strategically significant technology, slippery terms to
begin with, were discussed in the first Reagan
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Administration, for example, as having hyper-real power.
Maintaining the "technology gap" with the East was perceived
by some Department of Defense officials as offering such
obvious and instant advantages that there seemed to be a
temptation to provide any policy that was appropriate to the
activity (MacDonald, 1990). These officials argued that
more authority needed to be ceded to conduct surveillance
and to enforce regulations in hopes of maintaining this
"technology gap." This, however, is an issue quite
independent of the ability to enforce and control the
diffusion of technology. Nonetheless, a fetishized vision
of the benefits of holding the lead-time advantage in
militarily significant technology has been used by some
officials in Washington to aggrandize the role and power of
their particular agencies. One scholar has said that if
"strategically significant technologies" could be neatly
defined, labelled, and clearly differentiated from other
items, the concept would lose its political significance
(MacDonald, 1990). The concept can thus be read as a sign
that has use value. Its use value is increased by the fact
that the specifics of the lists of "strategically
significant technologies" are often classified.
This sign's signification politically, culturally, and
socially has been bound up in or fixed to images of power
and advantage over rivals (see Barthes on semiotic
118
interpretation)
. m that sense then insofar1BI1
'
msor as some of the
dynamics of the formation of 18th century export
prohibitions can be explained by a fetishization of the
notion of the "machine,"
"strategically significant
technology" has had a similar use value or in propelling the
formation of post 1945 export control policies and in
legitimating arguments for constructing and ceding authority
to enforcement bureaucracies.
It is clear that the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc
states have maintained extensive technology acquisition
networks in the United States and Western Europe. it would
also clearly be irresponsible for any country to "sell to
its adversary the rope on which it might be hung." The case
of the war against Iraq demonstrates the potential danger of
an ineffective strategic export control system. The goal of
this project is thus not to raise questions about the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of any strategic export control
program. Rather it is concerned, however, in part, with
questions about the role of the notion of "strategically
significant technology;" how it has been used and how its
signification is bound up in particular conceptualizations
of power and advantage. It is at this level that the
debates of the early 1980s were similar to the debates of
the early nineteenth century. In the Congressional debates
of the 1980s over the renewal of the Export Administration
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Act, the abuse of this notion by some hard-line officials in
the Department of Defense to justify broadened enforcement
authority for particular agencies was attacked from a number
of camps. As in the debates in the House of Commons,
critics of the use of this concept sought to articulate
counter conceptualizations of the source of United States
advantage and power and to warn of the long term commercial,
economic, and political consequences of the expansion of the
United States export control program (NAS, 1987; see chapter
5) .
This chapter has demonstrated that the state practice
of controlling the diffusion of technologies or items
considered strategically or economically significant has a
history in the international system. By assessing past
examples of this practice, this chapter provides a
historical context for an analysis of the post 1945 case.
Secondly, it is clear from this assessment of the past that
the logistical problems and political issues raised in the
construction of post 1945 export controls are not altogether
new. The particulars of the British case are striking in
this regard. Finally, by looking at the way in which the
items that were controlled were represented, we have sought
to raise questions about conceptualizations of power and
advantage and about how those representations worked to
propel the formation and maintenance of controls.
CHAPTER III
CONSTRUCTING THE POST-1945 EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM-UNITED STATES POWER, ENFORCEMENT RENTS AND
CLASHING DISCOURSES
Turning Away from the "One World" visinn
In the final months of the war against the Axis the
nature of post-war United States-Soviet economic relations
was not preordained. Conflicts over the shape of the
post-war order were, however, already beginning to emerge.
In this context of uncertainty a variety of perspectives on
the appropriate relationship between East-West trade and
Western security interests were articulated. President
Roosevelt, for example, envisioned "One World" in which the
failures of the interwar period could be overcome through
economic interdependence and international organizations.
According to this view, ideological differences between
powers would take a back seat or even evaporate in the face
of the common interests of economic recovery, industrial
expansion, and welfare enhancement (Yergin, 1977; Gaddis,
1984). Roosevelt's perspective was predicated on a
particular image of the Soviet Union and on a liberal notion
of the role of trade. The Soviet Union was perceived to be
a traditional Great Power that could be brought under
control by appeals to common interests. Commerce in turn
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would be the great civil i2er
. As Roosevelt , s aide^
Hopkins put it, articulating a lesson from the failures of
the interwar period, "destroying monsters grow out of
poverty" (Jentleson, p. 73, 1986).
After Roosevelt- s death and in the face of mounting
tensions over the war settlement, alternative perspectives
on United States-Soviet economic relations gained greater
credence in Washington. These views were buttressed by past
experiences with the Soviet Union and by telegrams from
American diplomats in Moscow. Ambassador Averell Harriman,
for example, drew on an instrumentalist discourse, saying
that economic carrots and sticks could be used on the
Soviets. He said that "any expansion of economic relations
or reconstruction aid should be tied to Soviet behavior in
international matters" (Yergin, p. 309, 1977; Jentleson,
1986)
.
in a longer telegram that would have a more enduring
impact, George Kennan, the charge d'affaires in Moscow,
articulated an image of the Soviet Union that would come to
guide American Cold War economic policy. He said that the
Soviets were "impervious to the dictates of reason." Thus
carrots and sticks would not work. The best that the United
States could do would be to reduce economic interaction as
far as possible in hopes of isolating and containing what
Kennan called the "malignant parasite that would feed on
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diseased tissue" IZox^P^Mp^^
(hereafter FRUS)
,
vol. VI, pp. 696 . 709/ at 7Q9§
Fro, 1945 until early 19 47 the United States pursued a
somewhat confused policy on economic relations with the
Soviet Union and its emerging satellites. President Truman
cut off lend-lease assistance on V-E day only to free up
$200 million worth of industrial machinery and "non-lethal"
lend-lease supplies in October 1945 (Yergin, p. 151, 1977
.
Jentleson, p. 50, 1986). The Truman Administration also
embargoed a number of items of direct military significance,
but allowed United States-Soviet trade to expand in other
areas with only minimal government intervention. In 1946
American exports to the Soviet Union totaled $352 million
(Jentleson, p. 53, 1986). This situation was short lived.
Strains of the emerging Cold War in Iran, Eastern Europe,
Greece, and Turkey helped to alter radically the United
States position on East-West trade.
By March 1948 the United States instituted a broad
program of export control on transfers of goods with direct
and indirect military significance to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. This control program included an elaborate
export licensing administration as well as surveillance
mechanisms to maintain vigilance on Soviet bloc economic
relations with the non-Communist world. Along with the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, economic warfare
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became an essential part of a triad of United States Cold
War foreign policy.
This chapter reviews the formation of the United
States export control program and economic warfare strategy.
The chapter begins by describing how the policy was
developed and then analyzes the construction of the
administrative instruments that were used to carry out the
program. This includes an analysis of domestic level
divergences of opinion on the appropriate approach to
East-West trade. In addition, this chapter assesses the
degree to which the preponderance of an absolutist discourse
legitimated a policy of economic warfare against the Soviet
bloc. The image of the nature of the threat posed by the
Soviet Union also helped to justify statutes that granted
the executive unprecedented authority to interfere in
commercial transactions in the interest of national
security.
The chapter also assesses diplomatic initiatives to
induce Western European states to conform to the United
States position on East-West trade controls and examines the
dynamics of the negotiations that resulted in the
construction of COCOM. Despite divergent positions on the
appropriate Western alliance strategy for East-West trade
and divergent economic interests, Western Europe followed
the United States lead in the COCOM program from its
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inception in 1949 until 1954. The reasons why are compie*
There was a level of shared peroeption of mutual security
interest. This was particularly the case following the
outbreak of the Korean war. American political prestige was
also a factor that added to the United States' ability to
convince reluctant allied sta.pc ^v,~a tes of the necessity of a broad
embargo and of minimizing economic transactions with the
Soviet bloc. More significantly, however, the United
States' national export licensing program and Marshall Plan
aid provided leverage for extracting compliance from the
allied states. The United States could hold up transfers of
goods by delaying or denying export license applications and
could cut off aid if allied states were found to be in
violation of export control regulations. There were
intergovernmental conflicts over the advisability or utility
of using these instruments to coerce reluctant Western
European states to agree to an extensive embargo. Despite
the inter- governmental disagreements, these instruments
played a central role in getting allied states to comply
with the United States position. This chapter draws on the
contested exchange model to show the relationship between
the instruments that were at the disposal of American
officials and evaluates the effectiveness of the instruments
in this case of contested political exchange.
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Finally, the chapter analyzes the liberalizations in
the COCOM multilateral export control program that tooK
Place after 1954. The United States continued to maintain
stringent unilateral controls as well as an extensive export
and reexport licensing program. The chapter explains why
the United States acquiesced in Western European
governments' demands for relaxations of the COCOM program in
1954. The theoretical perspectives outlined in chapter one
will be drawn on to provide a fuller description of the
complex factors in United States-Western European
collaboration on export controls and the instruments used by
the United States to impose its position on Western firms.
The Emergence o f Economic Warfare
In the months leading up to the end of the war,
American officials encouraged the Soviets to join in the
Bretton Woods agreements and considered proposals from
Foreign Minister Molotov for post-war loans (Yergin, 1977).
Truman, Harriman, and Acheson among others came to believe
that the Soviet Union was a "world bully" and that "economic
pressure could be used to control, discipline, and punish
it" (cited in Yergin, p. 93, 1977). By late 1945 Secretary
of State Acheson said that "the first instrument of United
States foreign policy (diplomacy and negotiation) had failed
to control the Soviets or to build trust." Therefore,
Acheson said, "we must use our second instrument of foreign
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policy, namely, economic power, to control the Soviets"
(Yergin, p. 308, 1977) .
The persuasive power of such a view was contingent on
an acceptance of the presupposition that the Soviet
leadership would react rationally and predictably to
economic rewards and punishments. Several executive
officials and United States Congressmen did not believe,
however, that the Soviet leadership was guided by "rational-
calculations of interest. The instrumental
conceptualization articulated by Harriman ran counter to the
construction of the Soviet Union as the embodiment of the
Enemy-Other. As inter-national events spiraled out of
control and as the understanding of Soviet actions became
increasingly determined by more radical constructions of the
nature of the threat, the faith in the instrumental value of
United States economic levers to control the Soviets faded.
United States policy makers moved to reconsider their
East-West economic policy strategy.
George Kennan in his long telegram articulated
succinctly the presuppositions that were to guide United
States East-West economic policy strategy throughout the
1950s. Kennan cast the Soviet leadership as being driven by
a type of "neurosis" and "internal logic" that was alien to
the West. He said that there "can never be on Moscow's side
any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the
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Soviet Union and the powers which are regarded as
capitalist- (FRUS, vol VI, 1946). "Everything possible will
be done to set the major Western Powers against each other,"
Kennan contended, and the Soviet leadership, he said, was
"committed fanatically to the belief that with the United
States there can be no modus vivendi" (FRUS, vol. VI, p.
698
,
1946)
.
Kennan set up the contrast between the Soviet Union
and the West as a juxtaposition of a rational enlightenment
individual to the uncivilized or the insane. He said that
the United States in formulating policy must "study it with
the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same
determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by
it, with which a doctor studies an unruly and unreasonable
individual" (FRUS, vol. VI, p. 709, 1946). What strikes
Kennan as peculiar to the Soviet Union is "the fact that it
is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in
its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective
fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure
against which outlook is constantly being tested and
re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are
selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook
already preconceived" (FRUS, vol. VI, p. 708, 1946). In
addition, "the Russians," according to Kennan, "have learned
to seek security only in patient, but deadly struggles for
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the total destruction of rival powers, never in compacts and
compromises- (FRUS, vol. VI, p. 698, 1946). The Soviet
leadership, he argued, believes it "necessary to destroy our
traditional way of life" and will "spare no effort to
discredit and to combat all efforts which threaten to lead
to any sort of unity or cohesion among other powers."
Kennan concludes his analysis by saying that "this problem
is within our power to solve," but that "there is nothing as
dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown" (FRUS, vol. VI,
p. 709, 1946)
.
Kennan' s telegram can be read on a number of levels.
His images and the construction of the source of Soviet
conduct meant that appeals to common interests or the use of
economic inducements in any form were useless. The Soviets
could not be disciplined or reformed through means that
would work on those for whom there was still hope for
salvation. The Soviets, like the untameable Eastern hordes
of old, had to be walled up or marginalized. To combat this
threat that had an ability to penetrate our body politik
required "every courageous and incisive measure to solve the
internal problems of our society, to improve self-
confidence, discipline, morale, and the community spirit of
our people" (FRUS, vol. VI, p. 708, 1946). Within the
confines of this discourse the sanity of the West or of the
United States became constituted and confirmed through the
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image of the Soviet Union. "Reality" while separate from
us, was something we were closer to because we constantly
tested our positions and our ideas in relation to that which
was external. We were empirical, non-ideological and closer
to the truth. The Soviet leadership was alien and
unenlightened.
This construction of the Soviet threat would come to
require, in terms of economic policy, "constant surveillance
(of economic interactions) through a comprehensive export
licensing system" (FRUS, vol. I, p. i 03 0, 1951). The policy
strategy this set of representations legitimated was one of
economic warfare. The reasoning behind the program was that
by debilitating the Enemy's military and industrial
development, the West could undermine the Soviet "war making
potential." The other central rationale for this program
was that by attempting to maintain monopolies or at least
lead times on technological advances, the West or the United
States could maintain economic and military superiority
(FRUS, vol. I, p. 1032, 1951; on the rationale for economic
embargoes see Hirshman, 1945; Gordon and Dangerfield, 1947;
Medlicott, 1959; Snyder, 1966; Knorr, 1975; Baldwin, 1985).
The Domestic Effort
In the summer of 1947 the Truman Doctrine was
proclaimed. In that same year the Soviet Union consolidated
power in Hungary and in 1948 it did the same in
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Czechoslovakia. In the economic sphere, Congress approved
$17 billion in aid for the Marshall Plan. Like the other
parts of the national security apparatus created in 1947,
such as the National Security Council and the Central
intelligence Agency, the system to control East-West trade
did not emerge suddenly and full-blown. The system was
institutionalized gradually through a series of statutes and
organizational innovations. The legal foundation for the
United States control system came first, through extensions
of the export control authority granted to the executive in
World War II and then in 1949 through the Export Control
Act.
In 1947 the newly formed National Security Council and
the newly created Policy Planning Staff in the State
Department (headed by George Kennan) began to develop
long-range policy strategies for the United States position
on East-West trade. In a November 1947 report submitted by
Kennan 's staff, contrasting views were articulated on the
particulars of the appropriate United States policy on trade
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Commerce
Department had submitted a proposal to the NSC recommending
that all exports to Europe and dependent territories be
placed under control. The report recommended that all
transfers be subject to an individually validated license
requirement. Shipments of any goods, the proposal
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maintained, should only be permitted to go forth when: l)
the receiving country furnished adequate justification of
need; 2) European recovery and world peace would be thereby
served; and, 3) the position of the United States would not
be adversely affected (FRUS, vol. iv, p. 490, 19 48 )
.
The reasoning behind this proposal apparently was
threefold. First, many United States officials concluded
that the Soviet Union was doing everything in its power to
"sabotage the European Recovery Program." This included the
attempts to acquire and stockpile foreign resources at the
expense of other European states. United States officials
argued that this situation necessitated "an immediate
termination of shipments from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. and
its satellites of all commodities critically short in the
U.S. and in Europe or which would contribute to the Soviet
military potential." Secondly, United States officials
believed that establishing a control system with a mandatory
individual license program for all commercial shipments to
Europe would allow for a more effective administration of
the European Recovery Program. The United States could then
gauge and control the distribution of goods transfers. The
third reason articulated in the proposal stated that "during
the period of operation of the recovery program, we will
wish to be able to exercise some pressure on countries
receiving our aid. A blanket control program would give us
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the means for exercising this influence- (FRUS, vol. iv, pp.
489-496, 1948)
.
The ensuing discussions reflected schisms that would
characterize United States domestic policy debates over
East-West trade controls into the 1980s, a part of this
schism involved what has been called the conflict between
the unilateralists and the multilateral ists. Some members
of the State Department, for example, expressed concern over
how such an action would appear given the United States
position on free trade in the ITO Havana negotiations.
These officials pointed out that taking this action without
regard to the traditional role of Eastern European raw
material exports in Western European economies could have a
potentially negative impact on U.S. -allied negotiations in
other areas. Some of these officials expressed a concern
over the possibility that such a move would be interpreted
as a hostile act by Stalin and that he might retaliate by
cutting off Western European states access to Eastern
European raw materials and energy supplies (FRUS, vol. V, p.
120, 1949) .
After some discussion in order to address these
concerns the NSC on December 17, 1948 agreed to order
blanket controls for all of Europe and its territories
including the Soviet Union ("the R procedure for export
controls"). Instituting blanket controls was designed to
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avoid the "overt act of discrimination against the Soviet
Union and its satellites" (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 512, 1948).
This was justified as a tactical move to avoid retaliation.
By March 1, 1948 according to the NSC order, all commercial
shipments to the "R" group would be subject to review
through the individual export license program. This allowed
the United States to deny transfers of goods to the Soviet
Union and the Eastern European states.
By March 1948 an overall strategy was taking shape.
Secretary of State George Marshall, Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal, and Secretary of Commerce Averill Harriman
ordered an inter-departmental sub-committee to "recommend
procedures for establishing a peace-time economic warfare
organization." According to this committee's recently
declassified report "the objective of the United States was
to inflict the greatest economic injury on the U.S.S.R and
its satellites and at the same time to minimize the damage
to the U.S. and the Western Powers resulting from; a)
probable Soviet retaliation; and, b) the inability of the
East to continue exports of certain supplies to the West"
(FRUS, vol. IV, p. 525, 1948).
These contrasting goals conflicted at points and
produced inter-agency divergences of opinions as well as
clashes between the Executive and the Congress. Within the
State Department there seems to have been a consensus that
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ensuring certain levels of Eastern Fnr-™e Eu opean raw material
exports was important for the overall goal of Western
European economic recovery. m contrast, many members of
Congress advocated a complete embargo on trade with Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. m addition, Congress
advocated strongly the use of economic coercion to get
allied states to comply with the United States economic
warfare strategy.
The Commerce Department was supportive of the idea of
an extensive embargo on trade with the Soviet bloc.
Commerce officials argued that granting licenses for the
transfer of any type of goods to the Soviet bloc should be
based on a strictly specific guid pro gups (FRUS, vol. IV,
p. 538, 1948). In addition, the Commerce Department pointed
out that in order for the United States program to be
effective "it would be necessary, through the ERA and
diplomatic channels, to arrange that Western European
countries pursue export policies which were more or less
consistent with those of the U.S." (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 542,
1948) .
Commerce Department officials were concerned that the
United States program would be undermined by Western
European re-exports or transshipments of controlled goods.
The licensing program, according to the Commerce Department,
should be used as an instrument of surveillance to detect
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unusual requests on the part of Western European states that
"might indicate re-exporting or other activities that should
be discouraged- (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 541, 1948). Charles
Sawyer, who replaced Harriman as Secretary of Commerce
expressed the view on several occasions that pressure should
be brought to bear on states receiving aid to bring them in
line with the United States" preferred position (FRUS, vol.
IV, 1948; FRUS, vol. IV, 1950).
This stand brought the Commerce Department into direct
clashes with the State Department's Division of Commercial
Policy, Division of Investment and Economic Development, and
Office of International Trade Policy (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 545,
1948). in May 1948, for example, to their consternation
Sawyer refused to approve export licenses for sales of
equipment essential to raw materials production to Eastern
bloc states, such as coal-mining and transportation
equipment to Poland. The Secretary of State intervened and
tried to convince Sawyer to approve the export licenses by
arguing that such denials would be detrimental to Western
European recovery because it would impair Eastern European
states' ability to deliver raw materials. This particular
issue was characteristic of the inter-agency conflicts that
occurred from 1948-1953. It represented the conflict
between the goal of inflicting the maximum amount of
economic harm on the Soviet bloc and of making sure that
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such controls did not result in greater harm to the United
States or the Western alliance economies.
One way of dealing with the problem of balancing these
goals was by establishing criteria to categorize goods in
terms of their strategic significance. The class of items
that were considered to have the highest strategic value
were categorized as 1A. This included:
a. Materials or equipment which are designated or
used principally for the production and/or
development of arms, ammunition, and implements of
war.
b. Materials or equipment which could contribute
significantly to the war potential of the Soviet
bloc where the items incorporate advanced
technology or unique technological know-how. It
applies only to goods sufficiently important to
the war potential that the absence of an embargo
would permit a significant advance in Soviet bloc
technology over its present level of development.
c. Materials or equipment which would contribute
significantly to the war potential of the Soviet
bloc in that the items, if embargoed, would
maintain or create a critical deficiency in the
war potential of the Soviet bloc.
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The 1A list originally contained 167 items including
specialized precision machine tools, petroleum equipment,
chemical equipment, precision scientific and electronic
'
equipment, and certain nonferrous metals (FRUS, vol. iv, p.
87, 1950). The 1A list also included a separate Munitions
List. The criteria for inclusion in the list meant that it
contained items with direct and indirect military
significance. That is, it included unique technologies and
items that would help the Soviet bloc states break
bottlenecks in their economies.
The second list, IB, consisted of "materials and
equipment which, if shipped in substantial quantities, may
contribute to the war potential of the Soviet bloc to so
great an extent that only reasonably small quantities of
such material or equipment should be permitted to move to
the Soviet bloc- (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 89, 1950). This list
included more than 300 items whose main contribution would
have been to Soviet bloc states' general industrial
development. The list included some primary commodities such
as copper, lead and zinc, and relatively common industrial
equipment and transportation equipment such as trucks and
freight cars (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 89, 1950; Mastanduno, p. 98,
1985) .
A more inclusive 1C list was also established in 1951
and contained an additional 200 items. The Commerce
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Department in consultation with an inter-departmental
advisory panel was given discretionary power to approve or
deny export license applications for ic items (FRUS, vol.
IV, p. 1049, 1951). The united states ha(J an uncondit . onal
embargo on the 1A list items. For all practical purposes
the IB and IC lists were also subject to embargo. In 1949,
for example, $22 million of class IB license applications'
were submitted to the Commerce Department, but only $770,000
worth were approved (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 80, 1950; cited in
Mastanduno, 1985)
.
In 1948 the United States moved to attempt to get the
allied states to adopt similarly broad embargo policies.
The nature of the initial Western European resistance
reflected not only a divergence in economic interests, but
also a deeper divergence of perception. The United States
and most of the Western European States did not share the
same view of the appropriate relationship between East-West
trade, export controls, and Western security interests.
The United States became convinced that economic
warfare was the best strategy for Western security. This
conviction was a result of a number of factors. First,
United States officials believed that there was really no
difference between the Soviet military and industrial
sectors. Any trade that would benefit Soviet industrial
productive capability or development to any degree
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whatsoever was thus seen as strategic. Secondly, United
States officials believed that an embargo program would
allow the United States to maintain military and economic
superiority over the Soviet bloc. The United states
preponderance in these areas was based in part on its
superior technology. The experience of World War II had
etched into the minds of the American public the image of
what it meant to have the scientific or technological edge
(Medlicott, 1959). United States officials were convinced
that the Soviet Union was attempting to acquire, as quickly
as possible, material and advanced technologies that would
allow it to make significant advances in industrial
development and military production and preparedness. Thus
they believed that the embargo net should be cast as widely
as possible, and that particular attention should be focused
on Western scientific and technological innovations (FRUS,
vol. I, p. 1032, 1951). Thirdly, a number of officials in
the NSC came to adhere to the construction of the nature of
the Soviet threat articulated in Kennan's telegram. What
Stanley Hoffmann calls the "containment crusade" was waged
and legitimated largely in the terms of what I have called
the absolutist discourse (Hoffmann, 1976; also see Larson,
1985, on attitude change and the influence of Kennan's image
of the Soviet Union)
.
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What is also revealing about the construction of this
policy is the fact that analyses conducted by both the CIA
and the State Department- s Office of Intelligence Research
concluded that the Soviet economy was relatively self-
sufficient in terms of resources (this may have not been
true for rapid technology development: see FRUS
, vol. I, pp .
1035-1041, 1951). This meant that there was some
recognition that the economic warfare program would only
have a limited impact on Soviet bloc economic power. Thus we
can conclude that the policy was driven to large measure by
the idea, widely accepted in Congress, that any trade that
would benefit the "dictators of enslaved peoples was morally
unacceptable" (Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, p. 58, 1986).
The rationale was then on one level expressive of the
perceived moral outrage at the Soviet "Other." it was also
driven by the idea that the "unruly individual had to be
isolated" or contained so as to minimize its potential
corrupting influence on the "reasonable" Western Powers.
The image of the Soviet Union that was articulated by Kennan
thus helped to legitimate the United States' economic
warfare strategy.
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Western Europpan Positinnc
immediately following the war most Western European
leaders believed that a limited embargo of narrowly defined
strategic goods was in the interest of Western security.
Most of these leaders were opposed, however, to the
proposals for a broad ranging embargo. They were averse, in
particular, to following a strategy of economic warfare
against the Soviet bloc. There were a number of reasons,
economic, political, and perceptual, for the contrast
between the United States and the Western European
positions. As Adler-Karlson put it (1968, p. 40) , the
motives for these contrasting views, "over the formation of
the export control policy, were based on different beliefs
about reality."
In December 1947 while the United States was beginning
to organize for economic warfare, the British were in the
process of negotiating an Anglo-Soviet trade and financing
agreement with Stalin. In the same month that the NSC
decided to place all exports to the "R" group under
licensing control, the British had agreed to sell railway
equipment, generators, and heavy machinery to the Soviets in
the hope that they could ensure raw material and fuel
exports from the Eastern bloc. At the end of the war
virtually all of the states of Western Europe believed, that
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a significant portion of their raw material and energy needs
could be filled by Eastern bloc exports.
The first source of resistance to the United States
proposal to engage in economic warfare with the Eastern bloc
was economic interest. Prior to the war, trade between
Eastern Europe and Western Europe had been complementary;
finished goods flowed East and raw materials, fuels, and
food flowed West (Jentleson, 1986; see table 3:1). Most
American officials in 1946 did not understand the gravity of
the devastation of Europe; a devastation "symbolized by the
urban rubble, which, like graveyards, dotted the Continent"
(Yergin, 1977) . There was a food and an energy crisis at
the end of 1945. More than 125 million Europeans were
living on an individual average of less than 2000 calories
per day. This is in contrast to the 3300 calories per day,
individual average in the United States (Yergin, 1977) . In
this environment, Western European leaders were not very
receptive to the idea of engaging in economic warfare with
anyone. They desired instead the resumption of
complementary trade arrangements with the East.
The second reason that European leaders opposed the
comprehensive embargo was because they believed it
impossible to implement in an effective manner. Third, even
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TABLE 3.1
Value of Total Trade, United States and WesternEurope with the Soviet Union and EasternEurope, 1938 (Millions of Dollars)
Western Europe (a) USA
Exports to:
USSR 153.9
Eastern Europe (b) 422.*0 H\l
Imports from:
USSR 292.2 26 qEastern Europe 54 3.2 31 3
1,411.
3
199.0
(a) Western Europe includes all of those states that werelater members of COCOM: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and
(b) Eastern Europe includes Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR
Sources: Bruce W. Jentleson Pipeline Politics (Ithaca NY:
Cornell University Press, 1986) p. 64 and Gunnar
Adler-Karlson (Stockholm: Almguist & Wiksell, 1968) p. 317.
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if it could be, they were skeptical of the prospects of the
strategy doing more harm to the East than to the West. m
the event that Eastern bloc exports were cut off in response
to the economic warfare program, Western European states
would be forced to find alternative sources of supply for
food, energy, and raw materials. The United States seemed
willing or incapable of providing full compensation for this
potential loss of trade. Western European leaders were also
skeptical of the success for such a broad program given the
practical difficulties and the administrative costs. The
leaders were concerned that their exporters would be
disadvantaged by such a control program because of the
possibility that some states would choose to go it alone or
to defect from the program. The creation of the
multilateral COCOM program was designed to satisfy some of
these concerns because it provided for the exchange of
information between participant states.
Western European officials were also opposed to such a
strategy because they did not believe that war with the
Soviet Union was inevitable. The trade wars of the inter-
war period and the conseguences of isolating Germany
economically led some Western European officials to believe
that engaging in economic warfare with the Soviet Union was
a slippery slope to war. They also believed that such a
strategy might feed into Stalin's hands by giving him
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bargaining power in intra-Eastern European trade regions
and an excuse to consolidate communist rule to an even
greater degree in Central Europe. Western European leaders
hoped that they could encourage
"Titoist" tendencies through
some level of economic interdependence with the Eastern
European states (Adler-Karlson, 1968).
There were two final issues that lay at the heart of
the United States-Western European conflict over the issue
of export controls with the Eastern bloc. First, in
devising a system of export controls that would enhance
Western security, Western European officials believed that
it was legitimate to separate Soviet economic or industrial
potential from its military or war potential (see
Mastanduno)
.
These officials argued that Western security
would be best served by controlling only items of direct
military applicability. Western European officials thus
advocated a much narrower definition of "strategic."
Secondly, there was simply a different understanding of the
legitimacy of engaging in trade with the Soviet Union.
Western European leaders and members of parliament were
suspicious of Stalin. When it came to the economic sphere,
however, moral indignation usually stopped short of casting
the Soviet Union as a evil adversary with whom there was no
hope of any ground for common interest. Western European
businessmen's willingness to "sell themselves Red" was not
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held up to the same type of sorutiny fooused on their U.s
counterparts. In the 1950s, for example, Senator Joseph
McCarthy on more than one occasion brought American
businessmen before his committee to accuse them of "traitor
trade" (Jentleson, p. 63, 1986; Adler-Karlson, p. 33, 1;.968
Gaining Western European r0ii ahorat j nn
In Economic Warfare
in 1948 the United States began diplomatic initiatives
to get the Western alliance states to agree to collaborate
in a coordinated export control program and met resistance.
By January 1951, however, Western alliance states agreed not
only to participate in a multilateral system to coordinate a
strategic embargo, but also to accept the United States
preferred strategy of economic warfare and the U.S.
understanding of what types of goods should be regarded as
strategic. The United States 1A and IB lists were accepted
by the allied states. This meant, that despite deep
reservations, Western European officials agreed to follow
the United States lead. There is some disagreement among
scholars when it comes to explaining the dynamics of Western
European collaboration with the United States on export
controls from 1949-1954.
The more widely accepted explanation is that the
Western alliance states were coerced into going along with
the United States preferred approach. This explanation,
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advanced first by Adler-Karlson, rests on the fact that
United States Marshall Plan aid was tied directly to
compliance with the U.S. export control program. Congress
was intent on making sure that states receiving United
States aid did not trade with Soviet bloc. As Adler-Karlson
puts it: "Despite all the West European reluctance its
governments did cooperate in the embargo policy. Thus we
must also ask why the West European nations did cooperate as
much as they did. The answer is clearly to be found in the
American threats to cut off aid in cases of non-compliance"
(Adler-Karlson, p. 45, 1968; see tables 3:2 and 3:3).
This interpretation has been challenged recently by
Michael Mastanduno. He contends that the United States was
able to persuade Western European officials that a broad
embargo was in their interest. Mastanduno argues that the
United States was able to get COCOM states to agree to
embargo both the 1A and IB lists because the invasion of
South Korea and Soviet actions in Eastern Europe had
increased Western European statesmen's concern over the
potential for East-West conflict.
Mastanduno concludes that the Executive was convinced
that attempting to force compliance with the United States
position on export controls would be detrimental to United
States security interests. According to Mastanduno, the
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TABLE 3.2
United States Foreign Assistance to WesternEurope 1950-1952 (in Millions of Dollars)
1950 1951 1952
Austria 168
.
5
J- -L U , J 11 / . 8
Belgium 229.7 59 . 6 Id . 8
Denmark 83 . 0 48 8 14 . U
France 700. 6 435.0 i DZ . 3
Germany 733 .
1
392 .
4
1 07 T
Iceland 7.1 8 . 3
~> • o
Ireland 4 j . 1 15 . 5 X
Italy 401. 6 262 . 0 170. 5
Netherlands 268 . 8 107.3 100. 0
Norway 95.2 41.3 16.9
Portugal 31.4 19. 0 X
Spain X 17.2 35.5
Sweden 51. 6 21.6 X
United Kingdom 995.2 265. 6 350. 3
Source: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1,
1945-June 30, 1961, Agency for International Development
Statistics and Reports.
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TABLE 3.3
United States Aid to Western p„rona n
Trade 1949 - 1955 HuSsTDXrs,^"^
1949 i960 1951 1952 195!
Western Europe
Total Economic Aid 6276.0 3619.2 2267.8 1349.1 466.4
Grants 4 910.9 3516.2 2211.5 1149.2 375.0
L°anS 1365 ' 1 303.0 56.3 199.9 91.4
Total Military Aid xxxx 37.1 604.6 1013.9 1541.
Total Exports
to Eastern Europe 832.4 653.3 745.9 742.9 1100.1
Total Imports
from Eastern Europe 1011.7 812.9 1009.8 995.4 1357.9
Source: Adler-Karlson. Western Economic Warfare, 1968.
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Executive believed that imposing an unconditional and broad
embargo would undermine the goal of aiding in the immediate
recovery of Western Europe and could produce conflicts that
would harm alliance stability. For these reasons the
Executive, says Mastanduno, worked to mitigate the potential
damage of coercive legislation by proposing an exceptions
mechanism. This allowed states to export controlled goods
when to do so was necessary to obtain critical supplies or
when prior commitments existed. It was under this condition
that Western European states became more willing to accept
the United States proposals for a broad ranged embargo.
Mastanduno supports his argument through an analysis
of some State Department officials' expression of the
Department's position on the issue and reports on
intra-allied negotiations from 1948-1951. For example,
during this period Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated:
There is no intention of using the threat of
withholding ECA aid to force the acquiescence of
European governments in U.S. policies on export
controls, for U.S. policy in the long run will be
infinitely more effective if based on the spirit and
principle of cooperation and a common recognition of
the danger in developing the military potential of the
Soviet Union and its satellites" (FRUS, vol. V, p.
81-82
,
1949)
.
Mastanduno' s argument is persuasive in that there does
appear to have been a greater congruency in the State
Department's and Western European officials' perceptions of
the nature of the Soviet threat after the invasion of South
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Korea, in addition, as pointed out above, the state
Department was opposed to the use of economic leverage to
get allied states to comply with the United States position
This argument fails to fully consider, however, the nature
of the instruments that were available to the United States
to bring leverage to bear on allied and Western governments
as well as firms. The contested exchange model, outlined in
chapter one, can demonstrate how the United States enforced
a more restrictive position on export controls throughout
the 1950s by offering compliance rents to firms and states.
There were indeed deep and intense divisions within
the Executive over the appropriate tactics to use in the
negotiations with the allied states. Allied officials were
aware of the fact that the Commerce and Defense Departments
and the Congress favored the use of leverage to bring them
in line with the United States policy position. Despite the
fact that the State Department expressed its opposition to
the use of aid as a leverage, allied officials realized that
the Congress had imposed an obligation on the president to
cut off aid in instances of non-compliance or to defend not
cutting off such aid before Congress. There was no
guarantee that the State Department could keep Congress at
bay. Western European officials were also no doubt aware of
the speed at which the United States Executive's position on
several issues had been undermined by the Congress following
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World War I. In addition
, the Unitgd states ^
to slow down and in see cases deny licenses for the export
of its goods when a clear compliance with U.S. export
controls was not guaranteed. This mechanism became an
effective instrument to get some states to agree to abide by
the United States wishes regarding controls on particular
items. Thus some of the governments that agreed to abide by
the economic warfare policy and to comply with controls on
specific items did so as a result of the threat of the
withdrawal of access to United States goods. This was also
no doubt true for many Western European firms.
Congressional Actions
In the opening discussions of the Marshall Plan aid
program in March 1948, several amendments were introduced
that tied aid to the issue of East-West trade. These
amendments were incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act
in section 117 (d)
. This section directed the Administrator
of Marshall aid to monitor the transactions of aid receiving
states and to refuse delivery of United States commodities
"which go into the production of any commodity for delivery
to any non-participating European country for which such a
commodity would be refused export licenses by the United
States in the interest of national security" (cited in
Adler-Karlson, p. 23, 1968). During the period in which the
Commerce Department was in the process of establishing
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criteria to designate which classes of goods should be
subject to what type of controls, this provision was
inefficiently enforced.
As a result, in late 1948 the Senate Committee
Expenditures in the Executive Departments conducted a seri
of studies that analyzed the effectiveness of the United
States export control program. in this review the Senate
attacked the Office of International Trade in the Department
of Commerce for its inefficiency in terms of ensuring
compliance and enforcing the program. The criticisms
contained in the Senate report were many and focused not
only on the fact that some United States exporters engaged
in flagrant violations, but also on the "complete
ineffectiveness in terms of destination controls" (The
Administration of Export Controls, Dec. 1948; Senate report
no. 1775, 80th Cong., 2nd sess.). The Senate report called
for a reorganization and reinvigoration of the export
control and licensing program. The proposed changes
included an expansion of the compliance and enforcement
staff; the collection of extensive lists and data on
individuals and firms that were engaged in exporting and
receiving United States goods; and the establishment of
mechanisms to monitor and prevent "unauthorized diversions,
transshipments, or end use of export commodities once such
commodities have left our ports."
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The recommendations of this Senate report were
incorporated into the Export Control Act in February i949
This Act formally institutionalized and standardized the
export control and licensing program. The stated purpose of
the new act was "to exercise the necessary vigilance over
exports from the standpoint of their significance to the
national security- (Export Control Act of 1949, Public Law
89-63, 89th Cong.). The Act also declared that it was the
policy of the United States "to apply such controls to the
maximum extent possible
. . . in dealings with the
Communist-dominated nations" (PL ,89-63, 1949). The
regulatory procedures of this legislation were exempt from
the Administrative Procedure Act because of their sensitive
nature. Individuals and firms found in violation of the
export control regulations were subject, however, to severe
administrative sanctions. This could include the loss of
all export privileges and criminal penalties of fines up to
"five times the value of the exports involved or $20,000,
whichever is greater, and/or five years imprisonment" (cited
in Adler-Karlson, p. 218, 1968; PL 89-63, 1949). The
extensiveness of this program, the vigilance it established
on Western individuals and firms engaged in trade, is
striking given the fact that the United States Executive is
lauded historically as the beacon of free trade in the
post-1945 world.
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Throughout 1949 and 1950 Congress continued to be
dissatisfied with what was seen as the inability of the
Executive to gain satisfactory collaboration fro, the
Western European allies on imposing broad controls on trade
with the Eastern bloc. It was probably the case that many
members of Congress were unaware of the diplomatic
initiatives and headway to gain Western European compliance
in the export control program that the State Department had
made from 1948 to 1950 (Adler-Karlson, 1968). This was
because Western European officials requested that any
cooperative arrangements on export controls be kept
confidential. Many members of Congress were also unaware of
the role that Eastern European trade played historically in
the development of Western European economies. Thus by l950
the issue of the level of Western European cooperation in
the export control program had become highly controversial
in the Congress. Resentment emerged in the Congress over
the prospect that aid-receiving European states might be
willing to engage in trade for economic gain with the Soviet
bloc at the expense of Western security. This became an
issue not only because of the perception that United States
firms who complied were disadvantaged, but more
significantly because it was cast as immoral to sell to the
enemy. In the 1950 Annual Report of the House Committee on
Un-American Activities, Western European aid receiving
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states were viciously attacked for their lax attitude on the
issue of export controls (Jentleson, p. 55, 1986).
After the outbreak of the Korean war the Congress
became even more vociferous and adamant in its desire to see
unqualified Western European support for the United states
position on export controls. m September 1950, a rider was
attached to the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951.
This rider, which became known as the Cannon Amendment,
stated: "During any period in which the Armed Forces of the
United States are actively engaged in hostilities while
carrying out any decision of the Security Council of the
United Nations, no economic or financial assistance shall be
provided out of any funds appropriated to carry out the
purposes of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
amended, or any other act to provide economic or financial
assistance (other than military assistance) to foreign
countries, to any country whose trade with the USSR, or any
of its satellite countries (including Communist China and
Korea) is found by the NSC to be contrary to the security
interest of the United States" (Chuthasmit, p. 40, 1962).
Many members of Congress were opposed to the provision
of Executive discretion embodied in this rider. The
original version, proposed by Senator Wherry, was designed
to allow the president no leeway on this issue (Chuthasmit,
p. 36, 1962) . Senator Lodge, however, siding with some
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members o £ the state Depart, expended enormous amounts
of energy to get the discretionary provision included
(Chuthasmit, p. 46 1962)
.
in early 1951 there was open conflict in the Congress
and between the president and Congress over the enforcement
of the cannon Amendment. m this context Senator Kern was
able to get a new rider attached to the Third Supplemental
Appropriations Bill of 1951. This amendment was much more
restrictive than the Cannon Amendment. it required the
Executive to cut off all assistance to any aid-receiving
state that engaged in trade of any item embargoed by the
United States. it required states that engaged in trade in
any form with the Soviet bloc to demonstrate in detail why
such trade should be exempt from the provisions of the
amendment. The Kern Amendment allowed for exceptions, but
required that the NSC report all such exceptions, with
supporting arguments, to all House and Senate committees
involved in oversight on East-West trade (Chuthasmit, p. 47,
1962; Mastanduno, 1985). The requirements of the amendment
were to be carried out in an extremely short amount of time
(approx. 2 weeks) . Truman was furious with this move and
stated that the rider was "an attempt to achieve by coercion
(U.S. of the Western Europeans) what must be achieved by
cooperation" (Adler-Karlson, p. 27, 1968). He reacted by
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wanting blanket exceptions^ ^.^^^^
comply
.
State Department officials attempted to get the Kern
Amendment replaced with a less restrictive piece of
legislation. The result was a compromise in the form of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) that was
passed on October 26, 1951. The Battle Act was a
significant change in that it was a more permanent piece of
legislation. it was effective in times of peace as well as
when the U.S. was engaged in hostilities; and it linked
economic and military assistance to compliance with U.S.
export controls (Mastanduno, 1985). it required the
president to terminate, unconditionally, all assistance to
any nation that exported arms, implements of war, or atomic
energy materials to the Soviet bloc (Chuthasmit, p. 53,
1962). it also required the termination of assistance if a
state was exporting primary strategic materials or "other
materials" to the Soviet bloc that were subject to embargo
by the United States (Adler-Karlson, pp. 28-30, 1968). it
gave the president discretion, however, to provide
exceptions when the national interest would be served. The
president was required to justify any exceptions before
Congress in the annual Battle Act Reports . The Battle Act
also established one of the key instruments for bringing
United States leverage to bear on Western European states
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and firms. The Act required the Executive to develop a
system to monitor permanently the compliance of foreign
nations, firms, and individuals with the United States
export control system.
The Executive never terminated economic or military
assistance under the Battle Act. Yet the actions taken by
Congress had significant and lasting repercussions on
Western European officials' perceptions. it also
established and institutionalized a variety of instruments
that could be used by the United States to extract
compliance. The Battle Act, and the legislation that
proceeded it, created a perception that various segments of
the United States government were willing and able to use
economic leverage to attempt to get the allied states to
comply with an economic warfare strategy. in addition, the
Export Control Act built conflict into the institutional
structures of the United States government by vesting the
responsibility to administer controls jointly in the
Department of Commerce and the Defense Department. This
brought these two Departments into direct conflict with the
State Department, which was responsible not only for
negotiating compliance with the United States export control
program, but also for establishing agreements with the
Western European allies in a number of other areas. State
Department officials were often more reluctant to risk
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disrupting progress made in other areas by taking a
hard-line on the controversial export control issue.
The contested exchange model shows how instruments
established through the ECA and the Battle Act worked
together to provide leverage in getting allied states to
comply with the United States strategy. The United states
had "rents" to offer; namely, access to its high technology,
goods, and economic and military assistance. it could
threaten to withdraw them in two ways. First, Commerce
Department officials could use export license delays or
denials to deny firms and governments access to United
States goods and technology. Secondly, and perhaps less
appealing because of political cost, the United States could
threaten to terminate economic or military aid. The
surveillance mechanisms established through the ECA and the
Battle Act allowed the United States to gauge compliance by
individuals, firms, and governments. in the context of a
global economy where the United States controlled a greatly
disproportionate share of almost all high technology and
capital goods, it was not in allied states' or Western
firms' interests to defy the United States.
The Dynamics Of Negotiations
By early 1948, unknown to Congress at the time, the
State Department had embarked on a series of intense
bilateral initiatives to gain Western European collaboration
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on a coordinated export control program. The goal of these
initiatives was to gain compliance as far as possible with
the United States 1A list and then to move on to the IB and
1C lists (FRUS, vol. IV/ p. 585/ 1948). The United States,
as was stated above, encountered resistance to its proposals
for an extensive embargo strategy. The bilateral talks
moved rather slowly and the Commerce Department began to
demand that the State Department exert more pressure to
bring aid-receiving states in line with the United States
policy (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 469, 1948). The Secretary of
Commerce complained bitterly to Secretary of state that non-
compliance and undesirable transshipments by Western
European states was undermining the United States program.
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer began to use "special screening
procedures" of export licenses for countries where bilateral
negotiations were moving slowly (FRUS, vol. iv, pp. 523-545,
1948) .
The European responses to the United States diplomatic
initiatives varied. The British and the French were the
most receptive to the initial United States proposals. They
expressed agreement in principle to the necessity of
establishing some type of program that would curtail exports
that could increase the Soviet bloc war potential, but were
reluctant to go beyond the United States 1A list. Italy,
the Scandinavian countries, and the other smaller Western
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European states were more reluctant to go along although
they did state a general agreement in principle (FRUS
, vol
IV, p.586-587, 1948). while agreeing on principle none of
these states were willing to take concrete actions to
implement any program that United States officials proposed.
All of these governments shared similar concerns.
First, they were skeptical of United States assurances of
compliance by other alliance member states. They did not
want their firms to be disadvantaged. Secondly, they were
concerned about the effects of trade and reexportation
through third party non-alliance states such as Switzerland,
Sweden, and Austria. Thirdly, they were reluctant to enter
into such a program because they were wary of violating
their obligations under trade agreements with Soviet bloc
states. Finally, they were reluctant to enter into a formal
or public agreement with the United States on this issue
because of the possible reaction in their respective
parliaments (FRUS, vol. IV, p. 69, 1949).
In late 1949 the Western European states agreed to
participate in multilateral discussions to coordinate a list
of common controls. The informal multilateral mechanism
that resulted from these talks was a compromise. The United
States and the Western allies agreed to set up two permanent
bodies in an organization to coordinate export controls:
the Consultative Group (CG) and the Coordinating Committee
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(COCOM)
.
The ^ership of the organization was the United
Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Japan, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Denmark, Portugal,
West Germany, Norway, Greece, and Turkey.
The CG was to meet four times a year as a policy and
guideline making body made up of high level representatives
from participating states. COCOM was to meet on a regular
basis to coordinate and implement agreed upon controls. The
terms and even the existence of the organization were to be
kept confidential. COCOM was meant to solve the issue of
uncertainty by providing information on the nature and level
of alliance member state participation in the export control
program. in addition, Western European states, particularly
the smaller ones, believed that this organization could help
mitigate against intense United States diplomatic pressure.
Compliance with CG-COCOM recommendations were considered
voluntary, but required if the organization was to last
(Mastanduno, 1985)
.
The states that agreed to join COCOM decided, based on
the United States proposal, to set up a series of three
international lists of items that would be subject to
control. The international list I included items that the
member states agreed should be embargoed unconditionally.
The second list, international list II, was made up of
classes of goods that were to be subject to quantitative
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restrictions. The last l ist was made up Qf^ ^^
under consideration as candidates for control and that were
monitored. This list was known as the surveillance list.
Negotiating the content of the lists was volatile and
protracted. The State Department sent officials from
capital to capital to generate support for the United States
position while the multilateral CG-COCOM talks proceeded in
Paris. The American, French, and British officials also met
in New York and London in tripartite talks to work out
particular details and to develop specific proposals to be
submitted to the multilateral forum (FRUS, vol. IV, pp.
187-194, and 234-241)
.
Initially the Western European states agreed to
embargo unconditionally 144 of the 177 items that were on
the United States 1A list. Six of the items on the United
States 1A list were placed on international list II while 27
were retained on list III (FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 87-93, 1950).
Western European officials refused to embargo a variety of
items on the United States 1A list such as tankers, diesel
engines, ball-bearings, and certain oil exploration and
transportation eguipment (FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 87-93, 1950;
cited in Mastanduno, 1985) . Once the organization was in
place, the United States began to pressure the Western
European states not only to accept all of its 1A list for
unconditional embargo, but also to agree to bring
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list. This would mean that the United states export control
guidelines would become the COCOM guidelines. By early i 952
the United States had succeeded.
immediately following the formation of the CG-COCOM in
1949 the United States was faced with three challenges. if
its economic warfare strategy was to be effective the United
States had to: first, persuade the Western European allies
to adopt controls of the US IB list; second, convince the
neutral European states to adopt or honor US and alliance
export control regulations and last; develop alliance
cooperative mechanisms to uncover diversions and to prevent
transshipments. The United States used diplomatic
persuasion rather effectively to achieve these goals. The
appeal in negotiations was to the common security interests.
Where diplomatic initiatives bogged down, however, the
export control licensing system and the threat of "throwing
the allies to Congress" provided a means to apply leverage.
The United States used data collected on trade flows,
and on firms and individuals to develop blacklists
identifying violators of international and the United States
export control regulations (FRUS, vol. IV, pp. 255-257,
1950; FRUS, vol. I, pp. 1032 and 1059-1067, 1951). The
United States was able to use this information to delay or
to deny export licenses bound for individuals, firms, or
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nations that were relurt^f *.uctant to comply witn the Vnit^
position on controls th-;~. Thls was a much more differentiated
system of instruments to bring nres„„0 ,. .j-iiiy p sure to bear on the
Western European states than t-h= .r he
"sledgehammer" approach
congress had established in requiring the termination of all
economic and military assistance to states that were found
in violation of export controls. United states technology
and capital inputs were required to quickly rebuild Western
European industrial plant. in addition, United states
exports were important input supplies for Western European
finished goods. This gave American officials with the power
of export license reviews leverage. It was widely known at
the time, particularly by British and French officials, that
the State Department and the Commerce Department radically
disagreed over the appropriate tactics to be used in
negotiations (FRUS, vol. I, p. 1153
, 1951) . while the^
Department controlled the negotiation process, the Commerce
Department and Secretary Sawyer - who favored the use of
leverage sooner rather than later - controlled the export
licensing program.
Throughout 1950 the United States attempted to get the
Western European states to adopt the IB list in full.
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer and Secretary of State Acheson
had numerous exchanges over the issue of tactics. By 1952
the Western European states had accepted the IB list so that
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there was virtually no difference between the COCOM Lists
and the United States lists. m the context of the heated
negotiations, recently declassified documents show that the
United States
-held up licenses applications for the export
of ball bearing manufacturing equipment to Italy and the
United Kingdom and of a steal strip mill to Sweden- (FRUS,
vol I, p. 154, 1950). These license applications were being
held up so that United States officials could "express
concern" over the inconsistency between member state control
criteria and the United States' criteria. m addition,
American officials in London were instructed "to point out
that if shipments of strategic items to the Soviet bloc
resulted from the licensing, public opinion in the United
States might force the government to adopt a more
restrictive policy toward licensing to the United Kingdom"
(FRUS, vol. I, p. 154, 1950). This was significant because
the United States was using the British as a mouthpiece for
the American position in negotiations with other Western
European states.
In another case the United States delayed licenses for
the Danish Ford and General Motors subsidiaries to export
automotive parts. These items were not on the international
lists and the Danish government had been bartering the parts
for desperately needed coal from Poland (FRUS, vol. I, pp.
1173, 1950). Within the context of the COCOM discussions
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the Danes had been rather outspoken in their opposition to abroad embargo strategy. The license applications ^
shipments of these parts were held up in the Commerce
Department despite the fact that the Danes made several
appeals regarding the grave necessity of obtaining Polish
coal. The State Department, playing "good cop" made several
appeals to the Commerce Department regarding the licenses.
It took an intervention by the President to resolve the
issue. He ordered to Commerce Department grant the licenses
(FRUS, vol. I, pp. U61-U76, at 1176, 1950). During the
process of resolving this issue, however, the Danes moved to
support the expansion of the COCOM embargo.
Leverage was applied much more directly in persuading
neutral states to adopt controls parallel to COCOM
. On
numerous occasions the United States made it clear to Sweden
and Switzerland that the United States would have to review
"with much greater scrutiny" applications for export
licenses to these states if no assurances were forthcoming.
State Department officials were told to "use this point at
the appropriate point in the negotiations" (FRUS, vol. v, p.
65, 1949). While the State Department would have preferred
to bring these neutral states along with persuasion, the
Department "recognized that withholding license applications
has had an affect on the Swiss willingness to cooperate"
(FRUS, vol. I, p. H54, 1951). In the case of the Swiss,
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Acheson instructed his negotiator to "exnr^ **express disappointment
that the Swiss have not agreed to the embargo and si.ply
indicate that the US will have to continue to review
licenses for these items in light of all the facts ... and
depart" (FRUS, vol. I, p. 1157# 1950)
.
Alliance niveraencp. and thp
Relaxation of COCOM Cnntrnic
By 1951 the Western Alliance was following a policy of
economic warfare against the Soviet bloc. This program, as
we have seen, was organized and led by the United States.
By 1953 a variety of factors came together to result in a
movement away from the broad embargo policy in COCOM. The
United States continued, however, to unilaterally pursue a
policy of economic warfare. United States officials used
the validated license program and developed an import
certification and delivery verification system to maintain
its instruments of leverage on Western firms. The United
States also maintained its surveillance, intelligence, and
blacklist system for firms and individuals that did not
comply with its more restrictive control system. In order
to avoid a diplomatic conflict, however, the United States
was willing to acquiesce to Western European governments'
demands that large numbers of items be removed from the
COCOM Lists.
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in 1953 Joseph Stalin died. The Soviet leadership
began pushing a peaceful coexistence line that included
courting Western commercial interests (Jentleson, 1986).
The Korean war had also ended. m addition changes began to
occur in West-West relations. m 1952-1953 there was a
global recession. Western European growth rates declined
and unemployment was "27 percent above the 1950 rate in
France, 25 percent higher in Great Britain and 15 percent
higher in Italy" (Jentleson, p. 80, 1986). Marshall Plan
aid outlays were also quickly fading and this meant some of
the resources that the United States could draw on for
leverage were decreasing (Adler-Karlson, p. 91, 1968;
Jentleson, 1985)
.
In this context the Western European governments
became highly critical of the extensiveness of the COCOM
embargo program. While McCarthyism raged in the United
States, Western European officials began to eye Eastern bloc
markets. There was a public outcry in Western Europe
against the United States pressure to continue tight
controls despite the changes in East-West relations.
Protest was registered openly in the British and German
Parliaments (Adler-Karlson, 1968) . Various Western European
newspapers also published criticisms of the United States
embargo policy. In the summer of 1953 Le Monde and II Sole
demanded revisions of the United States policy and recession
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of the Battle Act ( Adler-Karlson
, 1968)
. Several
European states, particularly the British and the French,
sent trade delegations to Moscow in the summer of 1953
(Labbe, 1988; Bertsch and Elliot, 1988). Most notably,
Winston Churchill in a speech before Parliament advanced a
neo-Kantian argument for expanding East-West commercial
relations. He said that trade was a peace-promoting agent
and that "the more trade there is through the Iron Curtain
... the better still will be the chances of our living
together in increasing comfort- (Adler-Karlson, 1968). This
speech had been prepared by British Board of Trade officials
whose Department had always opposed extensive controls.
By 1954 negotiations were underway between the United
States, France, and Great Britain to institute a relaxation
of the COCOM control system. The major revisions of the
COCOM Lists took place in three stages in 1954, 1955, and
1958. 1 When they ended in 1958 the United States was
^This chapter does not deal directly with the nature ofallied negotiations over the formation of a multilateral
economic warfare policy against China. It should be pointed
out, however, that a so-called "Chincom" was formed in 1952 as
a part of the CG, to administer and coordinate controlsdirected at China. In addition, following the Korean War and
at the 1954 revisions, the COCOM states agreed not toliberalize controls on China. This resulted in a situation
where, at the United States insistence, there was a disparity
in the controls applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
and those applied to China. This was known as "the China
differential .
"
Clearly, this policy was self defeating in that items
controlled for China could be transshipped through the Soviet
Union or Eastern Europe. By 1956 Chincom and the differential
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pursuing an economic warfare program unilaterally
(Adler-Karlson, 1968; Jentleson, i 986 ; Mastanduno, 1985)
The united states maintained its position that export
controls with the Soviet bloc should encompass all
"industrial fields which serve to support the basic economy
of a country and which therefore support either a peace-time
or a wartime economy" (Jentleson, p. 78, 1986). The COCOM
program, however, was scaled back to a more narrow strategic
embargo (Mastanduno, 1985). m addition, while the United
States goal of a coordinated alliance economic warfare
program was rejected, the goal of denying Soviet bloc access
to items where there was a Western technological monopoly
was retained.
In the initial negotiations the COCOM List I was cut
from 320 items to 226 items. The quantity control and
"surveillance" lists were cut from 92 to 26 and 102 to 63
items respectively (Jentleson, 1986; see table 3:4). The
most significant decontrols occurred in general industrial
equipment and chemical products while the decontrols in
electronics and precision instruments and metalworking
machinery were much lower (see table 3:5). The total
classes of items under any kind of controls decreased from
514 to 315. The 1958 revisions established a policy that
in controls applied to the Soviet Union and China were
disbanded. See Mastanduno (1985) for a closer analysis of this
case
.
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the international lists should be revised yearly lB
addition, in 1958 the C0CQM ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^
one list oalled the "watch list" (Adler-Karlson, 19M) .
Items that were taken off of the international lists
included : "some types of civilian aircraft, electrical
generating equipment, some classes of ships, pumps and oil
drilling equipment and refining equipment, electric motors,
turbines, small steel rolling mills, industrial diamonds,
'
industrial ball bearings, aluminum and copper and tires"
(Adler-Karlson, 1968)
.
These revisions represented a concession by the United
States. The United States was willing to go along with
these revisions for a number of reasons. First, and at a
general level, the United States was concerned with
maintaining intra-alliance harmony. President Eisenhower
stated that it was in "the interest of the United States to
facilitate accord with the allies by going along with
liberalizing multilateral controls" (Jentleson, 1986).
Secondly, there was a quid pro quo. The United States
agreed to the relaxations, but continued to maintain strict
unilateral controls. In exchange, the Western Europeans
agreed to develop legislation and administrative systems to
provide for much more extensive and effective enforcement
mechanisms and transshipment controls (Adler-Karlson, 1968).
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TABLE 3.4
Number of Items on COCOM Lists Before and AfterRevisions of August 15, 1954
Before revision 320
After revisi<
Source: Task Force on Economic Defense Policy to theChairman, Council on Foreign Policy, "Draft Guidance Paner
Rnv ?
St
;
W
?f Trad6 '" °Ct0ber 5 < 19^' T A??achmen? ABox 1 Folder: CFEP-East-West Trade, Records of ClarenceFrancis, 1954-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower PresidentialLibrary, Abilene, Kans., cited in Bruce w. Jentleson
^g^ lne EfllltlSfi dthaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
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The United States wanted to ensure that its control
Program would not be frustrated by the inconsistency between
its lists and the items subject to control in other Western
European states. since 1948 the United States Commerce
Department granted licenses for exports of controlled goods
only when the government of the receiving agent was willing
to guarantee that "such goods, the products of such goods,
or similar goods would not be re-exported to a controlled
destination or to provide information as to why such
reassurance was impossible" (Mastanduno, 1985). To increase
the effectiveness of this policy, the United States in 1954
set up an Import Certification/Delivery Verification (ic/DV)
program and required all states receiving U.S. controlled
exports to adopt the system. This meant that all importers
of United States goods and "users" of United States'
technology were required to obtain a certificate from their
home governments stating that the U.S. control policy would
be honored and that re-export would not occur. Importers
were required to present this document to the United States
government as part of the export license package ( Battle Act
ReP°rt no
-
v
/ May 17, 1954; Mastanduno, 1985). The United
States could also request a delivery verification from the
importing country. The United States also reserved the
right to impose sanctions, such as the penalties proscribed
in the ECA, and to deny access to the United States market,
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:es
:ern
on firms and individuals found in violation of its export
control regulations and the IC/DV system (Battle Act Report,
no. V, May, 17, 1954). This meant that the United State
imposed its export controls extraterritorially
. This
ensured that the United States could maintain leverage
instruments that could be applied to Western firms.
The COCOM revisions explicitly required the West*
European states to strengthen enforcement of this system.
The revisions also called for the establishment of a similar
system, Transit Authorization Certificate, to monitor the
movement of goods through free ports. in addition, a
"financial transaction surveillance system" was agreed upon
to prevent allied firms from financing sales of controlled
goods through third countries ( Battle Act Report , no. 9,
June 28, p. 21, 1957; cited in Mastanduno, 1985).
Thus, despite the COCOM relaxations the United States
retained significant control over the goods that could flow
East. This control was possible because of the strict
unilateral program, the IC/DV system, and the fact that the
United States held the commanding heights in leading edge
and advanced technology. In addition, in the first two
decades following the war the United States government
accounted for the vast majority of R & D spending in all
high technology areas such as space and nuclear technology
(Mastanduno, 1985). This fact gave the U.S. government
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significant control over access to advanced technology
developments.
The revisions did not prevent the United States from
keeping its export control administration and COCOM intact
as organizations designed to help the West maintain
technological monopolies and lead times over the East.
Following the revisions of the i9Rn«! h^.i-uj. n ysos, debates in COCOM were
no longer preoccupations over the effectiveness of a
coordinated alliance economic warfare strategy. The
conflicts and debates were over whether or not particular
items should be added to or removed from the lists on the
basis of their strategic significance.
Conclusi on
The dynamics of U.S.
-Western European collaboration
during this period are explained most readily in terms of
the structural distribution of power and discourse analysis.
However, the institutional and market explanations also help
to account for aspects of the collaboration. in this
conclusion I will consider how some of these intepretating
contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of
collaboration. In addition, I will summarize how factors at
each level of analysis interacted to bring about
collaboration
.
The form of post-war East-West trading relations was
uncertain in 1945. As misunderstandings and conflicts
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between the superpowers multiplied, an
came to determine united states lnterpretations o( soviet
actions. This discourse legitlmated a poUey ^ economic
Warfare
- ^ S °Viet «« — as the embodiment o f the
Enemy-Other intent on disrupting international harmony ana
on destroying
"Western civilization." In order to isolate
this threat, the United states adopted rules and estahiished
institutional structures to carry out a broad export control
program This program was set up to guard Western security
and was designed to inflict damage on Soviet bloc economic
development and war-making potential. m addition, a
central goal of the program was to maintain Western
technological lead times and monopolies. The United States
policy was legitimated by the terms of an absolutist
discourse that had been accepted within the NSC.
Western European powers had had traditional trading
ties with the Eastern bloc states. while suspicious of
Stalin, most Western European leaders did not share the
image of the Soviet Union articulated by George Kennan.
While they supported the idea of a limited strategic
embargo, many Western European officials believed that trade
could have an instrumental value in manipulating the Soviet
Union and dividing the Soviet bloc. In addition, many
believed that trade held mutual economic benefits. Some
Western European officials argued that trade and economic
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issues should be decoupled from political considerations.
Most groups within Western Europe wanted to reestablish
traditional trade ties for economic reasons. Despite this
strong preference, these states followed the United States
lead. They participated in the formation of COCOM and
agreed to impose an embargo on East-West trade in items of
direct as well as indirect military significance.
Western European officials agreed to adopt the United
States approach to export controls from 1951-1953 for a
number of reasons. First, the outbreak of the Korean war
led Western European officials to be wary of following an
economic policy that would increase Stalin's war-making
potential. Western Europen officials also became more
willing to accept the terms of the absolutist discourse.
Secondly, Western European government and business officials
were reluctant to incite a Congress that had passed
legislation requiring the Executive to cut off all economic
and military assistance to states that violated the United
States policy. Marshall Plan aid, at this point, was much
more important to Western European economies than Eastern
European market. Thirdly, the United States State Department
helped to develop an exceptions mechanism in COCOM through
which trade in essential Eastern bloc goods, raw material
and energy supplies, could be maintained and standing
contracts honored. Unlike the Commerce and Defense
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Department, state Department officials appeared more
inclined to attempt to find compromises with Western
European States reluctant to forgo trade with the East The
fourth reason that Western European officials followed the
United States lead is explained by the micro-economic
contested exchange model. The United States could use
access to relatively scarce goods it controlled as well as
the threat of denying export licenses for these goods, to
extract compliance with its position in negotiations with
governments and to extract compliance from Western firms.
The surveillance programs on transactions and trade flows
established through the Battle Act and the ECA allowed the
United States to gauge compliance and to establish
blacklists of violators. This practice allowed the United
States to apply leverage instruments effectively.
By 1953 the nature of Western-Soviet bloc relations
had begun to change. In addition, Marshall Plan aid had
begun to dry up and Western Europe was coping with the
effects of a global recession. In this context, Eastern
bloc markets became more appealing while United States
economic leverage was in part eroded. The United States
believed it was in its interest to concede to Western
European demands for a relaxation of multilateral controls.
The United States did not abandon its economic warfare
strategy, but fell back on the IC/DV system and its export
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control licensing program to deny the Soviet bloc access to
its goods. After 1954, allied states were willing to
continue cooperation in COCOM as a coordinated effort to
prevent flows of strategic items and advanced technological
goods to the Soviet bloc. Conflict continued over which
items should be controlled on these grounds. The United
States continued to pursue a unilateral strict control
policy for over a decade. in the 1960s economic and
political forces came together to transform the United
States position on East-West trade. As we will see in the
next chapter, the rise of detente and the reemergence of an
instrumentalist and a neo-Kantian discourse legitimated a
much more flexible and relaxed United States export control
system.
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TABLE 3.5
of Ite»s OecoXoVed' ^roa^t
Product Category
Before
Revisions
After
Revisions
Percentage
of items
decontrolled
General industrial
equipment
Chemical products
Chemical and petro-
leum equipment
Electronics and
precision instruments
41
98
49
74
Metalworking machinery 78
Munitions and atomic 54
energy
14
45
25
50
53
51
65.8%
54.7
49. 0
32 . 4
32 . 0
5.5
Source: Task Force on Economic Defense Policy to theChairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, "DraftGuidance Paper on East-West Trade, » October 5, 1955 Annex
4, Attachment A, Box 1, Folder: CFEP-East-West Trade'Records of Clarence Francis, 1954-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans., cited in Bruce WJentleson Pipeline Politics (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University
Press, 1986) p. 77.
CHAPTER IV
EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY IN THE CONTEXT opECONOMIC COMPETITION: THE CLASH OF THFINSTRUMENTALIST AND NEO-KA^IAN
DISCOURSES
The Purpose Bpo i nd
,
th^_SJ1m_i n_^t^estTrade Pnl iry '
This chapter is an analysis of the changes that
occurred in United States policy on East-West trade and
COCOM in the 1960s and the 1970s. m this examination of
how the alteration of United States policy affected the
COCOM program, I address the two following questions: 1) To
what degree was the state of multilateral export controls
during this period determined by intensified West-West
economic competition; and 2) Was the linkage approach to
East-West trade liberalization that emerged made possible
and legitimated by an instrumentalist discourse?
After the 1958 COCOM revisions the United States
maintained a more restrictive unilateral East-West export
control program. This more comprehensive program was
designed to "guard United States technology that was not
available anywhere else in the world" (McKitterick, p. 22,
1966). As described in chapter three, surveillance
programs, the IC/DV system, reexport control authority, and
compliance rents were all designed to provide leverage for
the regulation of trade in categories of items or technology
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where the United states; a) held a nonopoiy; ^ ^^to prevent the diffusion of that technQlogy
_ ^ ^
late 195 os and early 1960s Eastern bloc demand for Western
European capital goods and high technology items increased
There was a movement away fro, the economic isolationism
envisioned by Stalin. m addition Western European
officials became more willina t-n »n™,ii 9 o allow firms to fin this
demand. This resulted from both a growth in inter-Western
economic competition and the fact that Western European
officials' perception of the appropriate relationship
between East-West trade and Western security shifted away
from a policy of economic denial to one of inducement. This
represented a shift away from an absolutist discourse toward
an instrumentalist discourse.
These changes caused American officials in various
executive departments to reassess the broader and more
restrictive United States approach to East-West trade
controls. By the early 1960s the economic warfare strategy
that had been legitimated by the absolutist discourse came
to be seen as misguided by many executive branch officials.
This was due only in part to the expansion of Western
European-East bloc trade and a greater diffusion of
technological development and productive capability. The
reassessment was also due to the fact that even in the face
of economic warfare, Soviet bloc states made tremendous
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and
strides forward in economic growth and in industrial
technological development. By 1960f having launched the
Sputnik and produced sophisticated missile delivery systems
the Soviet Union demonstrated an ability to develop and to
'
maintain advanced military technology despite United states
restrictive controls on technology transfers.
in this context American executive branch officials
faced a choice over how to reform the United States approach
to export control policy. As Mastanduno argues, there
appeared to be three options: pursue a unilateral economic
warfare program; attempt to coerce allied states and firms
into compliance with a coordinated broader restrictive
program; or reduce United States controls to the level of
other alliance states (Mastanduno, 1985). The unilateral
option made some sense in that the United States could have
used various instruments to attempt to bring Western firms
into compliance and to ensure that the embargo was not made
ineffective by Western European-East bloc trade. The
potential cost of resorting to attempts at coercion with
increasingly sensitive allies was seen by United States
officials as politically unacceptable. However, simply
liberalizing United States-Eastern bloc trade was
problematic given domestic constraints. There was strong
domestic opposition to East-West trade liberalization
particularly in the Congress where trade was still regarded
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as more of a privilege than a right and trading with
Communists states U3
c
, .n r was a moral issue. Ultimately the
executive branch advocated liberalizationxj.jjera izatio of controls tied
to political concessions from the Soviet bloc.
The image of the Soviet Union on which the eventual
United States policy shift was based, as well as, the
language used to defend the policy, represented a move away
from the Cold War absolutist discourse. By the mid-1960s an
instrumentalist discourse that legitimated a tactical
linkage strategy became the guidepost for the executive
branch position on East-West export control policy. This
discourse broke with the images, symbols, and
representations that had been articulated by George Kennan
in 1946. united States executive branch officials began to
draw more directly on an image of the Soviet Union as a
traditional great power with interests in status quo
supporting relations. Officials in the Kennedy, Johnson,
Nixon, and Carter Administrations all spoke of trade as a
"tool to be used" on the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc
(McKitterick, p. 26, 1966; Hardt and Holliday, 1973). This
type of language could have authority or persuasive power
only with an image of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc
different from that of the Cold War period. This "new"
discourse was based on the supposition that the Soviet
leadership, out of "rational calculations of interest,"
187
would react in a predictable fashion to appropriately
designed instructs of foreign polioy discipline. The rise
of this discourse corresponded with the incorporation of
behaviorist methodologies in foreign policy formation. This
included, for example, attempts to rationalize United
States' nuclear strategic policy and the Kennedy
Administrations' reorganization of the Pentagon (see Gaddis,
1982)
.
This instrumentalist discourse clashed, however,
with counter discourses, both absolutist and neo-Kantian, in
Congress
.
Changes in the nature of West-West economic
competition, the expansion of Western European-Eastern bloc
trade, and the breakdown of the images that held together
the Cold War consensus produced a shift in United States
policy on East-West trade. That shift was most clearly
articulated in 1969 when Congress replaced the Export
Control Act with the Export Administration Act. However,
the theoretical framework for the policy shift and the
initiatives for implementation came from the executive
branch in the Nixon-Kissinger and Carter-Huntington versions
of trade linkage.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first
section reviews the state of inter-allied relations over
COCOM in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I assess executive
branch proposals to alter United States policy on East-West
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trade during the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations
in addition, z analyze the position of the Congress and
sectors of the business community.
The second section of the chapter is an anaiysis of
the dynamics of executive branch and Congressional relations
during the movement from the Export Control Act to the
Export Administration Act in 1969. There were significant
intra-governmental divergences of opinion during this
process. The executive branch supported East-West trade
liberalization, but attempted to retain discretionary
authority over export controls for foreign policy purposes.
Key members of Congress attempted to move to a unilateral
East-West trade liberalization without any connection to
superpower politics. The outcome of this struggle and its
relationship to Western European states' policies, such as
Brandt's Ostpolitik, will be the focus of the final part of
this section. The key issue in this section is explaining
the change in the United States' position. Was it driven by
transformations at the international level? Which branch of
government led the way in altering United States policy? Was
the policy shift a result of interest group pressure in the
face of growing West-West commercial competition? Finally,
to what degree was the United States' policy shift bound up
in the move to an instrumentalist discourse?
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The third section evaluates the differences between
the Nixon and the Carter Administrations approaches to
establishing links between concessions on export controls
and changes in Soviet domestic or foreign policy. This will
include an analysis of the types of domestic constrains and
international difficulties these administrations faced as a
result of the peculiarities of their approach.
The final section of the chapter focuses more directly
on how the transformations of the United States position
played out in the context of COCOM. COCOM regulations were
ignored or by-passed by the United States and by Western
European states during this period. What explains the
disregard of COCOM by the United States and the Western
allies during the 1970s? in 1980 when the Reagan
Administration moved to invigorate the multilateral export
control program, many cases of COCOM and United States
approved transfers of security sensitive technologies were
made public. Reagan Administration officials pointed to
these cases, claimed that detente was a foreign policy
failure, and said that it had done significant harm to
Western and United States security interests.
Mastanduno argues that COCOM became an ineffective
organization during the 1970s because the United States did
not provide leadership for maintaining the integrity of the
program (Mastanduno, 1985) . This, however, does not tell us
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«*. This chapter will show that on a ^ ^
west-west economic competition, changes in allied officials ,
-ages of the nature of the Soviet threat, and changes in
allied officials, perception of the appropriate reiationship
between East-West trace ana Western security. United states
capability to ensure the integrity of controls on these
technologies where it maintained a global lead regained
relatively intact. This included areas such as eguipment
for the exploration and production of oil and gas,
computers, robotics, and microprocessors. United'states
pclicy, however, might have become guided by a sentiment
best expressed by Secretary of Commerce Pete Peterson who
said: "There comes a point at which we must face the fact
that business is business, and if it's going to go on in any
event we might as well have a piece of the action" (Peterson
Report, 1973).
cocom After iq^«
Following the revisions of 1958, reviews of items in
categories on the COCOM control list were held annually.
Adler-Karlson, who conducted interviews in the 1960s with
Western European representatives to COCOM reported that the
reviews of the late 1950s and early 1960s were largely
technical exercises. items were removed from the lists when
intelligence information showed that Soviet bloc states had
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mastered the productiQn process such goQds> ^
also removed when they had grown militarily obsolete
Predictably, however, conflict arose in COCOM over the
question of what should be added to the COCOM control lists
The united States was interested in controlling the transfer
of leading edge and state of the art technology. whether or
not other COCOM states agreed, the United States continued
to maintain a more extensive unilateral export control
program. The unilateral control program over high end
technology was eroded little by Eisenhower's 1959 decision
to liberalize trade in some consumer-goods sectors such as
textiles and agricultural machinery. United States exports
of consumer-goods to the Soviet Union increased from $3.4
million in 1958 to $60 million in i960 (Jentleson, p. 95,
1986)
.
The Soviet Union during this period became much more
interested in acquiring Western commodities and consumer
goods.
The United States, however, continued its broader
definition of what types of technological innovations and
items had military significance. Part of the reason for
this was that in the 1950s and early 1960s military
applications of newly developed technology usually perceded
civilian applications. United States government funds
dominated R and D spending in the defense, space and
high-technology manufacturing industries (Nau, p. 68, 1976).
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in 1959 59% of the dollar value of all r and n .n D preformed inthe industrial sector in the United state* »a b s was provided by
the federal government (Kau, p. 65
, 1976) . Th£ government ,
,
share of R and D funding in 1963 was 65% in ^
equipment and communications sector, 90* in the aircraft
sector, and 571 in the manufacturing sector (Nau, p. 68
,
1976,
.
In addition the government and particularly the DOD
served as the first market for many newly developed
technologies. m 1963, for example, the DOD was the sole
consumer of all integrated circuit production in the United
States (Mastanduno, p. 298
,
19„, . The high percentage Qf
governmental input meant that federal agencies, particularly
the DOD knew of the military value of technology before it
was released into private markets. This gave United States
officials an advantage in setting out the criteria that
should guide the regulation of the transfer of newly
developed technology. The fact that these officials
considered the military application of these technologies
first strengthened their arguments for its regulation. As
we will see, higher percentages of private R and D funding
and the development of Western European technological
productive capability in the mid 1960s reduced United states
government officials' proprietary knowledge and hindered
United States leverage over the transfer of dual use
technologies to the East bloc.
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The United States' unilateral -u, «,«i iidteraiiy more restrict-
export control system was based on the view that qualitative
military and industrial superiority provided the strategic
edge over the Soviet bloc numerical and conventional
superiority. The United States believed that it could
maintain qualitative superiority with advances in
technological capabilities that provided a lead time over
Soviet military developments.
In addition to this substantive basis for the United
States more restrictive program, by i960, as Henry Nau
points out, "U.S. technology began to acquire a broader
foreign policy significance, being valued as a symbol of
American leadership and prestige, as well as a substantive
contributor to military systems- (Nau, p. 56, 1976). Thus,
as we will see, some members of the United States Executive
came to believe that there was a way of preserving Western
military technological advantage through focused controls,
while at the same time using access to some items and
technology in an instrumental fashion. Based on this view,
the Kennedy Administration began to articulate a vision of
how technology could be used to win friends and influence
potential and long time adversaries.
In the early 1960s, however, the United States' more
restrictive position still rested on the view that the
export control program was designed to retard, as far as
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possible, soviet bloc economic development. In 1963 Labour
party leader Harold Wilson stated that his party (soon to be
government) did not share the United States understanding of
the goals of the COCOM program. He said that the
.-American
view is still based on a hope of containing Soviet economic
growth by refusing to trade, especially in plant and
equipment that incorporates Western know-how" (Adler-
Karlson, p. 99, 1968) .
The State Department was willing to tolerate growingly
significant disparities between the U.S. control criteria
and those of COCOM and other COCOM states. Recall from
chapter three that many members of the state Department
disagreed with Congress and other agencies over how to best
bring European states and firms in line with economic
warfare. other agencies within the American federal
government had been, and remained, highly critical of this
state of affairs. Nevertheless, inter-allied conflicts in
COCOM in the late 1950s appear to have been minimal. This
was due to the fact that the COCOM control criteria had been
made more narrow and were based on an explicit definitional
requirement of military as opposed to economic significance
(Mastanduno, 1985). The United States' had compromised in
the context of the multinational forum, but the United
States maintained its unilateral program. In addition, by
1960 a COCOM procedure called the "administrative exception"
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s
ere
had been instituted. This procedure was an addition to the
general exception request procedure that required that all
exceptions for trade in controlled items be subject to
multilateral approval in the COCOM forum. The
administrative exception, however, permitted governments to
allow the export of controlled items unilaterally when it
officials were "satisfied that no security interests w
being endangered- ( Adler-Karlson p. 99, 1968). states that
provided exceptions under this procedure were required to
report all cases to COCOM.
One of the inter-allied conflicts that occurred in
1960 resulted from a difference in understanding over the
administrative exception procedure. The ambiguity of the
criteria ("satisfied that no security interest is being
endangered") led to conflict between the French and other
COCOM members. De Gaulle seemed to be rather easily
"satisfied" on this issue. In March 1960 he used the
procedure to unilaterally extend trade with Eastern bloc
states in a number of categories of goods that were subject
to COCOM control. Included in these agreements was
communications equipment valued at $1 million ( Battle Act
Report, no. 14, December 20, 1960). The United States and
other COCOM states protested the deal.
In the United States this issue sparked more general
intra-governmental conflict as the DOD and Commerce
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Department once again came into conflict with the state
Department over the issue of the United States acceptance of
the Western European more liberal position on export
controls. According to McKitterick, "most of the domestic
departments of the Federal government fought a rearguard
action against the state Department', over the issue of
control criteria (McKitterick, p. 21
, 1966) . The
Department in 1959 attempted to persuade other alliance
states that COCOM as an organization should adopt an
international blacklist and a greylist of individuals and
firms that were known to have or were suspected of trading
controlled items with the Soviet bloc (McKitterick, p. 21,
1966). The United States developed these lists, but the
proposals were rejected.
The Articu lation of a New Vision of
East-West Trade in thp
Kennedy Administration
According to his secretary of commerce Luther Hodges,
John F. Kennedy came to office with a vision of expanding
trade between the Soviet Union and the United States
(Jentleson, 1986) . In addition, in his State of the Union
address in January 1961, Kennedy stated that the United
States should use "economic tools to establish historic ties
of friendship between the United States and the peoples of
Eastern Europe" (McKitterick, p. 26, 1966). This echoed a
speech Kennedy made in 1957 on the floor of the Senate where
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he said that "we must an* ourselves with more economic
tools. we must be willing to recognize divisions in the
Communist Camp and be willing to encourage those divisions"
(Adler-Karlson, p. i 05
, 1968). He went on to state that the
President should be allowed to use United States economic
strength to "wean captive nations away from their Kremlin
masters." Kennedy's references in 1957 were to Poland and
Yugoslavia. The United States had provided aid and trade
concessions to Yugoslavia after Tito's break with Stalin in
1948 and to Poland after Gomulka came to power in 1956.
Kennedy's vision was to use United States economic and
technological power in a broader more systematic way as
rewards or inducements. This was evident in several of the
Administration's ambitious programs such as the Alliance for
Progress. m terms of Soviet-United States trade, Kennedy
advisors such as George Ball had recommended "scrapping the
existing embargo" and opening trade talks with the Soviets
(Jentleson, p. 96, 1986). Kennedy went to the Vienna summit
in June 1961 with proposals for liberalization of trade
controls. He presented this idea to Khrushchev under the
condition that progress would be made in finding solutions
to unresolved problems. The Vienna summit was a failure.
Khrushchev rejected the linked liberalization proposal. In
addition, immediately after the summit tensions erupted over
Berlin and Kennedy's vision of the potential political
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benefits of East-West trade fell victim to h1C l domestic reactionand constraints.
Congress too, two steps in l 962 to curtail executive^ abUitY "— E—,t trade for foreign policy
purposes. The Trade Expansion Act of i 9fi? . •a t 1 62 required denial
of most-favored-nation tariff statue <-„ v11 s to Yugoslavia and
Poland (Mckitt^-< p- »«). The Executive uas able
to w0rk around th i S provision
. More signiflcantly< however
Congress reinforced the export control system as an „a tjue economic
warfare embargo through an amendment to the Export Control
Act of 1949. Based on the recommendation of a House Select
Committee set up to review the United States export control
system, Congress reduced Executive discretion by stating
that export licenses must be denied if the goods concerned
contributed to the "economic potential" (new language, or
the "military potential" (old language) of Eastern bloc
states (McKitterick, p. 26, 1966; Adler-Karlson, 1968;
Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986). While economic
potential had been the implicit criteria of the United
States' more restrictive export control program since its
creation, the Kennedy Administration had hoped to use
loopholes in the 1949 ECA to move away from the total
economic warfare program.
Paul Kitchin (D.-N.C.) who chaired the committee said
that "the free world would sink deeper into the guicksands
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of a world dominated by internation.iy al communism" if trade
was not curtailed (Jentleson, p. 98 i 986 ^ th> f »o, 1S )
. The new law
also required the executive to seek allipHK ed compliance with
more restrictive coni-rnictrols and recommended the use of
leverage once again through the extraterritorial
applications of United States law. Here once again the
Congress displayed its willingness to impose sanctions on
states that violated the United States position on controls.
This new policy did not enjoy support within elements of the
executive, however, in this case State and Commerce opposed
the restrictive policy. Nevertheless, the bill passed in
the House by 339 and in the Senate by 57 (Jentleson, p. 99,
1986) .
The Kennedy Administration encountered pressure on the
East-West trade issue not only from Congress, but from
right-wing political organizations and conservative consumer
groups such as the "Committees to Warn of the Arrival of
Communist Merchandise on the Local Business Scene"
(Adler-Karlson p. 107, 1968). These groups led attacks on
local businesses that sold items imported from the Eastern
bloc states and exposed firms that entertained the
possibility of entering into joint ventures to attempt to
gain access to the Eastern market. In the context of the
domestic reaction to increased East-West tension, the
Kennedy Administration used United States leverage to impose
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an embargo to stop the Soviet .Western ^^^^ ^
Pipeline ana to force allied states to violate existing
contracts to supply wide-diameter pipe (40 inches, to th.
Soviet Union.
The Soviets had planned to use the wide-diameter p ipe
wh lch they could not produce, to build the so called
Friendship Pipeline to transport oil from the Baku fields
through Eastern Europe to the West. In COCOM the United
States argued that if western firms enabled the Soviets to
break this production bottleneck, the oil would be used to
supply soviet armies in Eastern Europe and the foreign
exchange earnings would be put into increased military
production. Due to the unanimity principle in COCOM the
United States moved the issue into the NATO fcrum. m
November 1962 NATO voted to embargo all exports of pipe over
19 inches in diameter to the Soviet Union (Jentleson, 1986).
This move caused a major confrontation at the inter-
allied level and at the intra-governmental level in Western
European states. The response of the Western European
leaders varied. Germany and Italy., the states with the
highest stakes in the deal, finally complied with the United
States position. Several German firms were forced to
violate contracts that they had signed with the Soviets in
October 1962. The Adenauer CDU government infuriated the
domestic business community by giving in to the United
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States. This case demonstrated the United states' ability
to use leverage effectively on a specific issue in East-West
trade (Mastanduno, 1985)
.
The 1962 Friendship Pipeline case was politically
costly for alliance unity. one consequence was that it
created the perception that the United States was willing to
use leverage on export controls and COCOM to attain
commercial benefits for United States firms. United States
oil interests stood to lose a great deal from the pipeline
and they lobbied in opposition to the trade agreements.
Western European firms viewed this as a clear case of the
United States policy on controls being driven by commercial
interests. In addition, shortly after the NATO resolution
the United States signed an agreement to sell surplus wheat
to the Soviet Union. As intra-Western economic competition
increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Western
European states, perhaps recalling the United States actions
in this case, became increasingly more suspicious of
American motivation in COCOM.
United States intra-governmental conflict during this
period demonstrated the continued strength of the absolutist
discourse in the Congress and in the public at large.
Despite the fact that members of the executive were
convinced that technological trade with the Soviets and the
bloc could be used as an effective tool of foreign policy
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the ma:ority of the Congress viewed ^ ^
and the Soviet bloc was one of a
"monolithic evil" that
would not respond rationally or predictably to policy
instruments designed t-o^ reward or induce good behavior
absolutist discourse became unravelled to some extent in the
midst of the breakdown of the forei™t eign policy consensus over
Vietnam After this point the Kennedy vision of the
potential value of economic and technological tools entered
into Congressional debate and was implemented through the
detente program. This is not to say that the absolutist
discourse disappeared.
Shifting United m-^s Pon ny . The 1QfiQExport Admini stration art-
Micheal Mastanduno argues that the adjustment of
United States East-West trade policy was prompted by the
growing East-West trade of the allies and the recognition by
United States officials that the unilateral economic warfare
program had become a futile exercise. As stated above, in
addition to these factors the transition away from economic
warfare to the trade linkage strategy was made possible by a
transformation in the understanding of the appropriate
relationship between alliance security and East-West trade
among United States executive branch officials and in
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be
is on
Congress. if an absolutist ^
^
the ground for United states foreign polioy consensu
export oontrois in the late 1960s
, then ^ ^
alliance state East-West trade might have been irrelevant
United States officiais who refined tied to this discourse
would have argued for the oontinuation of an economic
warfare policy for symbolic or moral purposes. As we will
see, the American public did continue to be divided on moral
grounds on the legitimacy of the detente program. This
divisiveness and Congressional actions such as the 1974
Jackson-Vanik Amendment eventually constrained executive
branch flexibility in the use of trade as a link for
leverage in other foreign polioy areas (Gaddis, 1982).
Because of the expansion of Western European-Eastern
bloc trade, United States business interests had become
growingly concerned with the economic and competitive
consequences of the more restrictive American export control
program. In 1964, business leaders expressed their support
for an expansion of East-West trade before a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing entitled: East-West Tr*rl0 - B
Compilation of Views of Businessmen Bankers. ,nd
Experts. The title of this document is significant because
of the way it organized and presented the support for
expanded trade. In these hearings over more than hundred
business executives argued that trade restrictions should be
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liberalized and that the United states should make
differentiations in the export control progran, between the
East bloc states. The Eastern bloc market during the late
1960s was expanding rapidly. East-West trade grew at 12%
compared to overall international trade at 8% (Mastanduno,
P- 173, 1985; see table 4:1) .
in the late 1950s and 1960s United States firms
witnessed a significant expansion of allied East-West trade.
Most of this expansion was a consequence of massive
bilateral, long-term trade agreements concluded by Western
European and Soviet bloc governments. Under De Gaulle the
French in 1964 signed a five year trade agreement with the
Soviet Union. De Gaulle hoped to use French-Soviet trade to
counterbalance United States influence, and he expressed a
vision of
-detente, understanding, and cooperation" in a
Europe that stretched from the "Atlantic to the Urals"
(Labbe, p. 186, 1988). in addition, the "Grand Commission"
was formed as an organization designed to promote
French-Soviet scientific, technical, and economic
cooperation
.
In 1959 the British had become the first Western
nation to sign a long-term trade agreement with the Soviet
Union. This was followed up by similar agreements in 1964
and 1969. These agreements put Western European firms in a
strong position in relation to American competitors because
205
TABLE 4.1
Western Trade with the Soviet Union
EXPORTS ($ million)
1958 1960 1962 1963 1964 1966 ^ ^
UK 145.5 148.9 161 178.8 111.3 141.1 178.8 249.5 233.2
FR 75.9 115.6 138.1 64.2 64.1 75.6 155.3 256.5 265.1
FRG 72.2 185.3 206.8 153.5 193.6 135.3 197.9 273 406
IT 31.1 78.6 102.3 113.6 90.7 90.1 132 179 268.3
US 3.4 38.4 19.7 22.6 146. 41.7 60.2 57.7 105.5
TOTAL TRADE
UK 312.0 358.7 396.5 433.5
FR 170.8 210.2 248.8 205.3
FRG 164.4 345.4 421.8 362.3
IT 71.5 204.4 268.6 289.5
US 20.8 61.3 35.6 43.7
382.8 492.9 515.8 628.9 706.4
205.3 247.2 342.4 439.3 478.3
430.9 423.5 472.7 567.1 740.8
237.9 280.1 409.7 463.5 531.3
167.1 91.2 101.2 116.2 157.0
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1958-1970; Micheal
Mastanduno p. 174, 1985.
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the agreements established » f>*.=«oi a framework out of which allied
state firms could develop Eastern bloc markets. The
British, the French, and other COCOM member states also
Provided further incentives to expand East-West trade by
lifting quantitative import restrictions for many Eastern
bloc states. In addition the British, in 1964, extended a
fifteen year credit of $300 million to the Soviet Union
(Bertsch and Elliott, 1988). Several other COCOM states
followed the British example. A large proportion of these
trade agreements involved incentives for Western European
firms to build
-turnkey plants" in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988). These plants are
exported as complete facilities and are installed and
equipped on site by Western technical specialists. This
type of technology transfer became an issue during the
Reagan Administration because it is a transaction that
necessarily involves the transfer of Western know-how
particularly in the area of manufacturing design and
production processes. in addition it is an ongoing and
active transfer of technology because of the training etc.,
supplied to staff the facilities.
While the business community in the United States
expressed an interest in expanding East-West trade, there
appeared to be little public support for such an opening.
In addition, most members of Congress continued to cast such
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'
' .s
an expansion as a .orally questionable move. The John
Administration attempted to highlight the potential benefit
of East-west trade, and to sway Congress by commissioning a
Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. The Committee was chaired by
J. Irwin Miller, a businessman from the mid-west. The
committee of twelve included representatives from academia,
business, and banking. The Miller RPnnrf•3 xiic n ii Kepo t, released in 1965,
concluded that:
The time is ripe to make more active use of tradearrangements as political instruments in relationswith Communist countries. Trade should be brought
J ° H
e P°llcy area. ^ should be offered orwithheld, purposefully and systematically asopportunities and circumstances warrant This
requires that the President be in a position to removetrade restrictions on a selective and discretionarybasis or reimpose them, as justified by our relationswith individual Communist countries. S
Two elements of this Report are noteworthy. First,
the report called for "differentiation" between Communist
states in the export control program. The President was to
be given discretionary power to impose or remove controls
based on calculations of United States interest. This view,
which had been articulated by the Kennedy Administration,
diverged from the view underlying the earlier economic
warfare program. Export controls were not to be imposed on
states simply by virtue of the fact that they were
Communist, but were to be imposed discriminatingly on states
that posed identifiable threats to United States interests.
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in other words, this new image diverged fro, the image of a
monolithic communism" that McKitterick says donated
"the
mind of Congress and the public" during the 1950s
(Mckitterick, p. 29
, 1966) . The second noteworthy
of the the Miller Report is the fact that it justified
liberalization of controls on instrumental grounds. Gr0wing
intra-Western economic competition may have led the business
community to raise criticisms of the United states' more
restrictive program, but the justification of the
reconsideration of export controls was cast in
instrumentalist terms. Mastanduno says that this was
because it was impossible to justify the expansion of
East-West trade on the grounds of commercial interests
alone. He says it was also evidence that the issue of
United States trade with the Eastern bloc is an inherently
political issue. Many of the Western European states had
been more receptive of the "peaceful coexistence" overtures
from the U.S.S.R.. Many of these states had expanded trade
with the East and had justified their position simply by
claiming that mutual economic benefits should be separate
from East-West political or strategic considerations.
The Miller Report also expressed elements of what I
have called a neo-Kantian discourse by concluding:
The intimate engagement of trade, over a considerable
period of time, when taken with the process of change
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Communist societies'
"onrpatL^f^rabL't^ 11purpose and to world pea e ? j t0 OUr
channels available to' L construct^ ° f *he feWwith nations with whom wp finS 2 1Ve contacts
the long run, selected trade in^?^ hostil ity. m
and wisely administered? may' turn ou^tfn^T^*^of our most powerful toils of national poUcv " ^(Department of state Bulletin Mav in Yquoted in Hardt and Holliday?'p 7, ^973) ' P ' 855;
The first part of this paragraph, insofar as trade is
seen as leading to greater harmony between nations, is
expressive of a neo-kantian discourse. The last sentence of
the paragraph, however, is more directly expressive of an
instrumentalist discourse. The paragraph articulates
questions that would be posed in the Congressional debates
that would occur throughout the detente period. First, to
what degree should political detente precede economic
detente? Secondly, should trade concessions be tied overtly
and tightly to specific political concessions? Thirdly, to
what degree should detente, trade-linkage policies, and
relaxations on export controls be tied to Eastern bloc
internal political affairs as opposed to foreign policy
issues? The Nixon and the Carter Administrations answered
these questions differently. This resulted in domestic,
Western alliance, and Soviet responses peculiar to each
Administration's brand of detente.
After the Miller Report was released, the Johnson
Administration moved to attempt to push legislation through
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Congress to liberalize East .West^ regulations ^ ^
give the President discretion over the position or
relaxation of export controls. In the SWer Qf 1965 ^
Johnson Administration, arguing that the United states
needed to build bridges between the Eastern bloc and the
Western Alliance, began to formulate the East-West Trade
Relations Bill of 1966. This legislation would have
provided a framework for the expansion of trade by lifting
import controls and by providing credits in see cases.
Events in Southeast Asia and the "Great Society" program,
however, overshadowed the Johnson East-West trade
liberalization vision and the bill died. Not until a strong
coalition emerged in Congress to support liberalization did
United States policy actually shift.
The major push for the reform of the Export Control
Act of 1949 came from the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency. Senators Walter Mondale (D-Minn) and Harrison
Williams (D-N.J.) were instrumental in the political
maneuvering that lead to the passage of the new Export
Administration Act in 1969. According to William Long (p.
31, 1989), Congress passed this legislation in response to
new and more vociferous business demands for access to
Eastern bloc markets. Support for the bill was not
overwhelming, but it did represent a significant shift in
the position of Congress on the issue of East-West trade.
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This change reflected in part the relative erosion of the
United States in the international economic hierarchy.
Business leaders, fro* the high technology sectors in
particular, argued at Senate hearings in 1969 that United
States firms "could no long afford to ignore the rapidly
growing Eastern European markets" (Long, p. 32
,
i 98 9)
.
Several business officials in Senate hearings pointed out
that the content and procedures of United States export
control program adversely affected their firms' ability to
compete with the Japanese and Western Europe. m 1968 the
"United States controlled 2,029 commodity categories for
export to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet
Union, and 1,753 categories for Poland and Rumania, while in
that same year COCOM had designated only 552 categories for
control" (Long, p. 31, 1989).
Senator Gale McGee expressed the sentiment of the
supporters of liberalization saying:
I think instead of being anti-Communist quite so
vociferously, we ought to start thinking precapitalist
or probusmess
. . . I think our creeping capitalism
ought to be unleashed (quoted in Mastanduno, p. 196
1985) . '
By 1969 the United States balance of trade and balance
of payments surplus had been eroded. While an expansion of
trade with the Eastern bloc stood to increase the trade
surplus only marginally, any constraints on exports were
seen as symbolically significant. The final bill
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a
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established that controls should only be imposed if a
product presented "a significant contribution to the
military potential of any other nation or nations which
would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States" (Jacobsen, p. 214, 1985). The legislate
also stipulated that controls should be imposed only in
cases where no comparable product could be obtained from
foreign supplier. Export restrictions were defined a:
acceptable in six cases: a) Where the United States economy
would be protected from drains of scarce materials; b)
Where the United States would be protected from the
inflationary impact of foreign demand; c) Where necessary
to further United States foreign policy; d) Where necessary
to fulfill international obligations; e) Where controls
would ensure national security (Long, p. 34, 1989). These
exceptions were intended to signal a recognition by Congress
that the United States had to maintain some level of
controls in the interest of national security.
In fact the exceptions to the law provided the
Executive leeway in carrying out the Congressional demands
for trade liberalization. The bill did reflect a desire on
the part of a majority in Congress to move away from the
economic warfare and restrictive embargo of the past and
towards a liberalization program. The rationale for the
change that was laid out in the 1969 bill included a variety
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of arguments already articulated by tne Executive branch in
the early l 960s (Jacobsen
, p. 214
, 1985)
. „ ^
the economic rationale that ultimately turned Congress away
£rom the more restrictive position on export controls and
the embargo program. m the earlier period of the Cold War
economic warfare program, business interest groups
resistance to controls had been minimal. This was because
first, Eastern markets were insignificant in relation to the
growing Western European markets and secondly, because of
the strong Cold War anti-communist consensus. As the
economic state of affairs and the image of the Sino-Soviet
bloc changed (as the discourse shifted) so, too did the
Place and possibility of interest group input in policy
formation on this issue.
Nixon-Kissinger's LinkagezDetente strategy
and COCOM Controls
In 1969 the executive branch agreed with the reasoning
that led members of Congress and business officials to
support passage of the EAA, but disagreed with the
conclusion that the United States should thus move to
relaxations of controls without using such a move as part of
a tactical maneuver in a broader strategy of managing
superpower relations.
The Nixon Administration believed that political
concessions should precede trade concessions. Henry
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^singer argued that the £xecutive ^
liberalization because the Kremlin
.-would (first) have to
show restraint on its international conduct and arrange for
Progress on key foreign policy issues."
.-only after the
Soviet union cooperated with us in the political field,"
Kissinger argued, would it be prudent to extend economic
concessions (quoted in Jentleson, p. 133
, 1986). As a
consequence of these views, the Nixon Administration used
discretionary power given to the Executive in the 1969 EAA
to move rather gradually on liberalization of export
controls. Not until 1972 did the Nixon Administration
establish the framework for trade expansion in the
U.S.
-Soviet Trade agreement (Bertsch, 1983; Jocbson, 1985).
The Nixon Administration viewed trade as a political
instrument, and did not move on the issue until it was
satisfied that it would receive quid pro guos that would
fulfill political objectives. The primary objectives of the
Administration concerned Vietnam, arms control, Berlin, and
the Middle East. All of these areas involved strictly
foreign policy issues. The Nixon Administration, unlike
Congress in the 1970s, was much more interested in using
trade concessions for compliance on issues in the arena of
foreign policy and was much less interested in establishing
specific quid pro guos on what it considered to be Soviet
domestic political issues.
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The logic and assumptions of the Administration
Position and its relation to the United states- stand on
export controls and COCOM are complex issues. According to
Kissinger, the challenge of American foreign policy was to
take advantage of Soviet needs and desires to establish
"a
web of constructive relationships- (Bertsch and Mclntyre,
1983). The Nixon Administration argued that the United
States had opportunities for leverage as a result of the
fact that since the early 1960s the Soviet Union "had sought
to expand trade with the West as a shortcut to modern
technology and capital development- (Bertsch and Mclntyre,
1983). The fact that Western European states with
comparable technology were willing to sell such items to the
Soviets at no political cost, however, seemed to undermine
any perceived American leverage. But the fact that American
producers still held a significant technological lead in
some areas, such as oil and gas exploration and production
equipment, and the apparently poorer performance of the
Soviet economy in the late 1960s seemed to offer a new
window of opportunity. The Nixon-Kissinger detente linkage
logic was based on the idea that the Soviet leadership
wanted a normalization of trade relations for both symbolic
reasons (Mastanduno, 1985) and to improve civilian sector
production. Kissinger seemed to believe that by normalizing
trade relations the United States could confer great power
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legitimacy on the SQviet Unlon (Mastanduno> i985>
_ ^
the soviet motivation or incentive, the Nixon-Kissinger
position represented the assumption that the Soviet Union
could be brought to accept "the constraints and
responsibilities of a stable world order through a
sophisticated combination of pressures and inducements"
(=addis, P- 310, 1982). caddis says that critics of the
Nixon-Kissinger view said that it resembled a B.F. Skinner
approach to pigeons where "there would be incentives for
good behavior, rewards if such behavior occurred, and
punishments if not » (Gaddis, p. 310, 1982). Perhaps
behavioralist notions and the conceptualization of the state
as a unitary rational actor did influence the pre-
suppositions of the more optimistic versions of detente, but
calling Kissinger a behavioralist goes too far. Kissinger
more than likely had Castlereagh and Metternich in mind
rather than B.F. Skinner.
The Soviet leader stated repeatedly that they would
not accept any linkage of trade to political issues. The
trade inducement strategy, however, seemed to result in some
concrete responses by the Soviets in the early 1970s. In May
1971, the Soviets offered concessions in the SALT talks by
dropping their demand that an ABM treaty precede any
agreement on a limitation of offensive strategic missiles
(Jentleson, 1986). Similarly the Soviet Union agreed to
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allow the unimpeded flow of goods between West and East
Berlin. m addition, in response to the United states
bombing and mining operations in North Vietnam in 1972 the
Soviet union did not walk out of the Soviet-American summit
as had been predicted. Brezhnev in fact promised the United
States that he would pressure the North Vietnamese to make a
serious effort to negotiate a settlement within a specified
period of time. Marshall Goldman said that "in the Soviet
scheme of things, the toleration of the escalation of U.S.
violence in Vietnam was an unfortunate part of the price the
Soviet Union was prepared to pay to obtain the American
imports it needed- (Goldman, 1982; Jentleson, p. 134, 1986).
While it is difficult to establish whether or not these
Soviet concessions were related to their desire to increase
trade, the Nixon Administration responded by offering trade
concessions. in response to Soviet signs of collaboration,
the Nixon Administration pushed ahead the approval of a
number of export licenses for items that were subject to
COCOM and United States controls. This included a license,
denied on three separate occasions, to export sophisticated
gear- cutting machinery for the Kama River truck plant
(Mastanduno, p. 211, 1985).
By late 1972 these signs of Soviet willingness to
moderate their position for the sake of maintaining
stability in the broader relationship seemed to satisfy the
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Nixon Administration. During tnat year ^ Nixon
Administration began to move from selective relaxations and
concessions to a more general program on liberalization A
Joint Soviet-united States Commercial Commission was set up
to negotiate an overall trade treatment including a
reciprocal most favored nation agreement, a program for
government credits, provisions for the establishment of
business facilities to promote trade, and establishment of a
mechanism for settling commercial disputes (Hardt and
Holliday, 1973). Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson's
report on these negotiations offered a mix of political and
economic arguments for establishing a more comprehensive
economic cooperation program. After setting out the
familiar linkage position, Peterson stated:
th^o^e industrial and technological development ofhe ther ma: or economies, the U.S. no longer has themonopoly it once enjoyed in the production of certaingoods Our overall trade balance is a melancholy
reminder of these changed circumstances. Theincreased availability of high technology products
elsewhere rendered some of our original curbs on
exports to the Soviet Union increasingly
anachronistic. The real loser from these particular
restraints would have increasingly been the U.S.producer and worker, not the Soviet consumer or theSoviet economy. There comes a point at which we mustface the fact that business is business, and, if itis going to go on in any event, we might as well have
a piece of the action (Peterson, p. 10, 1973)
.
The effectiveness of the expansion of U.S.
-East bloc
trade depended on Export-Import Bank financing of exports
and MFN treatment for Soviet goods. These concessions
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required Congressional approval. The U.S.
-Soviet trade
a9reeaent m°re Particularly the MFN issue got caught up
in congressional reassertiveness to counter the "imperial
presidency" and the erosion of foreign policy consensus over
Vietnam. The issue of Soviet Jews' freedom to emigrate
became the focal point as Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
led the move to block the new economic relationship. The
Joint Commission and other Administration negotiations on
this issue had excluded any Congressional input. The
opposition to this argument that arose in Congress reflected
resentment over this fact and the convergence of a number of
forces and ideas.
The passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment reflected
an opposition to the realpolitik and instrumentalist quality
of the Kissinger-Nixon detente trade linkage strategy
(Stern, 1979). The Amendment also reflected opposition to
what Samuel P. Huntington called "laissez faire detente"
which he says was based on an exaggerated sense of
compatibility (Huntington, 1978). Through Jackson-Vanik the
old Cold War contingent and a faction that Holsti and
Rosenau have called the post-Cold War liberal
internationalists expressed their disagreement with what
they saw as an amoral foreign policy strategy. By linking
MFN status to the issue of Jewish emigration, Henry Jackson
was able to bring together a wide range of interest groups,
220
ethnic, ideological, and economic, that had been
traditionally in opposition on a number of issues. These
groups successfully countered the preferred foreign policy
tactic of the Executive. In addition
, Senate ^
able to pass legislation that limited Eximbank financing for
the soviet union to $ 300 million and gave the Congress veto
authority over all single credits over $50 million.
Kissinger stated that the Senate Committee had to
understand that "the domestic practices of the Soviet Union
are not necessarily related to detente which we primarily
relate to foreign policy." This position, he said, was not
a disregard for moral issues, but a recognition "of our
ability to produce internal change in foreign countries"
(Kissinger, p. 145, 1974; quoted in Jentleson, p. 142,
1986)
.
The Senate was not persuaded. When the
Jackson-Vanik amendment was finally passed in 1974, the
Soviet Union renounced the 1972 bilateral trade agreement.
The passage of this bill reflected the fact that powerful
elements of the American public, long accustomed to viewing
Soviet-U.S. conflicts as a broader struggle of good vs.
evil, was unwilling to accept openly a full trade
liberalization program without seeing a radical
transformation in Soviet society.
Despite Jackson-Vanik, the Nixon Administration's
approach had resulted in greatly expanded U.S. -Eastern bloc
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trade. Exports to the Soviet Union alone reached $2 billion
between 1972 and 1974; that represented 70% more than had
been exported in the previous twenty-five years combined
(Jentleson, p. 146/ 1986). m addition the United States
list of embargoed items dropped from 550 categories to 73
categories by 1973 (Mastanduno, p. 212, 1985).
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment demonstrated the limits of
the effectiveness of the trade instrument. The number of
exit visas for Jewish emigration issued by the Soviet Union
decreased as a result of the Jackson-Vanik amendment from
35,000 in 1973 to 13,221 in 1975 (Stern, p. 121 and 149,
1979; Jentleson, 1986). The overt tactical linkage to
Soviet domestic political issues was well beyond the
threshold of diminishing returns for the detente strategy.
The Nixon-Kissinger approach to detente was dashed on
the rocky shores of domestic constraints. The effectiveness
of Kissinger's vision of trade links was contingent on
executive control and discretion over offering or
withdrawing concessions. Despite Kissinger's success in
centralizing control in the NSC staff on a number of issues
he was unable to retain such control on the guestion of
East-West trade and export regulations. The overall
breakdown in the domestic foreign policy consensus resulted
in disarray on the rationale for the policy on East-West
trade controls in the United States. Because authority over
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export controls was spread among several agencies there
highly divergent opinions as to the rationale of the United
States domestic export control program. By the mid 1970s
United States policy appeard to be confused. At the
inter-allied level the United states wavered on its position
in COCOM and began to help undermine the integrity of the
multilateral control program by giving procedures.
Western European states in the late 1960s and early
1970s also began to follow a program of economic detente.
The conceptualization of detente by most of the Western
European leadership, however, differed from that of the
United States. There was much less of a concern with seeing
political concessions proceed economic liberalizations
(Jacobsen and Notzold, 1986). Western European officials,
such as West German Chancellor Brandt, were willing to
encourage trade with the hope that in the long run economic
interaction would create incentives to reduce political
conflict. During the 1970s Germany increased its trade with
Eastern bloc states tenfold and became the Soviet Union's
largest Western trading partner. Most Western European
governments were willing to offer a variety of programs to
encourage large scale ventures by firms into the Eastern
European market.
The political motivation for opening to the East was
perhaps secondary to the economic pull. The oil crisis of
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1973 and the recession that followed until l 975 provided
strong motivation for Western European states to seek ways
of expanding exports and to find non-OPEC oil sources. The
Western European states thus entered into the Eastern bloc
market in a big way. The percentage of trade in aggregate
t6rmS aPPSarS rather
-^nificant accounting, for example,
for around 6% and 4% of total exports in the 1970s for West
Germany and France respectively (see table 4:2). However,
in dollar terms, in terms of the size of the joint Venturis
and projects, and in terms of the percentage of exports for
particular sectors in these states' economies, the figures
are quite significant. The Soviet Union sought to use
Western technology to modernize its industrial sectors. As
a result, the Soviet Union's demand focused on items such as
capital goods and machine tools. In addition, many Western
European firms in the steel, aluminum, and chemical sectors
signed major contracts for turnkey plants. France's
Rhone-Poulenc and Technip landed contracts that totaled $1.7
billion to build chemical plants in the Soviet Union.
Italy's ENI and Montedison also landed contracts totaling
$1.8 billion to build eleven chemical plants. Britain's
John Brown and Davy Powergas and West Germany's Salzgitter
and Klocker signed similar contracts (Mastanduno, p. 243,
1985; Zaleski and Wienert, p. 223, 1980). French and German
consortia also landed contracts for deals to build some of
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TABLE 4.2
Western Trade with the Soviet Union ($ millions)
1 Q7A
-L y / u 1971 1972 1973 1974
UK 248 222 225 237 264
FRG 356 484 689 1037 1838
FR 319 313 423 610 718
IT 313 291 284 413 714
US 115 144 557 1390 747
510 540 508 978 1236
2700 2627 2366 2880 3483
1110 1224 1226 1426 1826
1093 933 1072 1256 1316
2027 2657 1711 2340 3793
TOTAL TRADE
UK 713 672 673 971 1116 1329 1634 1809 2232 2905
FRG 604 776 1010 1691 3002 3984 4176 4026 5072 6868
FR 459 529 657 980 1244 1797 2551 2339 2655 4003
IT 524 550 559 843 1504 1977 2352 2553 2884 3288
US 179 204 649 1577 981 2217 2921 2080 2714 4328
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Yearbook, 1970-1980 and Micheal Mastanduno p. 230, 1985
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the largest steel and aluminum plants in the world. These
contracts with the Germans and the French alone totaled over
$2 billion. western European firms also took advantage of
the United States
.ore restrictive controls to pick up
contracts that U.S. firms had been forced to scrap for
several computer and telecommunications projects. Finally,
Western European firms such as Mannesmann and Cruesot-Loirl
aided the Soviet's in oil and gas production by building
plants and selling large diameter pipe. Between 1970 and
1974 alone Mannesmann exported over $1.5 billion worth of
steel pipe to the Soviet Union.
All of these states except West Germany were willing
to provide heavily subsidized export credits to the Soviet
Union for these types of projects. This was despite the
fact that the O.E.C.D. countries had agreed in 1976 to raise
the official rate for large-scale export credits to the
Soviet Union (Pearce, 1980; Mastanduno, p. 247, 1985;
Crawford, 1988). The large contracts for turnkey plants and
the provision of credits for such projects had the effect of
creating long-term interests in maintaining relatively
normal trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe.
Large and influential Western European firms developed
significant economic interests in the Eastern European
market. Western European political leaders who pursued
bilateral detente programs argued that the political
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benefits for East-West relatione; w^n^ uv x tions ould become noticeable
over the long term. Western European economic interests,
however, had seen rather immediate returns; and these groups
were no doubt willing to apply pressure on n.'ff- their governments
to recognize the potential domestic political costs of
changing their stand on East-West trade for foreign policy
reasons. Before we turn to assess the implications of these
developments on the multilateral export control program in
detail, a brief analysis of Carters' version of detente is
in order because of its contrast with the Nixon-Kissinger
strategy.
Jimmy Carter and East-West Trade
Many analysis believe that the Carter administration
had a more comprehensive approach to economic diplomacy than
the Nixon-Kissinger trade linkage strategy (Bertsch, 1982;
Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1988). Jentleson and Bertsch
state that Carter's economic diplomacy expanded the agenda
of political issues linked to trade concessions to include
human rights and intervention in the Third World.
Mastanduno acknowledges this change, but is more concerned
to point out that Carter's program was based on different
presuppositions about the potential for the effectiveness of
United States economic leverage. The Kissinger-Nixon
approach was based on the idea that the United States had
leverage potential in symbolic terms because of the ability
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to bestow superpower prestige on the Soviets by granting
them equal trade status. The Carter Administration,
however, attempted to identify and to manipulate whit they
believed to be actual United States economic and
technological advantages. m order for the Carter approach
to be effective, the United States had to have a monopoly on
items or technologies essential to the Soviet Union, or it
had to have the ability to convince allied states with
similar technologies to participate in a coordinated
tactical linkage strategy to obtain common interest
political goals. Carter was not able to convince the allies
to follow in such a program. Unfortunately for many United
States high technology firms, however, the Carter
Administration believed that Western European states would
follow if the United States showed leadership by accepting
disproportionate costs by denying its technology to the
Soviets. The actual result was that many Western European
firms picked up contracts for projects that United States
firms were forced to scrap. From 1977 to 1978 total United
States nonagricultural trade with the Soviets dropped 32%
from $819 million in 1977 to $562 million in 1978. In
industrial machinery and transportation equipment the total
decline in only two years was some 33% (Brougher, p. 421 and
445, 1980; Jentleson, 151, 1986).
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The carter approach to United States-Soviet relati,
was set out in Presidential Directive No. 18 . of August
1977. The economic diplomacy component was more fully
articulated by ranking NSC official Samuel Huntington in a
1978 article entitled: "Trade, Technology and Leverage:
Economic Diplomacy.' (Huntington, 1978). Huntington
contended that it was time to take advantage of United
States economic strength and technological superiority to
encourage Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts
and reducing tensions. m short, he says,
.'economic
capabilities must serve the basic foreign policy objectives
of the United States- such as "containing Soviet
expansionism and promoting American values" (Huntington, p.
65, 1978). Huntington also says that the United States must
use "conditioned flexibility." He maintained that the
Soviet economy was in its worst crisis since the Revolution.
Rather than reform, however, the Soviets, he argued, would
continue to turn to Western technology on which thay had
become increasingly dependent.
In more straightforward terms the Carter
Administration approach differed from the Nixon approach in
three ways. First, it differed in terms of the type and the
detail quid pro guos that would be demanded from the Soviet
Union in exchange for relaxations on export controls.
According to Huntington the time had come to demand
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immediate Soviet responses on a wide array of issues
"economic detente and military adventurism could not go hand
in hand for long." The Administration believed that
"validated licenses should be required for all items of
machinery and technology for which the Soviets have a
critical need, and for which they are largely dependent on
United States supply- (Huntington, p. 76
, 1978) . Tnis VQuld
allow the Administration to control these technologies on
foreign policy grounds; "regardless of the extent to which
they are likely to be used for military purposes." The
Administration believed that this would include, in
particular, oil and gas technology and equipment and
computer technology.
Secondly, the Carter Administration wanted to
formalize the centralization of export regulations and
East-West trade policy in the NSC by forming a special
section in the Council to deal with East-West export control
issues. This was necessary, argued NSC officials, in order
to give the Executive flexibility in using carrots or sticks
on the Soviets. In other words, Carter Administration
officials, particularly in the NSC wanted to, acknowledge
formally and to use the fact that East-West trade policy was
a hostage to politics. Huntington and Brzezinski, were not
only suspicious of the ability of Congress to formulate an
effective approach; they also viewed the Commerce Department
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as being controlled by adventurist commercial interest,
the State Department as staffed by l iberals without an
understanding of the nature of East-West issues. These wsc
officials, however, found it very difficult to maintain
effective control over the extensive process that had by
this time come to include several different agencies in
Commerce, state, and the DOD, and several powerful
Congressional Committees.
Finally, the Carter Administration put muoh greater
emphasis on getting allied states to go along with controls.
The Sperry computer case is illustrative of the allies'
response. m 1978 the Carter Administration retracted a
validated license it had granted to Sperry to export an
advanced computer to the Soviet Union. The computer was
designed to increase TASS data processing capabilities for
the 1980 Olympics. The Administration publicly requested
its allies to fall in line and not allow its firms to fill
the order. The French and the Germans responded publicly
rebuffing Carter. They stated in no uncertain terms that
they would not subordinate trade in commercial goods to
"political considerations." Shortly after the
Administration's unilateral action, Thomson CSF of France
agreed to supply the Soviets with a comparable system (see
Mastanduno, 1985) . In oil and gas equipment the story was
much the same. In response to the Soviet arrests of American
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businessman F
.
Jay Crawford
, and Anatoly shcharansky ^
charges of crimes against the state, the Carter
Administration froze Dresser Industries' export license to
export a turnkey rock drill bit plant to the Soviets
(Transfer of Tecnnology and the Dresser Industries Export
Licensing Actions, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., October 3, 1978)
It appeared that Carter was holding fast to his stand on the
issue and supporting the NSC staff approach to the use of
export controls for foreign policy purposes.
Carter, however, began to reconsider his position
quite quickly. m September 1978 he reversed his decision
on the Dresser case and began to urge the Commerce
Department ahead on the approval of a number of validated
license applications. There are a number of explanations
for this change. First, there was arguably an improvement
in United States-Soviet relations. There was movement in
the SALT II talks and the Soviets had agreed to allow
Crawford to leave the country. The most important reason
for Carter's changed stand was that it had become apparent
that the allies were not going to follow United States
leadership on the institution of controls for foreign policy
reasons. Western European officials did not share the
United States view of the nature of the Soviet threat nor
did they believe it legitimate or effective to demand
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specific^ m^ from the Soviets ^ ^ ^^^^^
when such demands concerned Soviet domestic issues.
in addition, United states industry leaders had
Pointed out in Congressional hearings that there was in fact
foreign availability in many of the types of items that the
Carter Administration was attempting to control (Use of
Export Controls and Export Credits for Foreign Policy
Purposes: Hearings. 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 1978). m early
1977 many United States oil and gas firms lost sales as a
result of the licensing delays that resulted from inept
processing procedures and the NSC strategy. NL Industries
of Texas, for example, lost a contract valued at over half a
million dollars to Technip of France because of licensing
delays designed to enhance Huntington's "conditioned
flexibility" strategy. William Verity, chairman of Armco
Inc. argued that this lost sale alone cost the United States
$15 million in capital formation, $225 million in balance of
payments, and 10,000 jobs (Verity, 1978). it appeared that
in the face of widening trade deficits and with the prospect
of continuing lost sales to Western European firms, the
Carter Administration became willing to abandon its hopes of
effective political leverage, and to allow American firms to
compete for the Eastern bloc market. The Administration was
willing to do this even if it meant trading strategically
sensitive technologies. This attempt by the Administration
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to control East-West trade for foreign policy purposes was
once again a situation in which international economic
competition, a divergence in understanding of the nature of
the Soviet threat between the allies, and domestic political
pressure undermined the well-laid plans of tactical linkage
The result of this swing pattern between the more liberal
form of detente and the more close-knit tactical linkage of
Carter, a pattern George Shultz called "light switch
diplomacy," was radical fluctuations in United States-
Eastern bloc trade. The consequences of this pattern also
had a significant and lasting impact on the COCOM program.
COCOM in The Late iQ7n c
During the late 1970s COCOM became conflict ridden.
There still seemed to be a consensus on the part of the
Western allies that a control organization of some type was
necessary to prevent West-East trade in strategically
sensitive technologies with direct military applications.
The weakening of COCOM as an effective multilateral export
control organization during this period is evidenced,
however, by the fact that there were fundamental conflicts
over its rules and principles. There is also evidence of
widespread non-compliance as the Soviets were able to
acquire large amounts of strategically significant
technologies. This was no doubt due in part to effective
Soviet Acquisition networks. Finally, COCOM member states
234
accused each other of not being genuinely interested in
maintaining the control program.
This weakening of COCOM, during the 1970s, has been
explained by Micheal Mastanduno as a consequence of the fact
that the United states became unwilling to exercise
leadership in the COCOM program. He argues that once the
United States indicated its was willing to relax its
restrictions on strategic trade, other Western powers
followed. This was because they saw the United States
behavior as a justification of strategies of trade
liberalization. There is certainly some truth in this
interpretation in that the United States did compromise the
integrity of COCOM. Once the United States began to move
away from the broader economic denial or economic warfare
program in the 1960s its position in COCOM became confused.
This process, as we have noted above, began in the Kennedy
Administration. In addition, like so many other elements of
United States foreign policy, once the number of domestic
players involved increased in the late 1960s, the export
control system became more complex and at points paralyzed.
Mastanduno' s explanation falls short, however, in that
it does not include a full consideration of the importance
of the intensification of intra-Western trade competition as
a factor that helped to undermine strong commitments to
COCOM. In addition, his explanation does not include a
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consideration of the changing perception of the Soviet bloc
and the belief, held by Western European officials, that
trade relations could produce Soviet moderation or
concessions. It is arguable whether or not the other COCOM
states would have even followed if the United Stat,
willing to exercise strong leadership for a more exten :
embargo. The Carter example is a case in point. During the
1980s the United States was willing to provide leadership
for strengthening COCOM. Soviet actions and the
international environment, however, had brought clear
changes in the perceptions and beliefs of the Western
European leadership. in addition the United States signaled
its willingness to use leverage if persuasion failed.
During the 1970s the United States requested more
exceptions to multilateral controls than any member of
COCOM. in 1974 a total of 1,380 exception requests were
submitted to COCOM. Of this total 567 requests were
submitted by the United States. In 1975, 1,798 cases were
submitted and the United States requested 798 of these
exceptions. During these years 32 exception requests were
denied and in each case this was a result of United States
opposition. In some years (1976-1978) the United States
requested more exceptions than the total of all of the other
member states combined (Mastanduno, p. 260, 1985; Export
Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th Cong. 2nd
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sess., March 15, 1976)
. This number did ^ ^
"administrative exceptions" of lower end technologies at
national discretion. By 1977 C0C0M was granting exceptions
to controls on strategically significant technologies at a
rate of over $300 million per year. The great majority of
exception requests that were submitted during the 1970s were
approved. When asked why the United States had begun to
submit more requests, the Director of the State Department's
office of East-West trade said that this reflected the
"growing commercial interest among American companies in
developing the Communist country market
. . .
» (Export
Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th Cong., 2nd
sess., March 15, 1976). m 1974, for example, of the 1,380
exception requests submitted to COCOM, 343 of them were for
United States computer sales.
In addition and perhaps ironically, it was the United
States that led in using its veto to deny other COCOM
states' exception requests. On several occasions the United
States allowed its firms to export high technology items to
the East bloc states while opposing exception requests for
comparable exports to the same countries by COCOM partners
(Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th
Conq. 2nd sess., March 11, 1976). In addition the United
States took longer than any COCOM state to respond to
exception requests. In 1974, the United States
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representative in COCOM postponed taKing action on some 25
exception requests by Western European states for several
-nths. m a highly competitive international economic
environment such delays in many cases resulted in lost
sales. This pattern was detrimental to maintaining the
multilateral consensus and added to the perception that the
United States was willing to use COCOM and export controls
to serve its own commercial interests. Western European
states reacted strongly against what they perceived as a
misuse of the veto power by the United States in COCOM. The
French on several occasions threatened to withdraw from
COCOM altogether if the United States did not approve
certain exception requests. As a consequence, the United
States reversed its position on two exception cases covering
the export of semiconductor equipment to an Eastern European
country (Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review,
94th Cong. 2nd sess., March 11, 1976, p. 6). it was also
reported that the "United States had reached an
understanding with COCOM countries that the United States
objection (s) (to exceptions) would be merely for the record
as opposed to censure intended to stop the transaction"
(Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: A Review, 94th
Cong. 2nd sess, March 11, 1976, p. 47).
The fact that the multilateral export control program
became the victim of growing intra-Western export
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-.petition was aiso reflected in the types Qf technQlogies
ana items that allied states were willing to allow firms to
sell to the East. The most widely known ^xu x K cases involved the
participation of numerous United States firms in the
construction and outfitting of the Kama and zil vehicle
Plants. These plants significantly increased the Soviet
Union's ability to produce heavy trucks, and it was known
that the vehicles produced in these plants were to be used
by the military. United States high technology f irms were
also permitted to export computer systems and state of the
art equipment to the Zil plant where missile launchers were
produced (Proposed Legislation to Establish an Office of
Strategic Trade, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 1980).
In a perhaps more significant case the United States allowed
the Bryant Grinder Corporation to export machine tools used
to make precision anti-friction bearings to the Soviet
Union. Some critics of detente had argued that these
bearings were essential to developing effective guidance
systems for Soviet MIRVed ballistic missiles (Gufstafson,
. 10-14, 1981). By obtaining these machines the Soviet
ion acquired the capability to mass produce these
precision bearings.
In addition to these cases, it should be pointed out
that the Soviet Union was able to use intra-Western economic
competition to its advantage. Many of the East-West trade
PP
Un
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promotion programs developed in the 1970s included visits by
Soviet technical experts to the plants of f irms that were
bidding for commercial ventures. DOD officials claimed that
Soviet technical experts were able to acquire sensitive
information in the course of such visits. Miles Costick
from the Institute on Strategic Trade claimed before a
Senate hearing that in one case Soviet technical experts
that visited, the Boeing plant in the 1970s wore "special
soles built on their shoes in which they were picking up
various alloys used in the construction of aircraft. These
were to be taken back to the Soviet Union to be analyzed"
(Proposed Legislation to Establish an Office of Strategic
Trade, 96th Cong., 2nd sess.
,
September 25, 1980, p. 153)
.
Also in the context of the increased competition for Eastern
bloc markets, Western firms often provided strategically
significant technical data on the proposed project. The DOD
was highly critical of this state of affairs and claimed
that the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s had baen able to
acquire strategically sensitive technical know-how from
firms eager to sale.
Despite the fact that the United States entered into
competition for Eastern bloc markets its domestic export
control licensing program seemed to be designed to do
anything but promote an expansion of East-West trade.
Matanduno argues that the complexity of the process to
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obtain an export license for a controlled item was
particularly suited to a tactical linkage strategy. By
bogging down a proposed project in an extensive bureaucratic
process officials could stall on approval until political
concessions were obtained. Officials fro, Western European
firms and states, however, viewed delays and denials on
export license requests as products of commercial and
intra-Western leverage considerations. Holding up a license
or exception request application could conceivably give
competitors time to undercut deals. For United States
firms, however, these delays were viewed as commercially
detrimental. The delays resulted not from cooperation
between the central state actors and firms wishing to move
into Eastern bloc markets, but were rather the result of an
inept and overly complex bureaucratic process. As a result
of the nature of the export control program there were
several layers of agency and inter-agency input involving
the NSC, the State Department, the Commerce Department, and
the Defense Department. This weighed the system down and
led to delays of months on export license and exception
requests. In a fast moving, narrow, and highly competitive
market these types of delays were mortal. Steps were taken
throughout the 1970s to remedy this situation: mandatory
review deadlines were established, a Technical Advisory
Committee (TAC) system made up of industry and government
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representatives was e^ahUcK^st blished and mandatory deregulation
based on foreign availability was enacted. None of these
solutions seemed to solve the licensing and exception
request processing delays in the 1970s. Despite
congressional attempts to make the process more conducive to
trade liberalization, the export control program remained
under the firm control of the Executive (see Long, 1989).
It is true that this made the export control system more or
less subject to the foreign policy agenda of the president.
The export control system, however, also remained a hostage
to entrenched bureaucratic interests. As Graham Allison
pointed out:
I^n^Siti °nS tfkGn by each of the ^ncies appearCaricature; De fense officials vetoing any
,
he
;
Can ?et a handle on, if even to delay for acouple of years Communist acquisition of the
^"°°gy
'
reflecting their earlier commitment toWarfare against Socialist states; State andthe White House, especially in the Nixon period,prepared to make an exception for almost any item aslong as it appears in some way to contribute todetente: Commerce generally making American firms'
*nvh™ ^
S1
n
Ce^e technol °gy i* going to be solda yhow, the United States should at least reap some ofthe benefits from making the sale (Export Licensing of
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)
hnolo9Y > 94th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11,
Conclusion
Each of the four theoretical explanations set out in
chapter one contributes to our understanding of the dynamics
of alliance collaboration on East-West trade policy in the
1964-1979 period. From the vantage point of the modified
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structuralist view we see that there was a shift in issue
specific capability. The United States- disproportionate
share of high technology production began to be eroded in
the mid to late l 960s
.
From the vantage point of the market
explanation we see that intensified economic competition led
Western firms and political officials to believe that
expanded East-West trade and significant reductions on
export controls would serve their interests. Finally,
superpower strategic relations began to change in the 1960s.
All of these factors came together to undermine the
power of the absolutist discourse at the domestic level.
Discourses that had been submerged during the 1950s in the
United States re-emerged. The late 1960s and early 1970s
involved a clash of discourses in the United States where
alternative policy visions were offered by various groups.
Executive officials, beginning with the Kennedy
Administration, came to have a confidence in the
instrumental value of United States economic and
technological advantages over the Soviets. The shift from
economic warfare to economic diplomacy was initiated by
elements in the Executive branch. Congress and domestic
interest groups were divided, however, between those who
continued to adhere to an absolutist position and those more
inclined to a neo-kantian position.
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The policy vision of the executive during this period
legitimated a linkage approach to East-West trade. Oespite
the sanguine hopes of some members of the Executive
however, factors at both the alliance and domestic level
undermined their program. By 1969, for example, the
continued intensification of market competition helped
establish the conditions in which the neo-kantian discourse
camp gained the upper hand in Congress. The result of this
shift was the passage of the Export Administration Act.
The White House and the NSC during the Nixon and
Carter Administrations remained committed to linkage and an
instrumentalist discourse while the Commerce and State
Departments became somewhat more neo-Kantian. At the intra-
allied institutional level it appears that State Department
officials worked with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Ministry of Economics officials from various European
governments to minimize conflicts. Recall that COCOM
representatives began reaching tacit agreements that the
vetoes in COCOM would only be for the record.
United States policy on East-West trade became
confused during this period. At the international level
White House officials encountered opposition when they
attempted to get the Western Europeans to go along with an
instrumentalist linkage strategy. At those points when
executive officials believed that they had domestic support
244
and that a linkage strategy would work with the Soviets
they were unable to gain the necessary cooperation fror/the
allies. This was not simply a result Qf ^.^
States leadership, but also resulted from the fact that
Western European leaders did not share the American
understanding of the appropriate relationship between East-
West trade and Western security. one camp in Western
European had a policy vision that was driven by a neo-
kantian discourse. The plausibility of this discourse was
reinforced by the Soviet's peaceful coexistence line and
complementarity of economic interests. On the other hand
the policy vision of some Western European groups was in
fact driven by an instrumentalist discourse. This linkage
vision was, however, limited in ends to national interest
concerns as in the case of the Germans and the French
instead of more comprehensive issues.
In conclusion then the shift in issue specific
capability, intensified global economic competition, and the
gradual change in the East-West strategic balance enhanced
the plausibility of the instrumentalist and the neo-Kantian
discourses in the United States. The result was that the
absolutist discourse declined. In this context contending
discourse camps emerged. These camps drew on conflicting
images of the Soviet Union and divergent understandings of
the relationship between East-West trade and security. They
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also advocated conflicting policy packages. As these groups
struggled to gain control over the domestic policy process
the United states position became confused. Attempts by the
executive to construct a common purpose for Western policy
in the context of this divergence of discourses failed. The
dynami cs of collaboration that this situation produced was
best expressed by Robert Wright, Director of the Office of
East-West Trade in the state Department in his testimony
before a 1976 Senate hearing:
.
. .
there have been continuing differences in th»
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the Soviet union and tradewith the East bloc) internationally so that » .other countries in COCOK have not Len as enthusiasticabout continuing a tight system of control.
Over the years the scope and extent of the COCOM controlhas reduced. We feel that by-and-large this reductionhas been one that is justified in terms of a realisticevaluation of the essential items that should be kertunder control, while taking account of the commercialinterests that other countries have and that we have been!dv™TVq,, allY in recent years (^rt Licensing o?
^%icii Te$?^ui R°view ' 94th cong " 2nd sess -'
Despite this assessment, the United states turned in
the 1980s, to the use of compliance rents and surveillance
in an attempt to bring allied states and firms into line
with a more restrictive position on East-West trade policy.
CHAPTER V
ADMINISTRATION: POWER, INTERESTS
INSTITUTIONS, AND DISCOURSE
'
Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 the
Carter Administration attempted to gain allied collaboration
on economic sanctions against the Soviet Union (Mastanduno,
1985). The nature of the United States initiatives and the
reluctance of the allies to follow rested on a divergence of
opinion over the appropriate scope and function of export
controls and over the relationship between East-West trade
and Western security. As in the past, this inter-allied
divergence of opinion resulted from conflicting
interpretations and representations of the nature of the
Soviet threat to Western security.
These differences led to open inter-allied conflict
during the Reagan Administration when an absolutist
discourse began to regain preponderance in United States
domestic debates over East-West trade and Western security
policy. The Reagan Administration moved to renew a strategy
of economic warfare against the Soviet Union. This program
involved first an extensive reinvigoration of surveillance
on West-West high technology transfers. Defense Department
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and Coerce Department officials within the Reagan
Administration also advocated the use of coercive
instruments to bring allied states into line with a
coordinated and more restrictive export control strategy.
However, turning to these instruments in the context of a
radically changed global political economy had far-reaching
economic and political repercussions for United
States-Western alliance relations.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. The first
part of the chapter reviews attempts by the Carter
Administration to reinvigorate the United States and the
COCOM export control program in 1980. This part also
analyzes the sources and the nature of United States
intra-governmental divergences of opinion on the issue of
East-West trade in the 1980
-s. The second part examines the
way in which some Reagan Administration officials attempted
to bring allied states to accept a policy of economic
warfare. This includes an analysis of the instruments that
were drawn on to strengthen the United States position in
negotiations, with the allies, particularly during the COCOM
list review in 1982-84.
During the Reagan Administration the inter-agency
balance of power in the export control system shifted away
from the State Department. The State Department's
traditionally more conciliatory approach to negotiations
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with the allies was eclipsed by an activist alliance between
hard-line, unilateralist officials in the Defense and
Commerce Departments.
"Hard-line" in this context refers to a belief that
nothing could be gained, in econo»ic or political terms,
from East-West trade. For hard-liners ending East-West
'
trade was not onlv in thp «=+->- i„vu±y ne strategic interest of the West
but, a moral issue as well nff^^i. •n. Officials in this camp believed
that the West should use its resources to isolate
economically the Soviet bloc states. These officials
articulated an absolutist discourse which they believed
legitimated an economic warfare strategy.
"Unilateralist" refers to a belief that the United
States should formulate an overall broad export control and
embargo strategy and attempt to impose such a strategy on
the allies. Unilateralist officials believed that if
necessary the United States should go it alone in a more
restrictive export control program. I will show that during
the first Reagan Administration officials in this camp, from
the DOD and the Commerce Department, were able to influence
decisions about negotiating tactics in COCOM and with
Western firms. The United States in the early 1980s thus
turned to a coercive compliance extraction strategy with the
Western allies and some Western high-technology firms.
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I use selective individuals as representatives of the
hard-line unilateralist position that was held more widely
by officials in the Reagan Administration. I refer here to
Casper Weinberger, Richard Perle, Lawrence Brady, and
Stephen Bryant. These men not only most clearly articulated
this vision, but they organized and domined United states
policy on East-West export controls.
The third part of this chapter evaluates the
consequences and costs of turning to such a strategy.
Advocates of East-West trade denial and of tighter West-West
export control regulations generated opposition at both the
domestic and inter-allied level. By 1985 East-West
strategic relations began to shift. As the political,
economic, and competitive costs of the more restrictive
United States position became apparent, the Reagan
Administration attempted to repair damages by turning to a
more conciliatory line with the allies. Hard-line
unilateralist officials in the Executive branch began to
lose some power as a result of rising domestic constraints,
allied opposition, and changes in overall East-West
relations
.
The Roots of the Attempt to
Expand COCOM After 1979
The Carter Administration met resistance when it
applied economic sanctions in response to the Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan. Domestically agricultural
high-technology interests addressed the Carter
(Bertsch, 1985). At the alliance level Western European
officials disagreed with both Carter's response and with his
view that the Soviet action represented "the greatest threat
to world peace since World War II." Most leaders shared
West German Chancellor Schmidt's view; their governments
would not permit "ten years of detente to be destroyed by
Afghanistan" (Mastanduno, p. 371 1985; Jacobsen, 1988).
The breakdown of consensus in the United States
foreign policy community during the late 1970s resulted in
intense debates over the detente linkage approach to
East-West trade (Gaddis, 1984; Destler, Gelb and Lake,
1984). The invasion of Afghanistan served to shift the
inter-agency balance of power on this issue from officials
in the State and Commerce Departments who supported
liberalized of linkage East-West trade policy to officials
in the Department of Defense and the National Security
Council who were critical of such economic interaction
(Bertsch, 1985).
Many State Department officials believed that the
Soviets could be manipulated with economic levers. These
officials continued to draw on arguments put forward for
expanded East-West trade articulated during detente. The
arguments were rooted in sets of representations and images
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of the soviet leadership as
"tameable" through the
cultivation of mutual economic interests. The expansion of
trade deals rested on faith in the malleability of Soviet
perceptions of interest. United states- policy in the early
1970s had been defended through a language that was partly
an instrumentalist and partly a neo-kantian discours
East-West trade was seen to have political and economi
value. As long as this image of the Soviet Union and the
representations of superpower relations were authoritative,
then detente trade-linkage arguments seemed plausible.
Within the DOD images and symbols of an absolutist
discourse had had greater authority throughout the 1970s.
DOD officials were convinced that liberalized trade,
particularly in high technology sectors, had been
detrimental to Western security interests. They believed
that lax controls eroded Western qualitative superiority and
technological lead times. The actions of the Soviet Union
in the early 1980s seemed to confirm the hard-liners'
interpretation of the nature of the Soviet threat to Western
security. The Soviet action in 1979 became the occasion for
an attempt by critics of detente to move export control
policy in a more restrictive direction (Mastanduno, 1985;
Jentleson, 1986) .
Criticisms of the detente trade-linkage approach
advanced by the DOD and by several Congressmen in the
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after.ath of the invasion of Afghanistan were based in part
on a particular reading of a set of proposals articulated by
the Defense Science Board Task Force in 1976. This DOD
study, known as the "Bucv Rennn-"y K P°rt (after Taskforce chair j
Fred Buoy) reflected an atte.pt to establish a more cohesive
national policy on technology export controls, it was the
most significant and explicit attempt to articulate
systematically a set of principles for the entire United
States export control program (see Mastanduno, 1985). since
1949 one aspect of the rationale for the export control
program had been that Western security was enhanced by
maintaining qualitative lead-times through restrictions on
Soviet bloc access to advanced technological goods. The
Bucy Report centered on this issue. The Report focused on
three areas of concern: efforts to control the transfer of
technological
-know-how" as opposed to goods; efforts to
develop more extensive mechanisms to maintain United States
lead-times in technological advances; and efforts to develop
means of providing for greater scrutiny of intra-Western
transfers of state of the art technology (see Mastanduno,
1985)
.
The intentions of the authors were trampeled under by
the force of events. Bucy, in 1976, argued that the
principles set out in the Report could serve to rationalize
the United States' system, and also remove the burden of an
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overly extensive control system trora high
-technology fi rms
Meters of the Reagan Administration ooo, houever
, were ablg
to appropriate the ideas contained in the Report to serve
their own ends. As Buoy put it, "they took a Report
intended to rationalize controls and created a control list
as thick as the New york phone book" (quoted in MacDonald,
p. 78
, 1990) .
The Bucy Report established concepts that became part
of the official lexicon of the export control establishment
in the 1980s. The Report differentiated between
technological products and technological "know-how," between
"active" and ..passive- transfers of technology, and between
evolutionary and revolutionary technological advances.
Bucy explained these differentiations to the House
Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce in March
1976 [Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce
(hereafter SITC)
,
March 11-30, 1976]. Technological
"know-how', is design and manufacturing knowledge. This type
of knowledge was described "as the heart of a nation's power
capability." in the Congressional hearings Bucy said: "if
the United States were forced to sell all of the products
that it had available, high technology all the way to the
lowest technology, we would recover from that. But if we
were forced to divulge all of our design and manufacturing
know-how to any nation that wanted it, we would not recover
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from that blow" fqTTr r.^w(SI C, Bucy, p. 214f March 30
^ 1976 . c . ted
in Mastanduno, 1985)
.
The first part of the Bucy Report argues that
knowledge is power. The Report then moves on to explain the
forms and avenues through which such knowledge is
transferred. According to the recommendations of the Report,
greater emphasis should be placed on controlling the
transfer of information necessary to produce technical
products. This included design, operating, and application
information and sophisticated maintenance procedures.
Central to this position was the concept of
-process
know-how"; defined as the knowledge, methods, and skills
generally associated with industrial production on a mass
scale (Mastanduno, p. 321, 1985). The Report also called
for greater controls on "keystone" equipment; unique
equipment essential to completing a production process. For
example, a manufacturer can produce most of the parts of a
jet aircraft with widely available multi-purpose machinery.
Completing the construction, however, requires unique
titanium forging equipment. The titanium forging equipment
is thus the "keystone" in the process of jet aircraft
production. Finally, the Bucy Report emphasized the control
of process "know-how." In short, the product and its
application were not as significant as the capability
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Provided through the transfer of particular products in
terms of technological
"know-how."
The Report called for tighter controls on "active., as
opposed to
..passive" transfer mechanisms. As Bucy pointed
out in the Congressional hearings, this meant that the
United states should not be concerned as much with the
transfer of specific products. Rather it was essential to
regulate
-active relationships, characterized by an
intensive teaching effort by the donor company and by
frequent and specific communications between donor and
receiver" (SITC, Bucy, p. 215, March 30, 1976). Active
technology transfers, Bucy argued, involved communication
between a company and a nation, and this always involved
design and manufacturing "know-how" transfers. Such
relationships, the Bucy Report maintained, improved the
technical capability of a nation's population. This
approach is revealing in that the target of the controls
then moves away from military systems capability to the
civilian population. Along these lines the Bucy Report was
highly critical of the sale of turnkey factories - entire
factories complete with extensive personnel training and
ongoing maintenance arrangements.
The United States, the Report suggested, should also
attempt to identify and to control technologies that would
allow competitors to make revolutionary advances in
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technological capability. certain advances or discoveries
represent "quantum jumps that are based on conceptual
departures from current practice" (SITC, Bucy, p. 217
,
1976)
.
The protection of United States lead-time required
that these kinds of advances be identified and controlled.
The Bucy Report was unique in that it dismissed end-use
guarantees as useless. m other words, it was insignificant
whether or not a state diverted a particular product to
military applications. what was important was the value of
a product or system in terms of "know-how" and its form of
transfer. After the Bucy Report some officials in the DOD
came to believe that intelligence should not focus on
whether or not Soviet bloc states abided by end-use
assurances (Mastanduno, 1985). The key was how the
"know-how" obtained from active transfers of certain
technologies increased a particular state's technical and
manufacturing capability.
The Bucy Report was unique in other ways. it
articulated and expressed in a clear form certain attitudes
that had been the backdrop to United States export control
program since 1949. One of these was the belief that
technological knowledge had been and would be the key both
to United States economic power in the global political
economy and to its strategic superiority over the Soviet
bloc.
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Second, the Bucy Report ,as used in the 1980s to
articulate an argument for a clear break with the ideas of
detente. The arguement maintained that transfers of Western
technology into the Soviet bloc would not result in a
"crisis of rising expectations" in the general populations
of these states, but that such transfers would allow the
Communist party to avoid making choices between fulfilling
civilian needs and military outlays. The Report held that
there was no instrumental value in exchanging technological
"know-how" for political suid pro guos (Mastanduno, 1985).
Finally, the Report dismissed the notion that communication
between Western firms and Soviet bloc economic officials
would result in an interdependence with the potential of
bringing about liberalizing transformations.
The findings and recommendations were highly
controversial for a number of reasons. The recommendations
included a call for greater restrictions and surveillance on
certain West-West technology transfers. The Report
expressed a skepticism about the integrity of allied COCOM
member states' and firms' assurances that United States
technology would not be re-exported to controlled
destination (SITC, Bucy, p. 229 1976; Mastanduno, 1985). As
a consequence of the arguable unreliability of the Western
allies in this regard, the Report argued that: "Any COCOM
nation that allows such technology to be passed on to
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Communist countries should be restricted from receiving
further [U.S. origin] strategic Know-how (Mastanduno, P
306, 1 985)
.
The implication of this position was enormous
for United States-Western p„-,,_w European economic interdependence
imposing West-West restrictions and sanctions could
interrupt transactions between United states firms and
subsidiaries or joint-venture activities where there was
dependence on a parent firm *~ •rent, for design and manufacturing
"know-how.
"
The Bucy Report recommended even more restrictive
controls on transfers of United States technology to neutral
states. some neutral states such as Sweden, Switzerland,
and Austria had always expressed a reluctance to accept
United States re-export control authority. Their national
export control enforcement programs were minimal or
non-existent. Given this fact" the Bucy Report stated that
the United States should only allow transfers of technology
to these states that "we would be willing to transfer
directly to Communist countries" (Mastanduno p. 307, 1985).
Even in 1976, DOD officials used the Bucy Report to
argue for much more extensive vigilance on West-West
technology transfers. While the rationale for this
increased surveillance was set out in terms of national
security, there were strong neo- mercantilistic undertones
(Baranson, 1976) . The Report expressed a concern over the
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increased intensity of global economic competition in nigh
technology sectors, over the erosion of the competitive
position of united States high-tech industry, and over the
rapid and relatively unregulated diffusion of United States'
origin leading edge technology into the global market.
Many corporate and government officials believed that
United States firms aggravated this situation by regularly
and liberally transferring state of the art design and
manufacturing techniques (Mastanduno, p. 326, 1985). The
fact that some firms were readily willing to sell, trade, or
barter leading edge technology with foreign affiliates and
firms was seen by some officials as aiding foreign
competition in ways that worked to the disadvantage of
United States industry as a whole. in some cases state of
the art technology was bartered for finance capital as in
the IBM-Fujitsu case or was traded for concessions in
particular domestic markets as in the General Electric-
SMECMA France case (Baranson, 1976). Given these issues and
the nature of the Bucy Report's recommendations, many allied
officials believed that the primary target of the Bucy
Report was intra-Western trade (Interview, Brussels, January
1990) .
In the late 1970s the Department of Defense (DOD) was
given the task of implementing the overall recommendations
of the Bucy Report. This task included responsibility for
260
developing lists of critical technological
"Know-how »
identifying revolutionary technological advances, and
setting out formal criteria to distinguish active from
passive transfers Thicr . s 3 ob was given over to the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Research *nH »1 r a d Engineering
(DRE) and the Office of the Assi^ 3 nfwo. uik a sista t Secretary for
international Security Affairs (ISA) (Mastanduno, p. 310,
1985)
.
The approach developed by the DOD out of the Bucy
Report recommendations came to be called the "critical
technologies approach." The Department of Defense argued
that United States lead-time in a number advanced technology
areas had been eroded by the liberal policies of detente.
The Department of Defense in the late 1970s begin to push
for a much greater role in the export control licensing
process based on this approach. The Bucy Report became
ammunition in this inter-governmental competition. DOD
officials attempted to gain ground with the White House, the
NSA, and in Congress by arguing that the critical
technologies approach would result in a net reduction of the
number of products subject to control. The DOD argued that
there was a limited category, at any one time, of
identifiable state of the art technological "know-how" that
should be placed under transfer surveillance and control.
In practice, finding a way to implement the Bucy
Report proved to be almost overwhelming. The DOD spent
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enorrcous amounts of time and resources developing a
"militarily critical technologies list" („CL) . The list
consisted of fifteen rla^oc „ P . ,rr c sses of technology: l) computer
network technoloav; 2) i arno o«*«v«,+.9Y, l ge computer system technology; 3)
software technology; 4) automated real-time control
technology; 5) composite and defense materials processing
and manufacturing technology; 6) directed energy technology;
7) large-scale integration and manufacturing technology; 8 )
military instrumentation technology; 9) telecommunications
technology; 10) guidance and control technology; H)
microwave component technology; 12) engine technology; 13
)
advanced optics and fiber optics technology; 14) sensor
technology; and 15) underseas system technology (SITC, p.
225, 1976; Mastanduno, 1985). Within each of these broad
categories the DOD was to identify which particular
technology was of critical military value. Then DOD
officials were going to determine what technologies were
keystone state of the art, and revolutionary technologies.
Finally, DOD would have to determine for each specific
technology, the present level of Soviet capability in terms
of "know-how," alternative suppliers in the global market,
and the rate and sources of transactions in these
technologies in intra-Western trade. To accomplish this the
DOD-DRE along with the DIA set up a classified program
called "Socrates." This was a massive data gathering effort
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and computer systen, established to monitor break-throughs
and technological advanoes in Western sooieties and global
transfers of those technologies (Interview, Washington D.C.,
1990)
.
Western European officials were skeptical of the Bucy
Report recommendations. They did not believe that the
United States would be willing to allow the export of high
technology items to the Soviet bloc that were going to be
used in military systems simply because those items did not
transfer critical technological "know-how." They also had
reservations about the implications of such an approach for
the free exchange of information. m addition, Western
European officials were skeptical of the practicality of
enforcing technological "know-how" controls. Finally, the
Bucy Report generated resentment because of its allegations
that Western European COCOM states disregarded re-export
control arrangements (see Mastanduno on these issues, 1985).
This Report was significant for the domestic politics
of East-West trade for three reasons. First, the Report
helped to swing the bureaucratic momentum on the issue of
export controls away from the State Department to the DOD
and the office of the National Security Advisor. The Report
provided a coherent conceptual framework from which the
detente trade linkage policy could be challenged. It also
and perhaps more significantly, resulted in greater resource
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outlays for the evasion of the United states export
control program in the DOD. This put the DOD in a better
position to challenge other agencies. Secondly, the Bucy
Report helped to shore-up a disparate coalition of actors
who were advocates of tighter restrictions on export and
technology transfer controls. This alliance included,
conservative members of Congress (such as H. Jackson) who
were concerned with national security issues; members of
Congress who were concerned with the erosion of United
States economic and technological competitiveness (such as
J- Garn), critics of detente in the Department of Defense,
and Commerce Department officials who believed that United
States firms were being disadvantaged by Western European
firms' disregard for export control regulations. Thirdly,
the Bucy Report brought the issue of technology transfer
controls to center stage and provided a symbolic ground on
which to critique the implications of liberalized East-West
trade in the 1970s.
The Carter Administration Takes Action
The 1979 version of the Export Administration Act
( EAA) did not adopt the Bucy Report's harsher
recommendations. The Report did, however, provide the
framework for debate over the EAA legislation. The invasion
of Afghanistan in late 1979 provided the opportunity for
groups that supported a harder line to gain the high ground.
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President Carter ordered a review of the United States
export and technology transfer control program and a review
of the Un.ted States position on COCOM controls. Advocates
of a more restrictive policy used this as a forum to move
the administration away from liberalization and linkage.
in the context of this inter-agency review the DOD
clashed with representatives from the state Department over
how to reform policy strategy. m a series of hearings
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affair's
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1980, DOD
officials outlined their position and the goals of what they
called a long term strategy on export controls [Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs [hereafter PSI], Feb. 1980 and Sept.
1980]. in response to questions posed by Senator Henry
Jackson at the February hearing, Under Secretary of Defense
William Perry asserted that the approach to East-West trade
followed in the 1970s had been a mistake detrimental to
Western security, and that a reconsideration of the entire
export control program was long overdue. Perry stressed
that the most important areas for renewed restrictions
included intellectual property, technological "know-how"
embodied in items, and process "know-how" that could
indirectly aid Soviet military strength (PSI, pp. 25-59,
Feb., 1980). Throughout 1980 DOD officials appeared before
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this committee to argue that technologies and goods
contributing to the industrial base of the Soviet Union or
supporting military manufacture, should be strictly
controlled. As several scholars have pointed out, this
position was a significant shift away from a limited
strategic export control strategy (Jacobsen, 1985;
Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 19 86; Long, 1989)
. It was part
of an attempt to move policy to a broader program of
economic warfare or economic isolation with the Soviet Union
(Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986; Elliott, 1988). it also
represented the beginning of the re-emergence and growing
re-legitimation of what we have called the absolutist
discourse. Senator Jackson drew on the symbols, images, and
language of this discourse in his attacks on past approvals
of high-technology sales to the Soviets. m particular he
attacked the Administration for selling high technology
items to the Zil vehicle plant; a plant known to be used in
the production of missile launchers. He said "the whole
Soviet Union is a Zil complex. Isn't it really when you get
down to it?" He then evoked the image of the evil-other by
saying that approving export licenses for sales to Zil was
"like selling to the Krupp works under Hitler" (PSI, p. 49,
Feb.
,
1980)
.
In these and other statements Senator Jackson
articulated some of the fundamental perceptions rooted in an
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absolutist discourse pj-^ , . .. First, individuals who supported the
hard-line perspective saw the Soviet civilian economy and
Military production as being tightly integrated. Technology
sold for use in the civilian sector, according to this view
was bound to end up in the military sector (Parrott, 1985 ) .
in addition, within the terms of the absolutist discourse,
there were no grounds for peaceful coexistence or
strategically insignificant commercial relations.
Many Western European officials and some United States
officials sharply disagreed with these perceptions. They
did not believe that the Soviet Union "was one big zil
complex.- Western European analysts in general believed
that Soviet military production was isolated from the rest
of the economy. They were also much more skeptical of the
ability of the Soviets, given the central planning system
and the archaic infrastructure, to quickly or effectively
diffuse Western technology (Woolcock, 1982; Schaffer, 1985;
Rode and Jacobsen, 1985). In addition, most Western
European policy elites believed that when it came to the
question of East-West trade, there were ways of separating
political or strategic issues from economic issues (Bertsch,
1988)
.
These areas became major points of disagreement
during the Reagan Administration.
The Carter Administration, after 1979, did break with
the detente strategy of trade-linkage (Mastanduno, 1985;
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Bertsch, 1985)
.
A "no exceptions- pol icy prohibiting
exceptions for the export of controls goods to the Soviet
Un.on was instituted as the official United states position
in COCOM. m addition, export licenses for the transfer of
technologies to industries that could indirectly improve
Soviet military strength were to be denied indefinitely.
These moves represented a significant shift in the focus of
the United States position on export controls (Bertsch,
1985; Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986). The focus of the
control system was expanded by this action to include
technologies with indirect military potential.
The allies' reactions in COCOM were mixed. They were
receptive to the Carter Administration's suggestions on the
need to strengthen the strategic multilateral export control
program. In the early 1980s, some allied officials had come
to share the perception that too lax a system of controls on
transfers of state of the art technology to the Soviet bloc
could be a detriment to Western security interests. Western
European officials were unwilling, however, to see the COCOM
program turned into a forum for the continuation of Carter's
use of export controls for foreign policy purposes.
Attempts to move the COCOM program beyond the control
threshold of a narrow strategic embargo met with stiff
resistance (Bertsch, 1985). The allies did accept the "no
exceptions" policy, but under the condition that it applied
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oniv to the soviet Union ana that it induced
"exceptions to
the no exceptions" (Mastanduno, 1985) . They alsQ
an atte.pt by the United states to get COCOM to accept
criteria that would restrict f 0nh^itechnologies with indirect
military significance and a proposal that any export of
technology to the Soviet Union with a value of over $100
million be subject to full COCOM review (Mastanduno, 1985).
This resistance to the Carter Administration
initiatives had several sources. Most of the allies had
much more at stake economically in East-West trade than the
United States. Yet unwillingness to harm their own economic
interests was only part of their motivation for resisting
the proposals. While there was some political consensus on
the need to increase the efficiency of a strategic embargo,
the resistance to the broadening of COCOM that the Carter
Administration encountered was indicative of more
fundamental divergences of perception in the alliance
(Hoffmann, 1981)
.
This divergence of perception was bound up in long
standing differences in national experiences of trade with
Eastern bloc states. It stemmed immediately from growing
divergence of discourses; in representations of the Soviet
Union. There was a divergence in the construction of the
nature of the Soviet threat to Western security and in the
relationship between East-West trade and Western security
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over
e"
' ssue
interests. There were important differences" ii between and
within the allied states in these areas. The divergence Qf
dxscourses at both the domestic and intra-European level,
however, was never as great as it has been between the
United States and Europe at points in the past (Agnelli,
1980)
.
French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson would later
describe the United States-Western European conflict
East-West trade in the 1980s as "a progressive divorc
because "we no longer speak the same language" on the i
of East-West trade (Jentleson, p. 195, 1986).
West Germany's position, for example, was bound up in
its greater political stake in East-West trade due to the
division of Germany. This situation helped to shape a
particular conceptualization of the relationship between
East-West economic relations and Western security in the
1970s. Perceived successes on intra-German issues with the
Ostpolitik trade inducement program meant that FRG
officials, more than any within the alliance, believed
economic ties with Eastern European states could achieve
positive political results (Stent.. 1981; Jacobsen, 1985 and
1988)
.
In addition, there was a strong and broad based
consensus that the expansion of commercial ties with Eastern
Europe was in the economic interest of a number of groups in
the FRG. In early 1980 the SPD was reluctant to take steps
to alienate these groups. As an absolutist discourse
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ng
legitimating a broader economic warfare w^^
authority in the Unite, states foreign policy establishment
in the FRG an instrumentalist and a conservative neo-Kantian
discourse remained the basis of a national consensus on
East-west trade policy. This consensus legated both a
strategy of trade inducement when possible to encourage
concessions on intra-German issues and a liberal East-West
trade policy qualified by an acceptance of the necessity of
a limited strategic embargo of goods with direct military
significance (Stent, 1985) .
British and French officials were much more skeptical
about the potential political benefits of East-West economic
ties (Bertsch, 1988). m fact, in both of these states
since 1979, but for different reasons, it appears that a
type of conservative neo-Kantian discourse de-linking
political and economic issues has had more legitimacy in
debates over East-West trade policy. France's Gaullist
traditions and perceptions of autonomy from the political
affairs of the superpowers, has provided the ground for
opposition to a renewed economic warfare program (Labbe,
1988). The strong French support of liberalized East-West
trade throughout the 1970s was, however, modified somewhat
in the early 1980s. French intelligence obtained the
"Farewell Papers" from a high ranking KGB agent in the early
1980s. This documented in detail Soviet bloc high technology
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up
acquisition networks in the West, soviet KGB line "x"
omcers, technology acquisition specialists, had huilt
extensive networks in France through the 1970 s. Thus by
the early 198 0s, the French were open to strengthening
domestic enforcement of controls on the transfer of
militarily significant technology. French intelligence set
up the "Surveillance" committee and organized DST -
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire - to counter the
Soviet network (Tuck, 1986). They expelled 47 Soviet
diplomats involved in attempts to obtain controlled
technologies in 1983.
The British historical tradition of advocating a free
trade system provided a ground on which several of its
officials argued in opposition to the United States attempt
to expand COCOM in the early 1980s. These officials
maintained that trade with all states should be viewed as a
right and not a privilege (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988).
British officials were resistant to conflating political
with economic issues when it came to questions of East-West
trade. The British expressed a willingness to strengthen
the strategic embargo, but strongly objected to the
expansion of the multilateral export control program to
include items of indirect military significance (Jentleson,
1986) .
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-£^3an_Ad^^
and fhQ o
^^U^t__Discourse
The divergence in these discourses in ^ ^the stage for an ail out aliiance conflict in the early
1980s. This conflict became fuU _biown^ ^ ^^^^
discourse gained preponderance as the guide-post of the
Keagan Administration policy on East-West trade. Reagan's
campaign rhetoric, the images and symbols he evoked, the
success of the neo-conservative movement's public relations
and lobbying programs, and the actions of the Soviet Union
were all factors that helped to revive a Cold War absolutist
discourse (see Fred Holiday, 1986, . In campaign speeches
Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and
said that "the Western world should quarantine the Soviets
until they decided to behave like a civilized nation"
(quoted in Jentleson, 1986)
. The appointment of Richard
Perle as Under Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy and Lawrence Brady as Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration were clear signals about
the direction the Reagan Administration would go on the
issue of East-West trade (Bertsch, 1985; Root, 1984). Both
Perle and Brady had earned reputations as virulent cold
warriors. Perle, Henry Jackson's chief aide in the 1970s,
did "as much as any American to doom detente in drafting and
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engineering the
.acKson-Vani* amendment.. (Jentleson
, p .
1986; see Fred Holiday, 1986).
The appointments of critics n f *o detente to key posts in
the export control apparatus assured energetic
implementation of particular policies designed to
economically isolate the Soviet Union. it was also part of
an overall administration strategy to remove remaining
supporters of trade inducement from the American foreign
policy establishment (Mastanduno, 1985; Lowenfeld, 1987;
Jentleson, 1986). Perle called for the end of the
legitimacy of the instrumentalist-trade linkage and the
neo-kantian positions in the United States domestic debate,
saying, "it is simply no longer convincing to suggest that
trade (in any form) will moderate Soviet behavior or deflect
it from its build up of military power" (Defense '82, Feb.
1982; Jentleson, p. 173 1986). Administration officials
publicly construed the export control situation of the last
decade as having resulted in a loss of lifeblood, saying
that there had been a "massive hemorrhaging" of U.S.
technology (Bertsch, 1985). The construction of
representations of technology as having organic and
life-sustaining value were often curious elements of the
absolutist discourse.
Early in the first Reagan Administration some
officials, led by Secretary of Defense Wienberger, became
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1980s offered a grand strategic opportunity. According to
Wienberger the Soviet industrial base, "without constant
infusions of advanced technology from the West, would
experience cumulative obsolescence that would eventually
constrain the military industries" (Annual Report to
Congress Secretary of Defense, FY, 1983; Mastanduno, l985 ;
Jentleson 1986). Wienberger argued that by allowing the
Soviet Union access to advanced Western technologies, the
United States helped to preserve a totalitarian dictatorship
and allowed Soviet leaders to avoid the choice between its
military-industrial priorities and the civilian sector.
Hard-liners within the Administration became
uncompromisingly committed and relentless in their policy
stand on the desirability of a broad embargo on industrial
technology and equipment to the Soviet bloc (Bertsch, 1985).
Economic and technological competition was represented as a
peacetime surrogate for military struggle (Mastanduno,
1985) .
Most shocking for Western European leaders was the
fact that some of these officials advocated forcing the
allies to comply with the United States position.
Wienberger suggested that the allies should be forced to
chose between their economic interests in the East and their
loyalty to the United States (Bertsch, 1985) . In early 1981
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the hard-liners had not yet gained full control in the
intra-governmental struggles over export control policy
inter-agency conflicts centered on whether or not, and if
so, the extent to which the United States would pursue a
strategy of economic warfare (Mastanduno, 1985). Hard-line
officials, however, began pushing policy in this direction
on a number of fronts at both the domestic and the
inter-allied level (Jentleson, 1986).
Early on, these Reagan Administration officials sought
to obtain compliance with their views from the allies and
from Western firms. They sought to achieve their goals
through persuasion in bilateral diplomatic missions and in
multilateral fora that included not only COCOM, but also
NATO and the annual economic summits (Bertsch, 1985). At the
Ottawa summit in July 1981 Reagan wanted East-West trade as
a central topic of discussion. He was able to obtain allied
consent on a proposal to hold a ministerial-level review of
COCOM controls in January 1982. Some hard-line officials
believed that this ministerial-level meeting and the COCOM
list review negotiations scheduled to begin in November 1982
would be fora in which the allies could be brought in line
with their overall strategy (Mastanduno, 1985). They also
turned to attempts to strengthen the export control license
application review process and thereby to place pressure on
Western firms that were subject to the United States system.
276
-aw in
in January 1982 Richard^ ^ ^ ^
the Presidents Export Council
^^
Ministration, expressed the view that . ^
argument and pressure . „. goQd ^ ^ ^ ^have applied in the past" - should be afele ^ bring
the fact that the Administration decided to pursue an
economic warfare strategy bought the United States into
direct conflict with the allied states over the Soviet
Pipeline deal. The Fall 1981 declaration of martial 1,
Poland provided the excuse, but the real root of sharp
Reagan Administration reaction to allied refusals to scrap
the deal was tied to the rise of the absolutist discourse
and its legitimation of a strategy of economically isolating
the Soviets (Jentleson, 1986).
At the domestic level Administration officials sought
to expose the extent of Soviet intelligence networks set up
to illegally acquire Western technology. They took steps to
broaden the scope and substance of items subject to control
and also to reform administrative enforcement and
surveillance programs to monitor individual firms' and
states' compliance with United States and COCOM controls.
Several means were used to achieve these goals.
"To elevate the level of public consciousness on the
issue," the Commerce Department asked the CIA to release a
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live
de-classified version of its 1980-1981 comprehens
analysis of Soviet technology acquisition Methods. The
Commerce Department under Brady's direction also set out to
develop an extensive data base to document
"information
(technical data) and technological capabilities in free
world and communist countries- (Committee on Governmental
Affairs, p. 275, May, 1982). m addition, the Commerce
Department instituted an organizational restructuring
designed to improve enforcement. A "special analytical
unit" in conjunction with the Customs Service was set up to
enhance the capability of identifying firms engaged in
diverting controlled technology to the Soviets and to
uncover diversion routes (Committee on Governmental Affairs,
p. 206, May 1982) .
The DOD, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Technology Security Agency, under Perle's direction also
launched several new surveillance programs. These included
the "Ramparts" and the "Socrates" programs; unprecedented
expansions of United States' vigilance on intra-Western and
East-West transfers of high technology. The role of the DOD
in the export control program was expanded greatly. The DOD
was given the power to review COCOM and non-COCOM neutral
states license applications (Freedenberg, 1987). The DOD's
input in developing United States positions for COCOM
negotiations was also increased (Root, 1984) . The
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Administration launched „ Customs Operation
extensive domestic personnel and overseas ^ ^
of the attempt to incrpa<?0rease enforcement effectiveness through
monitoring the compliance of COCOM and non-COCOM free world
states, firms, and individuals (Committee on Governmental
Affairs, p. 206, May, 1982).
Use of the name
..Exodus" to desoribe the outflow of
Western technology to the Eastern bloc was expressive of the
hard-liners belief that there were massive movements of
illicit items. Each discovery of a new case of
..violation-
seemed to be used as evidence that more authority should be
ceded to enforcement agencies within the intelligence
community, the DOD, Customs, and the Commerce Department.
These agencies would then be able to ensure that
"straegically significant technology" did leak out of the
West.
The narrative of the loss of what was represented as
the life-blood of the West, in the form of "strategically
significant technology," articulated and reinforced a
particular conceptualization of the source of United States
power or advantage over its superpower rival. Stories of
uncovering plots to transfer controlled technology illicitly
were often set out in the press with a James Bond
adventurism; with spies, cops, and robbers (see MacDonald,
1990)
. These stories would build up to a final moment when
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the combined forces nf a„fv,o authority, from the West/ would
uncover the plot of the forces of evil and ri, recover the
technological device Mncf „Dust in the nick of time" (MacDonald
P- 75, 1990)
.
Tne use value of these dramatic narratives
'
and the notion of guarding
"strategically significant
technology" was increased by the fact that often the details
of cases were classified.
Perhaps the most notorious story along these lines is
that of the West German businessman Richard Mueller. Mueller
attained a type of mythical status in high-techno-bandit
theater (MacDonald, 1990). For a time in the 1980s, he was
like "Carlos The Jackel" in terms of terrorism, a symbol of
the ubiquitious threat of the techno-trader
. Since 1976
Mueller used front corporations in South Africa, Austria,
and Sweden to acquire large amounts of controlled
telecommunications, computer equipment and chemical weapons
technology for the Soviets and other target states. In 1983
Meuller attempted to obtain a Digital Corporation VAX-ll-782
for the Soviets. Western authorities finally tracked it
down in Sweden just before the shipment was to be
transported to Moscow, but Meuller escaped (see NAS, 1987;
accounts of this and other cases can be found in: U.S. DOD.
Soviet Acquistion of Militari ly Significant Western
Technol ogy; An Upd^rp, 1985)
.
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Many of these violations were uncovered as a direct
consequence of massive increases in the authority and
budgets of united States agencies responsible for
enforcement. The operations of these agencies was not
limited to uncovering ili icit acquisitions and sales of
Products, but enforcement was also extended to the transfer
of controlled information and know-how. The United states
barred foreign nationals from several conferences on a
variety of technical and scientific topics. m addition,
the DOD began demanding that American academics who were
presenting papers at conferences on technologies which were
subject to controls apply for export licenses (MacDonald, p.
71, 1990). m one case, DOD officials in 1982 insisted at
the last moment that over 100 papers be withdrawn from the
26th Annual International Technical Symposium of the Society
of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers, other
enforcement agencies during this period launched awareness
programs to sensitize the business community and the public
to the need to guard "strategically significant technology."
For example, the Commerce Department sent out elaborate
packages of information to high technology firms instructing
employees on what to look for regarding violations of the
export control regulations. They even, it appears, sent out
awareness material to their fellow agencies in Western
European countries. In the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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in London stickers, courtesy of the Cnr™Y r ommerce Department, arepasted on the secure carets that contain top secret files
They read
"Techno-Busters, We Si,t Afraid of no Sples; ^
you Remember To Lock „p? ., (observed by^
1990,
.
The FBI also launched its "Library Awareness
Program through which they encouraged librarians to "report
frequent use of specialist collections (particularly
technical and applied science, by suspicious aliens" (quoted
in MacDonald, 1990)
.
Some European officials pointed out that during the
early 1980s, DOD wanted to cast the debate over United
States and multilateral national security export controls in
strictly technical terms (Interview, Bonn, January, 1990).
The DOD seemed to share the view of some scholars that
"political scientists should be wary of pontificating on the
implications of lists of controlled items whose contents
include things such as: "coaxial cable with the outer
conductor electro-plated directly on spirally grooved cable
dielectrics- or "tubes in which space charge control is
utilized as the primary functional parameter including but
not limited to triodes and tetrodes" (P. Hanson, 1981;
quoted in MacDonald, p. 14, 1990). All COCOM lists are
classified, but the British list of controlled items
published by the DTI is thought to be a copy of the COCOM
lists (Interviews, Brussels and Bonn, September, 1990). By
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accepting such a hard-line offio-i=i6
'
lcials may have wanted to
silence broader social, poxitical, and economic questions
about the costs of an expansion of the export control
program.
Ii^e^ llied_Xonfli c^
The United States failed in its att^t- +xii empt to persuade
and finally to coerce the allied states to stop the Siberian
Pipeline deal. The details of this conflict are familiar by
now (Jentleson, 1986; Lowenfeld, 1987). The dynamics of the
conflict are complex and undoubtedly deserve more than the
passing glance given to them in this chapter. The conflict
is significant for the analysis of COCOM, however, because
it demonstrated the nature of the dynamics of the United
States domestic politics and inter-allied politics on the
East-West trade issue.
At the Ottawa summit in July 1981, President Reagan
attempted to use American prestige as the alliance leader to
get Western European heads of state to stop pipeline
contract negotiations with the Soviets. Despite success in
getting allied officials to agree to hold a ministerial
review of COCOM, Reagan failed to cajole the heads of state
away from the energy trade deal. All of the companies
involved in the Siberian pipeline deal had trade connections
to the United States either "as subsidiaries, technology
licensees, or parts users" (Jentleson, p. 194, 1986).
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Desser of France was an
Msthom Atlantique and Thompson-CSF used United Stat,
licensed technology, and Italy's Nuovo Pignone, West
Germany's AEG-Kanis and Britain « Tnhn ns Jo Brown Engineering all
used parts supplied by GE (Jentleson, 1986). The Soviet
Union lacked the technological
''know-how.' to produce
25-megawatt turbines, compressor stations, and computerized
control equipment for the pipeline. The Reagan
Administration believed that it could stop the pipeline by
getting allied leaders to agree to block export contracts
for these technologies. m addition, the Administration
argued that contracts to import gas from the pipeline would
not only increase Soviet hard-currency earnings, but that
such an arrangement was also a threat to Western security.
This argument was based on the idea that the deal would make
Western European states dependent on Soviet energy supplies.
The economic stakes were very high for Western
European firms. Many of the firms involved had experienced
sharp declines in earnings in the early 1980s. For example,
Mannesmann suffered a loss of nearly $52 million in 1981,
AEG-Kanis, a subsidiary of AEG-Telefunken, had not shown a
profit since 1978, and almost all of the firms that signed
contracts for wide-diameter pipe had not shown profits for a
least three years. The general contractors were Mannesmann
Anlagenbau (West Germany)
, Creusot-Loire (France) , and Nuovo
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Pignone (Italy) (Jentleson, p. i 90 i 98 6^ muv ^u, 1 ). These firms had
signed contracts valued at $2.! billion
. The major
manufacturing subcontractors for the 25-megawatt turbines
were dohn Brown Engineering and AEG-Kanis
. m addition, on
the manufacturing and supply side of * nx a the deal were hundreds
of subcontractors and suppliers scattered across Western
Europe. on the gas import side of the deal, large state-
owned utility f irms negotiated »ajor contracts with the
Soviets
.
When the attempt at diplomatic persuasion failed, the
Reagan Administration tried to put together a compensation
package. Administration representatives were sent to
Western European capitals with offers of increased supplies
of United States coal and with the suggestion that Norwegian
gas could be substituted for Soviet gas. This compensation
package was a blunder for a number of reasons. it was
unrealistic because the United States could not have
produced or delivered the necessary amount of coal.
Secondly, it was ill planned because not only were the
Norwegians unwilling to increase their gas production, their
gas would have cost more than Soviet gas to tap and to
deliver. Thirdly, the package was misdirected. It would
not have compensated, in the midst of a global recession,
for "the loss of exports or their favorable effects on
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emPloyment, balance of payments, and industrial production „
(Jentleson, p. 188, 1986).
The declaration of martial law in Poland intensified
the conflict as the United States increased its pressure on
European firms. The Administration became increasingly
frustrated with the failure of persuasion or compensation to
sway allied leaders. The conflict went back and forth from
January until June 1982. At the Versailles summit in June,
the heads of state failed to reach an agreement on
collective sanctions on the Poland issue. On June 18, the
Reagan Administration turned to coercion. The
Administration imposed extraterritorial export controls on a
retroactive basis. The sanctity of existing contracts was
ignored and the Administration threatened criminal penalties
and additional sanctions for violations.
Western European firms were reluctant to act against
the Administration due to the potential consequences for
their access to the United States market and technology.
This move back-fired, however, as the British, French, West
German, and Italian governments all invoked national laws
that ordered their companies to fulfill contracts. The
first violation occurred when Dressor-France and Creusot-
Loire shipped compressors to the Soviets on August 26, 1982.
President Reagan reacted by issuing an executive order
prohibiting all U.S. exports to these firms and their
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salaries. From August unta ^^^
imposed sanctions on British, Italian, Frenoh, and West
German £ irms that violated the exterritorial United states
controls
.
At the inter-allied level this conflict represented
more than simply a divergence of economic interest. it was
a result of a more fundamental conflict over the Western
alliance foreign policy strategy. Allied leaders were
willing to agree to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles to
counterbalance Soviet strategic advantages in Europe. They
were unwilling, however, to link economic and strategic
issues by agreeing to a coordinated alliance economic
warfare program. As Bruce Jentleson points out, "allied
leaders were dismayed by what they considered to be the
extremes and excesses of the Reagan approach- to the Soviet
Union (Jentleson p. 190, 1986). This divergence of opinion
was based on differences between the way top Reagan
Administration officials and Western European leaders
perceived the Soviet Union.
Western European officials disagreed in particular
with the Administration's assessment of the consequences of
the pipeline deal for Western security. They did not
believe that the Soviets would gain a strategic advantage by
supplying energy to Western Europe. In addition, they
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argued that the fldministration overestlmated ^
sfgnificence of increasing Soviet hard .currency
Many of the Western European officials argued that the
Pipeline deal could serve to stab ili ze East-West relations
(Mastanduno, p. 424
, 1985
,
. Perhaps nore importantly< ^
Reagan Administration's public action challenged the
prestige of Western European leaders who had resisted
domestic pressure by deploying medium range nuclear
missiles. Finally, the extraterritori a l epplic.tion of
United States law was an offense to Fnmno,uen r European sovereignty.
At the domestic level the decision to impose sanctions
was a victory for the hard-line in the Administration.
National Security Advisor William Clark and Secretary of
Defense Wienberger worked to bring reluctant officials
around in support of sanctions. Secretary of state Haig was
"cut-out" of the NSC meeting where the decision to impose
sanctions was made. This was the issue over which he
resigned. Stopping the pipeline deal came to be seen as
essential to the overall success of the economic warfare
program (Mastanduno, 1985; Jentleson, 1986). Preventing
Soviet hard-currency earnings from gas sales was considered
essential
.
The United States backed down from the imposition of
sanctions in November, 1982 by claiming that Western
European officials agreed to a "plan of action" (Mastanduno,
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1985)
.
This plan was nothing more than an .y m ma agreement not toS1gn new contracts untn . series of studies w^ ^^^^^
on East-west trade and Western security. what ^^
attest at economic coercion implied about the erosion of
Unite, states power was pronounce, because o f the heated and
public nature of the conflict. The consequences of the
conflict in fact threatened to undermine the ability of
hard-liners, to extract compliance and concessions from the
allies on strengthening the multilateral export control
system (Root, 1984; Jentleson, 1986). The costs of this
strategy and the domestic opposition to restrictive export
controls it generated, as discussed below, helped to
eventually erode the hard-liners' strength in the
Administration.
When it became apparent that Western European
officials were not going to be persuaded by the argument
that stopping Soviet access to hard-currency was in the
interest of Western security, expanding technology transfer
controls became even more of an imperative. if hard-line
officials could not control Soviet capability to buy, they
reasoned that the next best thing was devising better ways
to control what the West would sell.
In ministerial level COCOM meetings, in the list
reviews that began in November 1982 and through bilateral
initiatives, hard-line officials attempted to bring the
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allies in line with a broader «,f„fast^tegy of economically
isolating tne Soviets. These officii began to pressure the
allies over the objections of the state Department and
despite the fact that there continued to be inter-agency
conflicts. Their initiatives were unsuccessful on a number
of fronts. united States proposals to elevate COCOM to
formal treaty status and to establish a permanent military
subcommittee in the multilateral organization, however, were
resisted (Mastanduno, 1985). More significantly for the
economic isolation strategy the allied states consistently
resisted United States proposals in 1982-1984 to broaden
COCOM control criteria to encompass technology that would
indirectly contribute to the improvement of Soviet military
capability (Bertsch, 1985; Mastanduno, 1985).
When it came to getting COCOM member states to agree
to strengthen their domestic enforcement programs and to
agree to expansions of the control list, the United States
met with more success. The 1982-1984 negotiations extended
controls in telecommunications, on certain classes of
computers and software, and on robotics (Mastanduno, 1985).
These extensions entailed economic costs for alliance firms
that had landed contracts and had begun to develop Eastern
markets in these areas. For example, in the tele-
communications sector the British firms Plessey and GEC were
forced to scrap $200 million contracts they had signed with
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"^^^ ^ 3 ° f ^ «« Visions. see scholars
have argued that this was an ^
^ ^
part o f alliance states to strengthen the multUateral
export control program desPite economic costs (Mastanduno,
1985). This assessment is based on the argument that there
was agreement on the need to make the multilateral strategic
embargo more efficient. This is an accurate
characterization of the view of only some Western European
officials, particularly the French.
Achieving concrete commitments and reaching agreement
on particular issues was difficult. The first round in 1982
established tighter controls on electronic grade silicon,
printed circuit boards, commercial spacecraft, some oil and
gas technology, large floating dry docks, and industrial
robots (Mastanduno p. 477, 1985). The final round from
1983-1984 was a battle over computers, software, and digital
switching tele-communications equipment. There is evidence
that the final compromises made in the 1984 talks were
reached as a result of more than just "the persuasive power
of sound technical arguments" by the United States. Several
scholars have argued that the compromises resulted from
implicit and explicit threats by the United States to
withhold access to military technology, defense contracts,
and other rents from states and firms that did not go along
with the United States interpretation and position about
291
s
r
s was
particular controversial ite.s in the COCOM list
negotiations
( Cra„ £ord ana Lenwav, 1985; Schaffer
, ^
Bertsch and Elliott, 1988).
While the United States did aqree to in™.g some compromises
(i.e. microcomputers), top Reagan Administration official
expressed a willingness to use instruments available fo
leverage to bring reluctant allies into line. Thi
particularly the case for classes of items in which the
United States accounted for a disproportionate share of
global production. Allied officials stated that their
ability to resist United States proposals for restrictions
on particular items (i.e., telecommunications) was often
curtailed by the level of their industry's dependence on
U.S. technology (Bertsch and Elliott, 1988). This seems to
have provided U.S. officials the upper-hand in negotiations
over particular items in the COCOM talks.
Richard Perle personally directed initiatives to apply
pressure on the allies. He indicated that United States
military technology was withheld from certain allies until
they agreed to strengthen their domestic export control
programs (Mastanduno, 1985; Bertsch, 1985). In a
particularly undiplomatic move, Assistant Secretary Brady
threatened that the "United States would reconsider military
commitments to Western Europe" if full cooperation on trade
controls was not forthcomming (NYT, p. l April 24, 1983 ;
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cited in Jentleson, 1985) m a>qju-
,
. addition, Defense Department
officials under pprlp'c •Pe e s direction usurped state Department
negotiations on a number of occasions by sending delegations
directly to Western European capitals. This led to a pubUo
conflict between Perle and William Root, the state
Department's long time chief COCOM negotiator and head of
the Office of East-West Trade. Root resigned in the midst
of the protracted negotiations alleging that the DOD had
made agreement impossible.
The United States also used leverage to attempt to
extract compliance with controls on particular items from
non-COCOM states and firms. Austria was told that they
would be left with only "pastries and 1950s machinery" if
they did not tighten restrictions on controls in compliance
with COCOM (Mastanduno, p. 500, 1985). Similar pressure was
placed on Sweden and Switzerland.
Executive officials, during this period, were also
actively involved in protracted negotiations on the renewal
of the 1979 EAA (discussed below; Freedenberg, 1987). They
sought, among other things, a strengthening of Executive
power for extraterritorial extensions of U.S. export
controls. This power was to include the ability to impose
import sanctions on firms that violated U.S. and COCOM
controls. This invigoration of the United States
surveillance program, the strengthening of Executive power
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to Withdraw access t0 technology ^ u ^^attests to strengthen instruments for leverage. The
relationship between these instruments can be explained bytawing on the an en foroement rent compliance extraction
-de!. The expansion Qf surveUlance systems occu^
under the Reagan Administration increased United states
capability for guaging compliance and detecting defectors
in addition, the fortification of the ability to apply
sanctions for non-compliance gave United states officials a
bargaining chip for negotiations with the allies.
Costs a nd Consgguencps
Rectifying domestic surveillance and enforcement
programs and broadening executive powers for extra-
territorial sanctions did strengthen the instruments at the
United States- disposal for attempting to extract compliance
from COCOM and non-COCOM states and firms on specific
controls. This, however, was done in the context of a
divergence of discourses at the inter-allied level and in a
situation where the distribution of global high-technology
production had shifted. There was a pronounced divergence
of perception over the nature of the Soviet threat to
Western security in relation to the issue of East-West
trade. By using coercion in the pipeline case and by
attempting to extract compliance for its position in COCOM
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the United States incurred hm>,igh economic and political
costs
.
The cost of being subject to the United states
leverage and surveillance svstem led Western European states
and fi rms to see, ways of reducing exposure. After the
Siberian pipeiine confiict Western European states, with the
encourages of the EC and following the example of
Britain, began developing extensive legislation to prevent
firMs fro, copying with the extraterritorial extension of
U.S. law (Schaffer iqrk\ t ~ ^ > • . .I n tt , 1985). m addition COCOM and non-COCOM
firms began to factor in the cost of being exposed to the
United States compliance extraction system (National Academy
of Sciences (hereafter HAS), 1987). Consequently many
Western European firms begin to consider designing around
United States technology and turning to Japanese and German
technology so that they would not be subject to re-export
controls (HAS, 1987; Bertsch, 1988). Western European firms
also turned to joint ventures to develop technology
production capability to reduce reliance on U.S. products
and know-how.
Finally, the experience with United States economic
leverage and with the extensive surveillance system led to
an emphasis on broader intra-European multilateral efforts
to counter exposure. An example of this is the ambitious
EC-ESPRIT (the European Strategic Program for Research and
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Develops in Information Technology) proiect . ,^yy; j launched in
1982 (Jacobsen, 1988 ) . Tnis $1 . 3 bilUon program ^
designed to aid European firms ^^ ^ ^joint ventures to deveiop commercial programs in computers
tele-communications and related technologies, clearly there
were many factors that inspired this project, not the least
of which was a desire to help Western European firms to
break into capital-intensive markets. yet one broader
consideration was to develop a program that could aid
western European firms in their desire to reduce exposure to
United states economic leverage (Interview, Brussels, EC,
1990)
Hard-line officials' ability to hold sway in domestic
debates over East-West trade policy began to slip after the
failure of coercion in the pipeline deal. m 1983 when the
1979 EAA came up for renewal, business groups and some
members of Congress concentrated efforts on opposing the
Administration's hard-line. Throughout negotiations on the
renewal of the legislation, business groups lobbied for a
greater relaxation of controls on West-West trade and
consistently objected to the economic and competitive costs
of such controls. Over 300 high technology firms joined
forces in the Industry Coalition on Technology Transfers to
lobby for relaxations of controls. In addition, groups such
as the Business Roundtable, the Computer and Business
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Equipment Manufacturing Association, the Electron-
Association, and the Electronics Industry Association, all
put pressure on tne Administration for greater relaxations.
There had been both hidden and overt costs to the
Pipeline sanctions. For example, Caterpillar Tractor
suffered a S300 million loss as ,^ Qf ^
Fiat Allis lost over S 500 Million in contracts; and GE, one
of the principle suppliers, lost ,ajor contracts as a result
of the trade sanctions (Jentleson, p. 207, 1986). m
addition, business groups argued that the Reagan
Administration action increased the perception that United
States firms were unreliable suppliers. m this context Don
Bonker (D-Washington) sponsored a revision of the EAA that
reflected the belief that the export control program should
be scaled back significantly. His version of the bill was
supported by business interest groups. The bill would have
limited the role of the DOD and the Customs service in the
export control program and would have reduced regulations on
intra-COCOM trade in controlled items.
The DOD and other executive officials attempted to
counter this opposition by working through the Senate. The
Senate version of the bill was sponsored by Jake Garn
(R-Utah) and John Heinz (R-Pennsylvania)
. The bill was in
fact a compromise between the more liberal and conservative
camps in the Senate. The more liberal camp pushed for
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measures designed to limit executive *>discretion in the
imposition of export controls for foreian nnHr g policy reasons.
The bill also included a sanctity of contracts provision
designed to satisfy the concern with U.S. supply
unreliability. Conservatives, along with the DOD, pushed
for a significantly expanded national security export
control program. The bill provided for greafcly
surveillance program with more oversight given to the DOD
and customs. The bill also stipulated closer screening of
export license applications by the Commerce Department and
the DOD. The differences between the House and Senate bills
and the intensity of the conflict on the issue bogged
negotiations down in conference committee for three years.
During this period the 1979 EAA expired. The Reagan
Administration only maintained export control authority by
invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
The outcome of the Congressional imbroglio was mixed.
The Senate prevailed on the issue of maintaining and
strengthening Executive authority for extending controls
extraterritorially. The final bill reaffirmed export and
re-export control authority and established statutory
authority to impose import sanctions on firms that violated
United States and COCOM controls. The House prevailed in
its attempt to establish requirements to increase the
efficiency of export license application processing.
298
It is difficult to establish precisely when ^
hard-liners in the Reagan Administration begin to lose
control over thp nnn„„e policy process on East-West trade and over
the administration of export controls. The pipeline
conflict did help to disrrpH^ *-v, •P credit their position, but a number
of factors came together in late 1985 and early 1986 to tilt
the intra-governmental balance of power. Continuing declines
m the united States share of high-technology markets and
lent support to arguments for a reevaluation of the United
States program and for relaxations on controls. By the
beginning of the second Reagan Administration there was also
a vocal and organized opposition to an economic warfare
strategy and particularly to tighter restrictions on
West-West technology transfers. An absolutist discourse
still guided the perception of some officials in the
agencies charged with oversight on export controls. The
authority of symbols and images representing the United
States as having lost the strategic edge to the "Soviet
Threat, « however, began to wane. The image of the United
States in economic and technological decline vis a vis its
Western competitors gained wider circulation. The dynamic
of this trend became a growing focus of analysis among
scholars and policy elites. A sense of urgency to reverse
the trend of decline took hold in the policy establishment.
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President Reagan delivered a speech in 198 7 on the
need for the fortif ication of econQmic
strengthening commercial competitiveness
( wSJ Feb., 6 1987)
in addition, in early 1987 the National Academy of Science
released an influential study entitled Mlan^g^
^^-^nmi^mj^u^ (nas, i9 87; wsj Feb. 6
,
i 987) .
This study had been Commissioned by the Congress as a result
of the protracted conflicts over the renewal of the 1979
EAA. The NAS study brought together an array of business
and government officials and academics. The NAS sent
delegations to all of the alliance states and some non-COCOM
states to collect information and opinions on the entire
Western export control program. The final analysis
estimated that the direct, short-run economic costs to the
United States economy associated with U.S. export controls
was $9.3 billion in 1985 alone (NAS
, p. 264, 1987). This
was based on a complex calculation of administrative costs
of compliance for firms ($500 million), revenue loss for
West-West and East-West exports, and associated GNP loss.
This did not include a measure of the competitive costs to
United States firms and affiliates. The investigations
revealed deep resentment by Western European government and
business officials of the United States export control
program and re-export control authority. It was found that
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of the United states export controlm , '
were recipients nf it co U.S. controlled technologies and goods.
Long processing times for license ; *applications and the
inefficiency of the overall system were found to have
created competitive disadvantages in situations „h
alternative Western foreign availability existed. Thi
significant given the fact that in 1985 over 40 percent -
approximately $ 78 billion - of United states exports of
nonmilitary manufactured goods required a validated license
Associated with lost United states exports was also a
reduction in U.S. employment of 1 88
,
00 0 jobs (NAS p. 275
1987). m short the study exposed the real economic cost
associated with the United States more restrictive position
on export controls. The study did not consider the more
intangible, but no less significant, long term political
cost of attempting to extract compliance. The key
conclusion was that in the context of the transformed
international economy, the United States had to find ways to
balance national security export controls with the demands
of global economic competition.
In February 1987 new White House staff members, such
as National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci and former
Ambassador Robert Dean, appeared to be more open to
industry's position on the economic and competitive costs of
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COntr°1S (WSJ
'
Feb
' «' Canucci,
^ " bUSi-SSW instituted a Nationai
Security Council study that was expects to offer proposal
for relaxations on West-West controls. At the December lg86
COCOM meeting United states officials had pressed the alii
to strengthen domestic control programs in exchange for a
shortening of the list of items subject to control and in
exchange for relaxations of the strenuous licensing
requirements on intra-COCOM re-exports. The NSC study was
designed to set out concrete proposals for the July 19 87
COCOM meeting. m addition to the steps taken by the
Executive some members of Congress began proposing
amendments to the EAA designed to reduce impediments to
West-West trade flows.
Hard-liners in the Pentagon and in Commerce reacted by
portraying the movement toward any relaxation as a
willingness to trade long term security away for short term
economic interests (WSJ, Feb. 6, 1987). They called the
proposals "The Soviet Technology Relief Act of 1987" and
argued that the long term R & d costs of having to make up
for losses in lead time gaps would require a high price
(WSJ, July 22, 1987). Again Perle became the point man. In
public declarations he drew on a set of images reflective of
the absolutist discourse in an attempt to counter the rising
tide of demands for relaxations in the export control
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program . He critlci2ed those uho he said dri^ ^
short tern, co„,mercial interests. He clawed that guard!
the vital organs of the body politic by way of technology
transfer controls was still para.ount to Western security.
Perle said, "We've spwn ime up the patient! Nobody wants to rip
him up again" (WSJ
, Feb. 6, 1987).
Administration opponents of export control relaxation
proposals sought to maintain their position by using their
alliances with like-minded members of Congress. Just prior
to the July 1987 COCOM meeting the DOD released reports that
Toshiba Machine Co. of Japan had been shipping COCOM
controlled machine tools, used to make ultraguiet submarine
propellers, to the Soviet Union. in addition, the report
revealed that Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk of Norway had been
shipping COCOM controlled computer software to the Soviet
Union to run the machines. During the Spring of 1987 there
were additional disclosures of illicit sales of controlled
technologies to the Soviet bloc by French, Italian, and
United States firms.
These revelations resulted in a flurry of
Congressional activity out of which several proposals were
put forward to impose import sanctions on Toshiba and
Kongsberg. Senator Jake Garn introduced a bill that would
have barred the two firms from the United States market for
five years. House bills called for barring the firms from
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bidding on OOD and government procurement contracts. Both
Houses demanded compensation from Norway and Japan for the
cost of developing technology to counter the guieter Soviet
submarines. The Pentagon barred Toshiba Corporation from
participating in any new defense contracts until Japanese
officials had completed full investigations.
The timing of the revelations was clearly designed as
an agenda setting move and were intended to give the United
States diplomatic leverage in the July COCOM talks. The NSC
study and the Congressional amendments for relaxations were
far from calls for total liberalizations. They called for
the elimination of re-export licenses for intra-COCOM
transfers of low end technologies. in addition, by
submitting to a United States audit of internal safeguards
against diversion, some COCOM firms were given pre-approved
cosignee status eliminating the need for a re-export
license. Re-export licenses were still required to transfer
items incorporating United States origin technology to third
countries. Re-export licenses were also still required for
the transfer of goods "with U.S. technology content over 10%
for the East and over 2 5% for the West" (Bertsch and
Elliott, p. 234, 1987)
.
Over the summer hard-line control of the policy
process on East-West trade and export control issues began
to erode. Brady had been removed from his position in
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point man in intra-governmental battles, left the OOD for
the American Enterprise institute. Upon his departurg^
rarled once again against the aliies. He said that for
seven years the administration
"had urged" and "had
implored" the aiiies to strengthen the multilateral control
program. "Almost without exception „ he continue(J
_ ^
allies have resisted our efforts, sidetracking our
initiatives or watering them down; delaying, diminishing,
and deflecting us with every dilatory tactic and
bureaucratic maneuver they could devise" (WSJ, Ju iy 22/
1987,
.
Even though Perle left the DOD was able to hold onto
most of the ground it had gained in the early 1980s.
Perle's staff, particularly Stephen Bryand, his sucessor,
had the will and the capability to guard the DODs position.
It was not until 1989 that the Commerce and the state
Department began to gain some renewed power at the expense
of DOD (See Chapter 6) .
Policy Confusion and Negotiations
With The Al l ies After 1987
Out of the domestic conflicts of 1987 the United
States strategy on multilateral export controls became
dominated by two broadly related goals aimed at making a
strategic embargo more efficient. The first was to get
allied states to shore up domestic enforcement programs and
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to harmonize their control criteria Tho
*
e second was to find
remove restrictions on intra-cocoM trade. Throughout lat
138V the Unite, states pressed COCOM states to strengthen
their domestic control programs and to toughen statues for
punishing violators (Post Oct. 17, i987; Post Nov
. u
_
1987,. In October 1987 nigh ranking United ^
administration officials, Allen Wendt from the state
Department and Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Bryen
conducted a series of bilateral initiatives to generatl
support for these two policy goals. These officials also
sought allied agreement on the need for a high-level
multilateral meeting on export controls to be held in
January 1988 (Post, Oct. 17, 1987).
in the bilateral 1987 talks and at the January 1988
high-level COCOM meeting at Versailles, the Reagan
Administration was able to gain allied commitments to
strengthen their domestic control programs. The Toshiba-
Kongsberg case did raise the consciousness of allied
officials. Representatives from allied states warned the
Reagan Administration, however, that any sanctions such as
the "Garn Proposal" would do harm to United States
commercial interests. Taking such an action they pointed
out, risked undercutting Western European political
commitments to COCOM (NYT, Jan. 26, 1988). As a result of
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Uus case, however, COCOM states expressed a strong interest
in upgrading their domestio oontrol programs. Norway
Japan, and other COCOM states praised to shore up their
domestic oontrol program by costing additional resouroes
and personnel.
During the January 1988 COCOM meeting United states
officials consistently maintained opposition to applying
retroactive import sanctions on Toshiba and Kongsberg and
stated that "unilateral steps like the sanctions proposed in
Congress would not work- (Post Jan 29, 1988). This
demonstrated that the Administration was more committed to a
multilateral solution to strengthening COCOM. The January
meeting was one of the highest level COCOM meetings ever
held. It was announced as a success in that it reconciled
American concerns over stricter domestic enforcement
programs with member states' criticisms of the problems
posed by trade inhibiting regulations on intra-COCOM
(re)exports (NYT Jan. 27, 1988). The principle "higher
fences around fewer goods" in East-West trade and "no fences
on intra-COCOM trade" emerged as the ground for commitment
to continued collaboration on the multilateral export
control program (Interview, Bonn, 1990).
Despite these pledges, action was slow on the part of
both the United States and the allies. United States
officials thus continued to press allied states to harmonize
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control criteria and to strengthen
Member states n^>-H-i^,,i, particularly Great Britain and West Germany
Pressed for a faster paced streamiining of controls. In
1988 tension between the United states and the allies begin
to mount again as orders for machine tools, industrial
equipment, computers, and telecommunications equipment
poured into Western Europe. Chancellor Kohl, who took
prominent German business officials with him to the Moscow
economic summit, announced new trade agreements with the
Soviets in October 1988. other Western European officials
began to ,ove policy in directions that would allow their
countries' firms to take advantage of the commercial
opportunities presented by perestroika. Thus the
transformations in the East and the continuing United states
intra-governmental divisions set the stage for another
inter-allied conflict over the relationship between
East-West trade and Western security.
The Reagan Administration left office with the
Secretary of state calling for greater relaxations and the
Secretary of Defense warning allies to "beware of repeating
the experience of the 1970s" and arguing that "we need to
prevent our technology from flowing into the Soviet military
machine" (CSM, June 7, 1988; WSJ, Nov. 4, 1988). After
nearly eight years of inter-agency conflict, experiments
with economic warfare, endless Congressional reviews, and in
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the face of rapid changes in Eastern »
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the dilemma ofUnited States pynnr-i- „export control policy resembled the myth ofSisyphus
.
Conclu^i nn
The £our theoretical perspectives set out in chapter
one provide a framework out of which we can explain the
complex dynamics o f United states export control policy and
inter-allied COCOM negotiations. Reagan Administration
officials came to office dei-o™;„,^ -"ic termined to reverse what they saw
as the mistake of detente. They believed that the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the apparent swing right in the
do.estic political scence provided a strategic opening in
which the plausibility of the absolutist discourse could be
revived. Hard-line officials believed that the absolutist
discourse would servp i-v,~ ^.-.-t-iia e as the rationale and legitimacy for
their preferred economic warfare policy. Reagan
Administration officials who orchistrated this policy hoped
that the power of this discourse and the leadership ability
of the Reagan Administration would do two things: first,
silence counter discourse camps and override any substantive
criticism at home; second, persuade the Western European
governments to follow the United States lead. If this
failed to bring the allies along, however, Administration
hard-line officials believed that compliance could be
extracted.
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The assumptions of Reagan Administration on this issue
were wrong. As a result the stQry Qf ^ ^
is about how the attempt to revive the absolutist discourse
and an economic warfare program failed. At the level of
issue specific capability the United States- relative
economic power and its share of global high technology
production declined through the 1970s. The technological
lead that the United States had held in areas such as radar,
sonar, microcomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing was
'
eroded. This meant that compliance rents available to the
United States were generally reduced. I am defining rent
here then as simply granting to firms and states relatively
free access to high-technologies that the United States
considers to be strategically significant.
In this context of rent decline Reagan Administration
officials strengthened surveillance systems for both East-
West and West-West technology transfers. This increased
vigilance included a closer scrutanity of export license
applications and an increased DOD role in the review of
license applications. it also involved greater resource
outlays for data collection and special intelligence
operations to map technology transfers. These steps
enhanced United States' capability to detect violations of
its unilateral and the COCOM export control program. The
United States also increased its ability to withdraw rents
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by re-affirming the claim of extraterritoriality
^
addition, the Executive was g iven greater authority to
-Pose sanctions on firsm and states for violations of
United states and COCOM export controls.
Through the contested exchange model I demonstrate the
relationship between the instructs used by the United
States to attempt to ensure Western firDS , compliance with
restrictive controls and in an attempt to extract
concessions from allied states in COCOM negotiations
,figure
5:1). Hard-line Reagan Administration officials believed
that compliance with their policy vision could be obtained
by the combination of rentq b,,-..)!!,.s, surveillance, and the threat of
the withdraw of rents for non-compliance. What is
significant here is that as rents available declined the
outlays and the intensity of surveillance were in fact
increased
.
This strategy had two significant and inter-related
consequences. First, due to the increased bureaucratic
burdens surveillance and exposure to United States
extraterritorial claims Western firms perceived an
increasing cost in compliance. This accelerated the fall of
rents as Western firms turned to next best alternative
suppliers of high-technology (see National Academy of
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congruence or incogurance in the discourses
h° p J
Paries in the transaction. As the shared discoursebreaks down actors turn to these instruments to attempt toextrace or ensure compliance.
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Science, 1987). Western European firms in my^ nrm m any cases began
to design around United States technology.
The second conseguence was that this leverage strategy
began to entail high diplomatic costs. The insistance on
strengthening these compliance extraction instruments, by
hard-line DOD officials, began to alienate Western European
officials and had the potential to lead to an alliance rift
The greatest irony in the entire strategy was that carrying
through with the threat of rent withdraw could have
theoretically undermined Western security by denying
alliance states access to technological items that were
considered to have strategic significance. Perhaps there
were some individuals in this camp, namely Richard Perle and
Lawrance Brady, who favored this path if it would keep
advanced technology out of the hands of the Soviets. The
absolutists' policy vision and their prefered strategy for
bringing the allies in line was ultimately undermined,
however, by considerations of broader diplomatic costs and
the domestic resistance that this strategy generated.
The first Reagan Administration's more restrictive
stand on export controls and the strengthening of
surveillance programs on West-West technology transfers met
with important opposition at home. Business interest groups
were quick to recognize the potential competitive cost of
the more restrictive United States position. As a result of
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the global diffusion of high-technology promotive
capability western firms increasingly had alternatives to
relying on United states teohnology. In the context
increased and intense global economic competition the
United states business groups were unwilling and perhaps
unable to absorb losses that might result from the
absolutists compliance extraction strategy. This situation
sparked the domestic opposition. Unable to launch a frontal
assalt on the absolutists' policy vision, high-technology
business interests focused their efforts on issues such as
the sanctity of contracts and finding ways to decrease the
processing time for export license despite the increased
vigilance. The revived Cold War language of the absolutists
was not strong enough to silence counter discourse camps.
In an earlier time, as in the 1950s, United states business
interests might have lived with this increased vigilance
because their customers did not have next best alterative
suppliers. The state of the world economy in the 1980s,
however, meant tht these groups were less willing to accept
the policy vision of the absolutist discourse. The state of
market competition helped to undermine the plausibility of
the absolutist discourse. For a short time in the first
Reagan Administration, however, the hard-line did gain the
upper hand.
314
The institutionalist analytical n,t c kl i cu shows us how the
abolutists camp from the dod was abie tQ coionize ^ ^
the Commerce and state Departments. Western European
Ministries of Economics and Ministries of Eoreign Affairs
had always determined their states' COCOM policy stands
Officials from these Ministries did not share the United
of the fact that the Ministries and the DOD had divergent
organizational routines and missions, m addition, DOD did
not have ongoing trans-governmental links with these
Ministries. The DOD kept trying to get Western European
Ministries of Defense more involved in the process, but to
no avail. DOD officials in bilateral and multilateral talks
put enormous amounts of pressure on the allies to conform to
their policy vision. The institutionalist perspective gives
us insight into why DOD dominance on the COCOM issue in the
United states helped to produce discord at the alliance
level
.
By analyzing issue specific capability and market
competition we can see how the material conditions for the
prescriptions of the absolutist discourse were wrong. The
power of the terms of the absolutist discourse, as the
vision that was to provide the purpose behind the economic
warfare policy, was curtailed by material conditions that
resulted in strong and effective domestic and alliance level
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opposition. content discourse camps ^ ^ ^hoid groUnd untii changes in broader superpQwer reiatiQns
lent great piausibUity to tneir discourses and alternaUv£
policy visions.
CHAPTER VI
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MUTATION OR "THE WAY OF THFDODO": COCOM TRANSFORMATIONS 1989-1990
Revamping KaRt-waef Trnrj^_piill^
The multilateral export control program entered a
critical phase just when the Bush Administration came to
office. Radical transformations in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union were fundamentally altering the East-West
strategic balance. m this context it was inevitable that
the content and the logic of maintaining the COCOM program
would come under increased criticism by Western commercial
interests and by some political leaders. The Bush
Administration faced the chore of responding to demands for
immediate and broad liberalizations of controls on West-East
trade, particularly technology transfers. Yet many members
of the Administration believed it necessary to try to
maintain an effective alliance consensus on the need to keep
an effective multilateral strategic embargo intact in the
interest of Western security. As the political transition
of the Eastern bloc proceeded, however, it became
increasingly difficult for the Administration to explain the
rationale for the continuation of the extensiveness of the
embargo on East-West transfers of industrial dual-use items.
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The fluidity of the situatlon ^ ^ UniM a^Hasten Europe made forming
. ^ ^^
difficult task, on the whole Unite, states official
cautious about opening East-West trade. They argued tha
the liberalization of export controls should be done in
deliberate fashion. m addition, many officials in th
united states DOD and intelligence community regained
skeptical of Grobachev and the durability of the changes
They argued that liberalizations would prove detrimental to
Western security if the hard line reemerged in the Soviet
Union or if the Soviet Union fell into chaos. Some of these
United States officials believed that differentiations
between the Eastern European states should be made with
regard to the terms of liberalizations. Many Western
European officials did not share this skepticism about
changes in the East. They wanted more immediate and
comprehensive changes in the nature of the multilateral
control program.
The compromise alliance solution eventually worked out
at the June 1990 COCOM talks was facilitated by several
factors: first, effective diplomatic pressure by European
officials, particularly the British and the Germans;
secondly, a shift in the U.S. inter-agency power balance on
this issue away from remaining hardliners in DOD; and third,
the pressure of commercial interests. The actual solution
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was a product of close diplomafcic collaborat . on betw£en
united states and creat Britain. The plan served to Keep
political comments intact for the June 1990 C0C0M
Meeting. It is not clear, however, that United states
determination alone can mnf^ n ^contai forces and pressures at work
that have the potential to undermine coordinated efforts,
in addition, the effective enforcement of controls will
require a more concerted multilateral effort.
This chapter examines the consequences of the changes
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for the continuation
of the multilateral export control program. In so doing it
focuses on analysis of the reasons for the relative decline
of United States leadership in the orchestration and
enforcement of the multilateral export control program.
Several factors have helped erode the United States
position. First, the United States' ability to offer rents
to states and firms for accepting its more restrictive
position on COCOM or COCOM type controls, and for compliance
with these controls, has decreased. This is a result of the
growing relative decline of United States' economic power
and the wider global distribution of dual-use high
technology productive capability. Secondly, the United
States' ability and willingness to maintain a conservative
stand on the extensiveness of the multilateral East-West
export control program and a cautious pose on deregulation
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has weakened. This resulted f_ ^ ^ ^^ ^
Perceive, decline in genera! economic competitiveness
strengthened the position of domestic commercial interests
actively seaking export control programs less restrictive of
their access to potential Eastern markets. The under-
standing of national security in Washington D.C., has also
been broadened to include economic and technological
competitiveness (NAS, 1987). This allowed agencies,
sympathetic to commercial groups' demands, to improve their
inter-governmental power position at the expense of the
traditionally "control minded" DOD. Finally, there was an
erosion of a common discourse - shared images and symbols -
of the nature of the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat to
Western security. This hindered United States' attempts to
formulate a new consensus on the nature and rationale of
COCOM controls, in 1988. While the phraseology of an
absolutist discourse shifted to constructions of Iraq, there
remains an alliance divergence of perception on appropriate
East-West trade policy.
The first part of the chapter reviews the history of
alliance discussions of East-West multilateral export
controls in 1989 and 1990. An analysis of the outcome of
the June 1990 COCOM talks will show how the United States
begin to lose, and then attempted to regain, its position of
leadership in COCOM.
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The second part deals with problem areas that pose
significant challenges to cocom-s future and to the future
of United states leadership in maintaining any type of
multilateral export control program. These areas include-
disagreements about the content of the international lists
of items subject to control and the structure of the core
list negotiations, the revision of enforcement programs, the
-pact of German unification, and the impact of the EC l 992
Program. This section analyzes the present role of the
United States in these areas, in the COCOM program in
general, and in enforcing controls on COCOM and non-COCOM
firms. m addition, it assesses the degree to which
commercial competition and the growing foreign availability
of high technology are likely to undermine political
commitments to COCOM.
The third section of this chapter examines those
factors that are helping perpetuate the multilateral export
control program. These include the United States perception
of the Soviet Union, bureaucratic inertia, and recent calls
for shifting COCOM from an East/West to a multidirectional
gaze. Finally, the section considers some proposed methods
to increase the flow of technology to promote economic and
political reform in Eastern Europe, and at the same time
maintain control and management systems to protect Western
security interests.
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During 1989 inter-allied tensions in COCOM multiplied
Alliance leaders pressed for a reconsideration of the
rationale of the program At the very^ ^^
revisions and broad relaxations of the international
industrial list, procedural and institutional reform, and a
reassessment of the categorization of Eastern European
states subject to controls (WSJ, Aug. 4, 1989; Interview,
Bonn, January, 1990; Interview, Brussels, January, 19 90;
Rudolf, 1990). Despite continued pressure, the Bush
Administration did not respond to these demands in any
substantive way until January 1990. The April 1989 COCOM
meeting was stalled because Bush had yet to appoint
individuals to oversee policy on strategic exports (NYT
April 14, 1989; Interview, Bonn, January 1990). The
inter-allied conflicts and stalemate thus continued
throughout 1989 and the first half of June 1990.
The Bush delay proved significant to the inter-agency
balance of influence in the United States. Stephen Bryant
left his post in the DOD as the Bush Administration came to
power in early 1990. Bryant had been Richard Perle's
successor in the Pentagon heading up the Defense Technology
Security Agency (DTSA)
. Bryant was a formidable
inter-bureaucratic warrior and was known unaf fectionately in
European circles as "Dr. K(no)w" (Interview, Europe,
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October, 1990)
. Bryant had apparenuy been ^
the 19 sos in the inter .agency power baiance ^
control issues. In early 199b> ^ ^
appointed a temporary replacement for Bryant^ ^
decision could be made on a more permanent replacement.
That decision was bound up in the broader issue of the
direction of United States policy in this area. Bryant's
temporary replacement was not as adept at interagency
politics and was unwilling to engage in pressure tactics
with the Western Europeans (Interview, United states Embasy
London, October, 1990,
.
The slow presidential transition
and the effectiveness of United States commercial interests-
pressure on the administration, gave State and Commerce
Department officials room to maneuver in Washington. Over
the course of 1989 they were able to improve their positions
in the complex United states inter-agency export control
structure.
At the April COCOM meeting, however, the
Administration was unwilling to move. Alliance officials
pressured the United States to agree to remove the "no
exceptions" policy on the Soviet Union in response to its
removal of troops from Afghanistan. Allied officials also
began applying pressure on the United States to liberalize
the control lists in the area of telecommunications,
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precision machine-tool.!t ols, and computers. The British and the
Germans, in particular began to apply pressure m ^^States by claiming unilateral discretion to license items
for export on qrounds thai- i-h» ; <.y a at the items were not subject to
COCOM controls. In many cases United
with the unilateral action of these states led to heated
disputes
.
in May, the Bush Administration did agree to lift the
no exceptions policy that had been in place since 19 79 (WSJ
Nov. 20, 1989). Then over the summer, the Administration
announced liberalizations on controls of computer exports to
the Soviet Union and Eastern European states. The new
threshold set by the United States nearly doubled the
performance level of computers and computer operated devices
that could be shipped East (WSJ
,
July 31, 1989). Sales of
IBM's PC/AT and its clones, Digital Equipment Corp.'s PDF
11/44, 11/60, and 11/84-P, Hewlett- Packard's number 9000
desktop computer series 200 and 300 to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe were all permitted (WSJ, Aug. 4, 1989).
Perhaps more significantly, the United States agreed to
allow the sale of portable computers to the East, including
laptop computers. This meant that Toshiba, NEC, Compaq, and
Zenith all stood to benefit from the liberalizations. The
Commerce Department announced the changes amid much fanfare,
but maintained that the changes were the result of foreign
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availability determinations and that thev did „ -rn y not represent
a concise or a shift in overaU^ ^ ^ ^
"69,. This change was significant in that the computer
threshold issue had heen one of the DOD-s pri.ary concerns
under Perle and Bryant. Secretary of Defense Cheney
disagreed with the changes in the control threshold for
computers and publicly announced that the DOD opposed the
changes
.
Most Western European officials claimed that the
United States decision to liberalize in the computer
category while not moving on machine tools, tele-
communications, or other areas where questions had been
raised was driven by commercial interests (Interview,
Europe, October, 1990; Interview, Brussels, September,
1990)
.
Several United States firms such as IBM, Data
General, and Digital did stand to benefit from these
deregulations (NYT, Dec. 17, 1989). m addition, there had
been pressure on the Administration over the threshold on
computer export controls throughout the summer of 1989
(Interview, Washington, April, 1990). Whatever the actual
motivation, the perception of the commercially motivated
nature of these changes among Western European officials
increased the growing tension. It began to show signs of
undermining alliance commitments to the multilateral
process
.
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The allies were deterged tQ^ ^^
toward a comprehensive
reconsideration of thg confcroi
program. They continued to argue a ^^^^^ ^
-chine tool. and telecommunicates, ana they wantea a
reconsiaeration of states subject to control. Tne British
and the Germans were the key players in nnH'i F-Lciyer putting extensive
pressure on the United States. m the soring „1 n Pnn and summer of
1989, European governments and f irms began tQ show a
willingness to defy the United states and ignore the
multilateral prooess. The British, over strong United
States' objections allowed Simon-Carves Ltd. to go ahead
with a deal to build a plant to manufacture factory
automation equipment and industrial microcomputers in the
soviet union, similarly, the French government supported
Alcatel's development of a project contract to manufacture
telecommunications equipment in the Soviet Union, despite
the fact that the United States maintained that the deal
would violate COCOM (WSJ, May 3, 1989). These openly
announced decisions were indications that some Western
European officials were ready to risk a major diplomatic
confrontation with the United states over this issue. Some
Western European officials stated that they believed in the
summer and fall of 1989 some COCOM members were ready to
consider withdrawing from cooperation on maintaining the
international industrial lists if the United states
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continued to stall (Interview, Brussels, September, l990 .
interview, Europe, October
, mo) ^ ^^ ^
such an eventuality in the press beca.e a means by which
Western European officials and perhaps see United States
agencies, applied pressure on the Bush Administration
(Interview, Brussels, September, 19 90; Interview,
Washington, April, 1990) . It should also be said ^^
British officials interviewed, claimed that the Simon-Carves
case was not intended as a diplomatic pressure move
(interview, London, October, 1990). it, however, was
interpreted by United States officials as such (Interview,
Washington, July, 1990; Interview, London, October, 1990).
The fact that many Western European firms were moving
ahead on major deals in the East resulted in increased
domestic pressure in the United States (Interview,
Frankfurt, September, 1990). m the late summer and early
fall 1989, it appeared that an open intra-governmental and
intra-alliance disagreement was about to erupt once again on
the pace of liberalizations. Domestic and Western European
high technology business lobbyists "turned up the heat" on
the Bush Administration. As in the past, disagreement
between the Commerce Department on one side and the DOD and
the intelligence community on the other began to appear, but
this time in a less intense form because extreme hardliners
no longer dominated the DOD. The task of the NSC in the
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«11 of 1989 appeared to be heading off such a ^
for-ulating a policy option ^ wQuid ^ ^.^^ ^
all agencies involved.
As dissatisfaction grew among the allies United states
leadership was threatened. Moreover, there was concern in
Washington that some European allies might begin to ignore
COCOM agreements on industrial items altogether
(Freedenberg, 1989). m September 1989, President Bush sent
letters to all of the leaders of the COCOM states
admonishing them about apparent laxity in enforcement of
COCOM controls and urging them to "tighten-up on controls
until issues could be resolved" (Interview, Bonn, January,
1990; Interview, Brussels, January, 1990; NYT, Oct. 9,
1990). m addition, the Administration sent Ambassador
Allen Wendt and the new head of the Defense Technology
Security Agency, William Rudman, to European capitals in an
attempt to establish a framework for the October 1989 talks
(WSJ, Nov. 20, 1989). As part of this mission, Rudman
announced dramatic new figures on illicit machine-tool deals
with the Soviet bloc. Such announcements by now, had become
a standard practice. Just prior to every political level
COCOM meeting throughout the 1980s, the United States,
usually someone in DTSA, revealed new cases of allies'
failure to prevent or detect the illicit transfer of
sensitive technology (Interview, Brussels, January, 1990).
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Perle and Bryant's practice in +uthe past was usually to liup Senators, such as Jake Garn 1-n h ,, to help publicize the i <by making statements in Congress on fhi9 S
* ° t ls occasion, Rudman
stated that since 19 83 European C0CQM^ ^^ ^Slivered more than 6 ,ooo embargoed machine tools to th
Soviet union (WSJ, Nov
. 20
, 1989) .
-chine tools, he argued, had been used in projects run by
the Soviet Military Indu^i-ri * i ni ust al Commission. The most
critical case involved the Italian firm, Ing c . Olivetti
that sold machine tools to a Soviet aeronautics factory
'
where they were used to build the YAK-41 fighter bomber
(WSJ
,
Oct. 16, 1989)
. president Bush confronted itai . an
President Francisco Cossiga himself over the issue when he
visited Washington in October (WSJ
, Oct. 16, 1989).
These disclosures seemed to be designed to blunt and
slow down western European demands to relax the multilateral
export control program until the changes in the East had
solidified and until the United States could regain the
diplomatic advantage (Interview, Bonn, Jan., 1990). The
public criticisms raised by President Bush also seemed
designed to allow the NSC time to find a way to forge an
inter-agency consensus on an adjusted policy stand.
The United States delegation to the October 1989 COCOM
meeting was lead by Under Secretary of State Reginald
Bartholomew, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and
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Under Secretary of Coerce Dennis Kloske. Re iying on
sources in Paris, the St^et Jp^ and the ^^Xi^ reported that the United States delegation had been
outnumbered 16 to 1 in its opposition to immediate action on
comprehensive changes in the COCOM program (WSJ
, Nov. 20,
1989; NYT Oct. 27, 1989). However, Stephen Saboe a United
States official in Ambassador Allen Wendt s office, denies
that this was the case. He stated that there was greater
consensus in October than the Western Europeans were willing
to disclose, particularly, on the need to slow down the pace
of relaxations. He also said that public statements of
opposition to the United States position "were a smoke
screen and, in fact that they too wanted to slow the pace of
relaxation- (Interview, Washington, July, 1990). Officials
in Bonn stated, however, that there was general
dissatisfaction with the United States' position on the pace
of relaxations at the October 1989 talks (Interview, Bonn,
January, 1990)
.
This perception was shared by leaders in
other European capitals (Interview, London, October, 1990;
Interview, Brussels, September, 1990; Rudolf, 1990).
Great Britain and West Germany led in applying strong
pressure on the United States to alter its position on
relaxations. Representatives of both states made public the
intensity of their commitment to see a general
liberalization of the multilateral control program ( The Week
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. German officiais
""^ qUeSti°n
°
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or not COCOM was any ionger a
viable organization Th-i<= tIae ^hlS was an attempt to pressure the
Bush Administration (NYT, Oct. 9, 1989; CSM, Nov. 2, 1989;
WSJ, Nov. 20, 1989; Rudolf, 1990; Rummel, 1990). One German
official stated prior to the October meeting that "in an age
where, via dialogue and cooperation, we try to assist reform
processes in Poland, Hungary, and the USSR, COCOM is
outdated- (NYT, Oct. 6, 1989). Minister of Foreign Affairs
Genscher also stated just after the meeting that "COCOM had
become outdated" (CSM, Nov. 2, 1989). The Social Democratic
spokesman on economic matters, Wolfgang Roth, called on the
West German government and other EC member states to "no
longer follow the COCOM program even if this would risk a
trade conflict with the United States" ( The Week in r^ny
,
Oct. 27, 1989). Finally Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to
seize the opportunity of the growing transatlantic rift and
told a meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg that
"COCOM should be dismantled so West and East can join
together in a common European home" (WSJ, Nov. 20, 1989).
The October meeting ended in a stalemate. The Bush
Administration was able to delay immediate action in COCOM
by agreeing that the Western European proposals and the
changes in the East reguired a review of the entire program
(NYT, Oct. 27, 1989). The United States indicated at this
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meting that it was wining to consider the possioiiity of
moving Eastern European states into a category separate from
the Soviet Union (Interview Rnnn tinterview, Bo , January, 1990). This
meant that they would he placed in a
-china type category-
lowering the threshold of control (WSJ
, Nov. 20, 1989). The
United States delegation, however, registered strong
criticisms of other COCOM states' enforcement programs and
issued warnings about actions against firms found in
violation of controls. The standards and strength of
enforcement, Bush Administration officials pointed out, were
not uniform among the COCOM states. Several members did not
have satisfactorily rigorous administrative processes or
systems for surveillance on compliance with controls in
place (NYT, Oct. 9, 1989; WSJ
, Nov. 20, 1989; Interview,
Bonn, January, 1990; Interview, Brussels, January, 1990).
It is generally recognized that this criticism was directed
at the so called Southern tier states (Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Greece) (Interview, Brussels, Jan, 1990). in
addition, some United States Congressmen once again
brandished the threat of withdrawing compliance rents from
Western high technology firms that violated controls by
stating that Olivetti might be prohibited from government
procurement contracts and access to the United States market
for its violations (NYT, Oct. 27, 1989).
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The European reaction to the United states criticisms
at the October feting was highly critical. By December
1989 United States officials began to realize that they
might see a collapse of COCOM as a whole or at least an end
of collaboration on the industrial list items if they did
not adjust their position (NYT, Dec. 17, 1989; Interview,
Bonn, January, 1990; Interview, Brussels, January, 1990/
interview, Washington, D.C., 1990). According to European
officials, at the mid-levels in DOD and the intelligence
community, advocated withholding as much Western technology
as possible from the Soviet Union. They wanted to hold out
until "the economic crisis had fully undermined the position
of the communist party." These individuals maintained that
"transfusions" of Western technology would only prolong the
life of communist rule. They saw Gorbachev's policies as
shrewd tactical moves to save the position of the party
(Interview, Bonn, Jan. 1990; Interview, Washington, April,
1990) .
Most Western European government officials disagreed
with the hardline view and stated their determination to
move ahead with deregulations on East-West trade controls in
no uncertain terms. As one German stated, "streamlining
will occur with or without the United States" (Interview,
Bonn, Jan, 1990)
.
Western European resolve to move ahead
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with encouraging economic ties technoiQgy ^^^^^
was a consequence of several factors.
First, there was a general perception that the
security issues in East-West trade policy had begun to
change. The quest ion had begun to shift fro, how to prevent
such trade fro, enhancing Eastern bloc military capabilities
to how to use offers of access to Western economic and
technological capability to induce further refer, and
stability. Thus there was a renewed conviction that
increased trade and technology transfers had an instrumental
value (Interview, Bonn, January and September 1990;
Interview, Brussels, January, 1990).
Secondly, there was a perception, initially at least,
that the economic liberalizations in these countries held
vast commercial opportunities. This resulted in domestic
commercial pressure on these governments to oppose the
United States desire to slow the pace of liberalization.
Thirdly, Western European officials seemed to be less
willing to cling to Cold War-informed images and suspicions
(Interviews, Brussels and Bonn, Jan, 1990; Interview,
Washington, April, 1990).
Several export license cases in the fall strengthened
Western European perceptions that United States discussions
on relaxations of controls were driven by its own commercial
interests. While Secretary of Defense Cheney continued to
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voxo, concerns over the pace and the scop£ Qf ^
the Pentagon aPProved license appUcatlons ^
'
international Inc. to transfer colter assembly technology
» a 3 oint venture with the Soviet Ministry for the Radio
Industry (NYT, Dec. 17, 1989) Th i <= ,
,
±y» . s was significant since
it involved a trade that could improve Soviet computer
manufacturing capability because it transferred process
know-how and unassembled computer components. m the past,
DOD officials had successfully prevented the issuance of
such licenses on grounds that such transfers would
indirectly contribute to Soviet military potential. The DOD
also did not prevent a license issue for a Data General sale
of a 32-bit MV 2000 minicomputer to the Soviets. Several
other United States high-tech firms, such as Control Data
Corporation and US West, began pursuing more vigorously
contracts with Eastern bloc states for more extensive
telecommunications and computer system projects (NYT, Dec.
17, 1989; Interview, Bonn, January 1990). it is difficult
to establish whether these changes signaled some flexibility
among DOD and intelligence officials or whether it was an
indication of the overall inter-agency power shift away from
DTSA in the DOD on this issue to the Commerce and State
Department. What is clear is that cases such as these added
to Western European suspicions and resentments. This was
because the United States was unwilling to move in other
335
areas such as machine tools and telecommunications
(interviews, Brussels and Bonn, Jan
, 1990; Interview
,
London, Oct, 1990). it shnniH k) I ould be pointed out, however, that
the DOD did not obiert- +-o o« • .ject to some significant license issues to
European firms in the colter area, such as Siemanns-ASEA's
deal to sell 300,000 personal colters to the Soviet Union(CM, Nov. 2, 1989; interview, Bonn, Jan
, 1990,.
The united States more restrictive stand on relaxation
of controls was being undefined by several factors. First
the rapid pace of changes in the East and a growing
perception that they were more than superficial was
undermining this position. The drive to alter policy on the
multilateral control program was obviously in part a
response to changes in the strategic situation brought on by
the political and economic trans-formations in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. However, the move to alter
policy was also a direct result of the domestic and alliance
level pressure being exerted on the Administration. An
official in Bonn informed this author that his government
was "placing hope in the effectiveness a combination of
allied pressure and pressure from the United States high
technology lobby to force the Administration to raise the
control thresholds" (Interview, Bonn, January, 1990).
Perhaps more significant than the domestic factors
that helped to shift the Bush Administration policy position
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were the factors that threatened the United states leader-
ship position in COCOM
.
The first factor was the 1989
stalling on a policy shift that had lead to resentment.
Secondly, Western European governments and firms seemed to
have come to believe that the costs of being exposed to the
whims of the United States Congress and the potential costs
of being cut off from compliance rents, in whatever form,
did not outweigh the potential benefits that could result
from moving ahead with trade liberalization. Thirdly,
Western European leaders were not confident that the United
States could successfully negotiate agreements with or offer
effective compliance rents to, non-COCOM suppliers of COCOM
controlled items or technologies (Interview, Bonn, Jan,
1990)
.
The adage "he who hesitates is lost" seems initially
to have characterized the thinking of some Western European
firms when it came to entering these new markets.
The United States Policy Shift
The shift in the United States position on the multi-
lateral export control program came in two stages. The
first policy shift was announced in January 1990 and the
second in May 1990 just prior to the June COCOM talks.
Following a meeting between President Bush and President
Mitterand on St. Martin in late December 1989, the
Administration announced that it was going to recommend a
reorganization of domestic constraints on East-West trade
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and a substantial shorting of the COCOM list ,NVT, Deo 17
1989; NYT Jan. 1990)
.
were to he worked out through a NSC study to he completed by
the end of January 1990.
The January shift was based on a oonoept of
"differentiation" among oountries. The polioy did not
affect oontrol criteria to be applied to the Soviet Union
but it did call for a phased easing of controls for the
Eastern European states. First Hungary and Poland, then
East Germany and Czechoslovakia and finally, perhaps,
Rumania and Bulgaria would be placed in a "china type"
category (NYT, Jan. 23, 1990,. This would give those states
access to a much greater array of technology than in the
past when they were categorized with the Soviet Union. In
order to qualify for this recategorization, Eastern European
states would have to agree to develop safeguards against
diversion of technology into military applications. This
meant that they would have to establish legal and
administrative frameworks similar to those imposed by COCOM
states. In addition, this would include agreements for on-
site inspections by United States officials (NYT, Jan. 23,
1990)
.
The proposal also included significant reductions in
controls over computer technology and machine tools and some
liberalization on telecommunication eguipment.
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The United States proposal of TanJanuary, 1990 met with
strong and by now familiar criticisericisms
' Particularly from
West Germany and Great Rrif^in t-r *B ta (Interview, Bonn, September
1990; interview, London, October, 1990) . The proposed
shift, European officials argued, did not adequately reflect
the changes that had and were occurring in the GDR,
Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Western European
firms had begun to move into these newly liberalized
markets. The prospect of not easing controls on the Soviet
Union and only gradually easing controls on Eastern Europe,
beginning with Hungary and Poland where United States firms
had begun to conclude contracts for major projects, struck
the Europeans as unnecessary due to the political changes
that were occurring. The proposal also appeared to be
driven by commercial interests rather than strictly security
considerations (Interview, London, October, 1990). Many
major European project deals would have been placed on hold
by the criteria of this new policy. West Germany's Standard
Elektrick Lorenze AG, for example, had been developing a
massive joint venture with the GDR to construct a plant in
Arnsadt to install SEL's system-12 digital switching
technology to replace East German telecommunications
equipment (WSJ, Mar. 12, 1990).
The result was once again a stalemate. The Europeans
rejected differentiations between the various Eastern
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European states ana to retention of existing oontrols on tneSoviet Union. The united states attested in bil aterai
talks to convince the allies to rro =ini go along with the program,
but to no avail (Interview, Brussels, September, 19 90) In
light of the opposition, the United States established an
inter-agency working group to produce a new more workable
proposal before the COCOM talks set to begin in June
(Interview, Washington D.C. April iQQm, 1990). The new position
announced on May 2, 1990 called for what seemed to be the
most radical reorganization of multilateral export control
collaboration in the history of COCOM. The May initiative
appeared to be a diplomatic success for the United States
(Interview, Bonn, September 1990; Interview, Brussels,
September 1990). one German official told this author that
with this move "the United States exerted effective
leadership in COCOM and put itself back into the drivers-
seat" (Interview, Bonn, September 1990). The United States
had been, however, working closely with the British on the
proposals for the June talks. in all likelihood, what
emerged was a collective British-United States policy
proposal (Interview, London, October, 1990). As one United
States official in London put it, "what was finally agreed
upon could be called British wine in an American bottle"
(Interview, London, October, 1990)
.
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The Key change was that the United states changed its
position on differentiation and also agreed to a certain
degree of relaxations on controls for the Soviet Union. The
United States agreed that one single streamlined list needed
to be created. m return, the other COCOM member states
agreed to compromise on the issue of differentiation between
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states by
establishing a "special procedure." This special procedure
allowed some Eastern European states to apply individually
for exceptions in order to allow controlled items to be
transfered in specific cases. The compromise solution broke
the stalemate and effectively renewed the allied states'
commitment to the COCOM process to negotiate the particulars
of the changes in the multilateral control program.
At their Paris meeting in June 1990, the COCOM states
agreed to sweeping liberalizations. The outcome of the
talks was complicated. The COCOM states agreed to fully
rework the list of controlled items, in the interim they
agreed to drop 30 of the 116 product categories from the
list as it existed prior to the June talks. Member states
agreed that the international lists, particularly the
industrial list, should be redrawn "from scratch"
(Interview, Paris, November, 1990). The goal for the
industrial list of controlled dual-use items was to
establish by the end of 1990 a "core list" of eight
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categories, each comprised of . number Qf^
Bonn, September, 1990; Intervi^
».o). The industrial core Ust ^^^^ uere ^ ^ teie_
co^unications; computers; navigation and
Propulsion systems; sensors ana sensor systems and lasers;
electrons design, develops, and production; advanced
-terials and material processing; and marine technology
(interview, Paris, November, 1990). The list would be
subject to ongoing assessments so that items would be
removed when and as soon as foreign availability
determinations were made (Interview, London, October, 1990;
Interview, Paris, November iqqm t
,
u o , sgo). in January 1991 the new
core list was to be presented at a high level political
meeting for approval and was to be implemented in each state
by April 1991.
The streamlined core list was designed to apply to all
of the target states, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland were given the "special procedure" right. This gave
these states the opportunity to appeal to COCOM for
exceptions to the core list controls. Exceptions would be
granted on a case-by-case basis and would be decided on the
grounds of end-use assurances and the verification of
safeguards that these states would establish against
diversion. Thus these states would be required to establish
COCOM like procedures and enforcement mechanisms. According
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to German officials the vision can be interpreted as
allowing Eastern European states to be taken off of the
COCOM list of proserin destinations if they instituted
systematic and effective safeguards (Interview, Bonn
September, 1990
, . The British delegation ^ ^ ^^
only that these states would given favorable treatment in
case-by-case requests for exceptions to the lists
(Interview, London, October, 1990).
In addition to the cor? ii Cf -i-k^v—.e l st there was an agreement to
harmonize each governments individual enforcement,
administrative, and licensing procedures by April 1992.
Finally, an agreement was reached on an "interim regime" on
the issue of the united Germany.
The Continuation nf COCOM Consensus *nH
the Issue of United States t***^*
j r
While the June talks were successful in terms of
establishing a framework out of which states could negotiate
there exited a number of areas of potential conflict. One
German official told this author that while the United
States broke the stalemate in May, "there is still the
potential for a stalemate by January and there will no doubt
continue to be terrible fights at the technical level"
(Interview, Bonn, September, 1990). Aside from the
conflicts that might arise in the process of deciding on
Eastern European exception requests in a number of areas
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United states leadership has been^ ^ ^
-sue, in these area s could potential!, underline effective
Multilateral collaboration. The areas that pose the
greatest challenge to continued commitment to COCOM and to
United States leadership include: the details and content of
the core list; the difficulty of hanging, standardizing,
and enforcing controls and enforcement procedures; the
tension between intra-COCOM controls and EC 1992 full
integration; and the problem cf COCOM and German
unification.
The Core List Negotiations
The core list discussions involved intense conflicts
over the threshold of technologies in particular categories
of items that should be kept under control. The trans-
formations that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union have made it imperative that a common list be agreed
upon as soon as possible. Friction between the COCOM states
and the United States centers on the fact that "there will
be competitive disadvantages for nations that take a more
restrictive, comprehensive approach to controls" (see
statement by Kloske; FT, July 13, 1990).
As to be expected, many states came to the core list
discussions with proposals for very minimal lists. Under
Secretary of Commerce Dennis Kloske stated that many COCOM
states want only a select few items to be retained on the
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r a
industrial core lists Th P rQ v,. e e have been disagreements ove
number of items such as supercomputers, cryptographic
equipment, and telecommunications. It is important fco bear
m mind that the United States has often been able to
maintain the upper hand in discussions over the addition or
deletion of an item from the control lists. This has been
explained in earlier chapters in terms of the micro-economic
model of contested exchange and in relation to the United
States' preponderance in intelligence information and
technical expertise on the military applicability of
particular technologies. in the context of the present
negotiations, however, the United States finds itself in a
difficult position for several reasons. First, the United
States agreed to the European proposal to rewrite the core
list from scratch (Interview, London, October, 1990;
Interview, Paris, November, 1990). This means that the core
list discussions begin with a blank slate. Recall that
COCOM operates on a principle of unanimity. Thus, placing
an item on the list requires unanimity. Prior to this
agreement, the United States was able to control, to some
degree, the pace of relaxations because unanimity was
required to remove an item from the international list. The
United States could also often effectively get items added
to the list by threatening to hold "items hostage on the
list" that other states wanted to decontrol (Interview,
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Paris, November, 1990). The present arrangement
significantly alters the bargaining position of the United
States in negotiations. DOD officii * =uvu rricials have expressed
extreme frustration with this situation. one DOD official
stated that the individual who agreed to this idea, at a
Spring meeting in London, "was eithermn asleep or is an idiot"
(Interview, Paris, November, 1990).
One particular item of contention on the control list
bears analyzing in some detail if not for the irony of the
case then for the dynamics of the negotiations that it
exposes. At points there have been intense conflicts
between the United States and Great Britain, France, and
West Germany over the control threshold that should be
established for telecommunications equipment (Interview,
Bonn, September, 1990; Interview, London, October 1990).
DOD officials, throughout the 1980s maintained that the
threshold should be relatively low and that by providing the
Eastern bloc states with sophisticated digital-switching
equipment and fiber optic technology, the West would
increase Soviet bloc military command and control systems.
Now that the perceived threat from the Eastern bloc has
diminished, the United States has been unwilling to move on
the telecommunications issue, despite the fact that there
has been extensive pressure from European officials. The
reason: Sophisticated telecommunications technology makes
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eavesdropp ing difficult (Intervi^ ^ ^
interview, Brussels, September, 1990 ; i nterview
, London
October, 1990)
. The united states intelligence c_ ity
and the DOD have strongly opposed liberalizations on teleco*
equipment. While see ministries of defense in Europe share
this DOD view, most continental European COCOM members would
like to see extensive liberalizations in this area
(interview, Bonn, September 1990 ; Interview, London, October
1 99 0) .
Several Western European firms, however, have begun to
develop extensive, large scale contracts to produce and
install entirely new up-to-date telecommunications systems
in central European states. in many cases these systems
were ancient. Officials in Bonn, for example, could not in
many cases get through on the regular phone lines to the
GDR. Aside from the commercial interests involved, some
European officials have pointed out that in order to
establish a pluralistic society, there must be an effective
and operational telecommunications system. The United
States, however, has been unwilling to move on this issue.
The United States believes that it is not in the security
interests of the West to allow these states, particularly
the Soviet Union, to import sophisticated telecommunications
equipment that would allow them to put together effective
national communications networks. Effective tele-
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communications svqtpmc = v-~ uys e s are, however, seen by Western
European officials as a key factor in * *K t fostering pluralistic
societies in these countries nna «nes. o e exasperated German
official said "we have to find a way to balance the
eavesdropping interest with the pro-democratic and
commercial interp^t-Qii /t**-~~ •terests (Interview, Bonn, September, 1990).
Given the new structure of the international list
negotiation process, the issue could prove to be a test case
for future dynamics of core list disagreements.
Enforcement Issues
Each COCOM state after the June talks was required to
report on the nature and extent of their legal and
administrative procedures for enforcement of export
controls. Some COCOM states have extremely divergent state
bureaucratic traditions and histories as well as resources
to commit to developing effective regulatory procedures.
This is particularly the case for the so-called Southern
tier COCOM member states: Greece, Turkey, Spain, and
Portugal. Since the June talks, Under Secretary of Commerce
Dennis Kloske has invited representatives of these states to
Washington to demonstrate the operations of the United
States Bureau of Export Administration.
There have been conflicts over the approach that the
United States has taken in its attempts to get these states
to strengthen their enforcement systems (Interview,
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Brussels, September, 1990)
. one problem is that the United
States has in many instances offered its export control
program up as a blueprint for these Southern tier states
(Interview, London, October 1990). This is not only
unrealistic for these states, but often United States'
"evangelism- verged on cultural elitism because officials
did not take into consideration the divergence in cultural
traditions (Interview, London, October 1990). As of the
fall 1990, there was a political will on the part of these
states to develop enforcement programs, but United States
prodding has produced resentment that could undermine such
commitments (Interview, Brussels, September, 1990). Many of
these states' representatives have also argued that they
lack the technical capability and the resources to establish
such an extensive enforcement program (Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990)
.
m addition, even if there can be a
standardization in terms of administrative procedures, there
are serious guestions left about eguivalency and performance
standards. For example, will there be common penalties for
violators and will all of these states pursue surveillance
on enforcement of compliance with the same vigor? It
appears that here once again United States' vigilance and
surveillance systems might have to stand in for states that
have ineffective regulatory and enforcement procedures, but
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the question renins as to whether or not the nature of
united states actions will aiienate these governments.
in addition to attempting to achieve a harmonizing of
COCOM control standards, Secretary Kloske set up a fund to
help Eastern European states develop safeguards and legal
and administrative systems, to prevent controlled technology
from being diverted to military use or from being re-
exported to the soviet union. This fund of some $1 million
is to provide for consulting services for setting up an
enforcement and licensing structure. The issue of whether
or not these states have established effective regulatory
procedures and can therefore be legitimately given certain
favorable treatment or removed from the COCOM list of
proscribed destinations will no doubt be an enduring source
of friction between the United States and the other members
of COCOM. British MOD officials have expressed concern over
the fact that extensive networks still exist by which such
dual-use technology could be guickly transferred to the
Soviet Union (Interview, London, October 1990). This view
is shared by the United States, but the Germans are much
more sanguine about the prospects of these states being
removed from the proscribed list within the near future.
(')()
^^^^-^-Compjj^nce^^
The United States still perceives itself as
responsible for ensuring compliance with multilateral export
controls. For example, the United states continues to
insist on its right to impose its unilateral export control
program extraterritoriality. As pointed out in other
chapters, firms that use or incorporate United States origin
technology or access to controlled items are subject to
United States re-export control authority and in addition
are subject to Commerce Department inspections and reviews
of internal company enforcement systems. Present versions
of the revised Export Administration Act, now under
consideration, are actually designed to strengthen the
extent of United States discretion in using extraterritorial
controls and in imposing sanctions on individuals and firms
that violate United States and COCOM export control
regulations. These penalties involve threats to withdraw
what we have called in other chapters compliance rents
(i.e., government procurement contracts, access to United
States technology)
.
This means of insuring compliance with
the export control program was criticized throughout the
1980s by Western European business and government officials.
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Recall that Western European governments have no 1,
that require their national firms or firms operating in
their countries to comply with United states extra-
territorial export control claims (Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990; Interview, Bonn, September 1990; Interview,
London, October 1990). Officials in Great Britain and
Germany said, however, that they advise their companies to
"strongly consider their own commercial interests when
deciding whether or not to comply with United States
re-export control authority or with United States demands to
audit firms to inspect enforcement systems" (Interview,
Bonn, September 1990; Interview, London, October 1990).
British officials stated that if one of their firms
protested to United States extraterritorial claims they
would "stand by that firm because our government is opposed
in principle to extraterritoriality, but these firms must be
pragmatic" (Interview, London, October 1990).
The Commerce Department and the DOD continue to
maintain a "grey list" of firms and individuals that are
believed to be risks for diversion of controlled items,
technology, and technical data (Interview, Europe, October
1990). If a firm refuses to comply with United States'
extraterritorial claims or with multilateral control
agreements, then it is understood that this can be grounds
for being placed on the "grey list" (Interview, London,
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October 1990; MacDonald, 1990). once thic)• u s occurs, the
perception, on the part of grey listed firm. • „uy «y s, is that other
firms, out of their own commercial interest and in the
interest of seeing their license applications processed
through the Commerce Department in a timely fashion, will be
reluctant to do business (Interview, Frankfurt, September,
1990). This practice is criticized by the British in
particular because firms and individuals gain grey list
status simply on the grounds of suspicion or on the grounds
that they are seen to be not cooperating fully with United
States extraterritorial claims or COCOM controls. During
the early 1980s, as discussed in chapter five, there were
several intense public conflicts between the United states
and Great Britain over this issue (see Cahill, 1988;
MacDonald, 1990)
.
If a firm or an individual is actually discovered to
be involved in illicit transactions in violation of the
United States or the COCOM export control program, then they
are placed on a blacklist called the List of Denials. Once
placed on this blacklist it is:
Unlawful
.
. .
for any such person to order, buy
receive, use, sell, deliver, store, dispose of,
'
forward, transport, finance, or otherwise service, orparticipate in any transaction which may involve any
commodity or technical data exported or to be exportedfrom the US or any re-export thereof (Denial Orders
Currently Affecting Export Privileges, 1987;
MacDonald, p. 58, 1990).
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As argued in previous chapters, the instructs of
extraterritorial claims
, compliance rents, and surveillance
to monitor compliance have been central institutions in the
Unrted States' enforcement program directed at COCOM firms
These instruments have even been more central in attempting
to ensure compliance by non-COCOM firms. This has been
particularly the case with firms in newly industrialized
countries (NICS, where there are often extremely ineffective
domestic export control enforcement systems.
In chapter five I discussed the competitive and the
economic costs to the United States that resulted from the
use of these instruments. At present several significant
factors are eroding United states' ability to ensure
compliance with multilateral export controls. First a
general and growing proliferation of advanced and dual-use
technologies means that the number of actual and potential
suppliers of controlled items has been expanded (Interview,
Paris, November, 1990; see Bertsch and Elliott-Gower
,
1990).
In addition, the United States technological lead in many
areas of advanced and dual-use technology has been eroded by
the expansion and development of sophisticated productive
capabilities by COCOM and non-COCOM firms. Bertsch and
Elliott-Gower point out that the United States lead has been
eroded in areas such as: aircraft, radar, sonar,
microcomputers, transformers, semiconductor manufacturing,
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and radio and television teohno logy (Bertsch and
Elliott-cower, p. 8
, 1990). This means generaUy ^
United states comp iianoe rent of uninhibited access to
advanced technology is no longer effective for „n f •^^•i. cii t t enforcing
instruments controls m r^v-^~ *.i . order to verify empirically this
more general claim it would be necessary to assess
specifically the relationship between those sectors where
the United States lead declined and the relationship between
particular enforcement rents, surveillance and compliance.
Unfortunately such data is difficult to obtain at this
point
.
There is, however, evidence to support this general
conclusion. The United States, for example, has experienced
difficulties in the past few years in its attempts to gain
compliance from non-COCOM supplier firms with COCOM controls
(Interview, Paris, November, 1990). United States'
representatives to COCOM also stated that it was becoming
much more difficult to offer incentives to some firms and
states for compliance with the United States position
(Interviews, Paris, November, 1990). The use of government
procurement contracts as compliance rents has also been
undermined to some degree by Congressional initiatives for
so called "buy America" legislation (Interview, Paris,
November, 1990) .
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The basis of united states leadersh . p . n enforcement
efforts has also been harmed by the way in whioh the
American officials have sought to extract , •yrn. c compliance in the
past. The political cost of the claims of extra-
territoriality and of attempts to unilaterally enforce
multilateral controls, according to EC officials, "have
accumulated to a critical point" (Interview, Brussels,
September 1990,
.
The harmonious relationship between the
allies has been stretched to the breaking point so many
times over this issue in the past ten years that it has left
permanent marks. As one British official put it "We have a
deep collective memory of United states activities in this
area" (Interview, London, October, 1990). As one American
official stated: "The Toshiba case sent a loud and clear
message to Western firms about the potential consequences of
ignoring COCOM and United states controls" (Interview,
London, October, 1990)
.
The United States, by insisting on its claims of
extraterritoriality, expresses a distrust in the enforcement
programs of its allies. This has done lasting harm to
cooperation on enforcement in some cases. One European
official involved in a domestic export control program
stated that his government had become reluctant to share
information about their system or intelligence on diversions
with the United States because of the potential repercussion
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for his agency and for his country , s firms (jnterview
_Europe, October 1990).
in addition, the perception on the part of Western
European f irras renins one of deep distrust of the entire
system of united states extraterritorial oontrols and
enforcement efforts. Some European business officials still
express the view that the information the Commerce
Department obtains through the re-export licensing process
and from audits or inspections could be used to do
significant harm to their commercial interests (Interview,
Bonn, October, 1990). Despite the fact of whether such
misuse of information has ever taken place, the significant
issue is that the perception exists (Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990; Interview, Bonn, September 1990; Interview,
London, 199 0)
.
In addition to these intra-allied factors, United
States domestic level pressures have helped erode its
position as the leader in the enforcement of a restrictive
multilateral East-West export control program (Freedenberg,
1990; Vogel, 1990). High technology firms, having organized
over the past ten years, were effective in 1989 in pushing
the Bush Administration toward a streamlining of controls
(Interview, Washington, April, 1990; see Freedenberg, 1990,
and Bertsch and Elliott, 1990). The prospect of placing
United States firms at a disadvantage in entering into the
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central Europe an market was also a consideration in the
coerce Department's position on liberalizations of
controls (see statements by Dennis KlosKe, FT, Juiy 13
1990) .
in addition to these factors, the ability of the
United States to enforce compliance is weakened by the fact
that there continues to be an intergovernmental and
intra-allied divergence of discourses regarding the
relationship between East-West trade, the nature of the
Soviet threat, and the requirements of Western security.
Contrasting images of the Soviet reform program and of
Gorbachev are used to bolster conflicting positions on
whether or not the West should offer its advanced technology
and economic power to aid reform.
COCOM and t-hg vjC in 1QQ?
There is a potential for a head on collision between
COCOM controls and the EC goal of full integration. The
goal of the 1992 program is to remove all impediment to the
free flow of goods and services among member states. Unless
all facets of the multilateral control regime can be agreed
upon by all of the COCOM members that are EC members, then
controls within the community will not be fully removed
(Interview, Brussels, EC, September 1990). Agreement must
be reached on the criteria for determining an items'
strategic significance, the actual content of the lists,
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standards and procedures of enforcement, and the
destinations that are subject to what type of control. I£
there is a divergence of opinion in any of these areas, see
states may be unwillina 1-0 f„ii„ _ii g to fully remove intra-COCOM
controls.
The first issue that confronts the EC Commission in
dealing with this problem is that Ireland one of the members
of the community, is not a member of COCOM Because Ireland
is neutral, but has developed a COCOM state equivalent
export control program, it has been granted special status
by most other EC states and the United States, but not by
all of them. Secondly, there are wide variations, as stated
above, in Community members' control procedures and
enforcement programs. The Commission shares with COCOM a
desire to see the harmonization of these programs succeed.
Within the Commission there are two schools of thought on
how this should be accomplished and how a community wide
system of controls, regulating the transfer of items that
flow out of the community, can be maintained (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990). The first is a "maximalist"
school advocating the creation of one grand community wide
export control enforcement and processing system
administered from Brussels. Conceivably, this would mean
that all member states would turn over control authority to
a Commission bureau made up of export control experts from
359
all member statpq Tnf^,mtra-co^unxty controls would be remove(J
then and the Mission
"export control office" would
Process "EC export licenses" for controlled items snipped
outside of the EC.
The European Round Table of Industries recently
published a report that calls for such a program The
report states that the Commission from Brussels should
operate the strategic embargo "as the government of the USA
does rather than by the governments of all the US states
individually" (ERTI
, p. 10
, 1990) . There afe very ^
people in Brussels these days, however, who even entertain
the idea of the emission assuming such a role. Commission
members are not excited about the prospect of having to
figure out how to process the thousands of licenses that
would be needed if such a community wide system was
established (Interview, Brussels, September 1990). EC
member governments are also unwilling to see the Commission
be given competence in this area.
The contrasting "minimalist" school of thought would
like to see the issue worked out through informal agreements
between the member states (Interview, Brussels, September,
1990)
.
They thus would like to see harmonization between
the EC states on all levels of the export control programs.
This harmonization from within might then mean that since
all of the states have confidence in each others' programs,
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they all would bp w i 1 4-ia e illmg to remove any intra-CQCOM-EC
controls. The key lssue nere
,
of is confidence> .
in order to attempt to facilitate such confidence, the
EC Commission embarked on an ambitious project to collect
data on all member states- control and enforcement programs,
ironically, Commission members encountered problems, due to
government stonewalling, obtaining information from member
states on the particulars of their programs. As a result,
the Commission has now turned to relying on multi-national
firms for information on particular control programs
(Interview, Brussels, September, 1990). At one point a
Commission member who was involved in collecting data on
member states control programs stated that "the variations,
in administrative procedures, control criteria, and
enforcement systems were so great at points that they did
not even appear to be part of a common program- (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990)
.
Reconciling these divergences will take time and as
one EC official remarked, "We're running out of time in
resolving these problems before 1992" (Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990)
.
As a result of the cross comparative data
that the Commission collected, officials there are in an
excellent position to provide an information service to
member states. Commission officials could provide
administrative and technical assistance on how to improve
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iese
and harmonize en£orcement ^ ^
southern tier states for example, it might be nec£ssary ^
Provide some type of financial assistance to enable tn,
states to upgrade enforces program and to upgrade
licensing systems.
It has often been suggested that the EC emission
should participate in the COCOM process. This maxes sense
gxven the fact that these control systems have a direct
bearing on the emission's directives. Many Mission
members favor the proposal to make the EC a member of COCOM,
but they are emphatic that there should not be EC input with
regard to the content of the control list or in the
designation of destinations subject to control (Interview,
Brussels, September, 1990). There should be observer status
given to the EC so that Commission officials could provide
advice on how COCOM controls and EC full integration can be
worked out.
If harmonization of enforcement programs cannot be
worked out to the satisfaction of all of the EC states in
COCOM, a two tier system might be the result. This would
mean that some states in COCOM might treat others
differently or might maintain tighter controls until certain
states can develop adequate enforcement systems. The
Germans, for example, might not have confidence that Greece
could adequately prevent some items from being transferred
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to controlled dp^^n^f ^destinations. Consequently, if Germany
maintained controls on «i „ .3
° the £low ° f items from Germany to
Greece, it would do harm to the goals of 1992.
Despite all of these difficulties and potential
problems, the movement to full integration is an additional
factor that will undermine the United states position in
COCOM. once internal controls are removed, it will be mUch
more difficult to maintain surveillance on the flow of
technology within the community. This will no doubt present
problems for the United States enforcement agencies.
The German Quest inn
German unification poses some particularly complex
problems for the maintenance of the multilateral export
control program. The problem is that the GDR has had in
place a series of contractual agreements to supply the
Soviet Union with high technology items that were on the
international lists as of the June 1990 COCOM talks. At the
June talks, a so-called "interim regime" was established
whereby the GDR would continue to fulfill its contractual
obligations until the core list discussions had been
completed. FRG officials initially hoped that the GDR issue
could be solved before unification. With unification
occurring far faster than expected, they now hope for either
of two changes. First, the threshold of controls could be
raised high enough that the items under supply contract in
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the GDR would no longer be subject ^ cqcom
(interview, Bonn, September, 1990) . secondly, these
arrangements be allowed to remain in place due fcQ
availability determinations. The level o f GDR teohnol og ical
sophistication in militarily significant technologies
however, was much higher than Western analysts expected
(interview, Bonn, September, 1990
, . It now appears ^
items the GDR is supplying to controlled destinations,
namely the Soviet Union, will remain subject to control
after the core list discussions. This means that Germany as
a member of COCOM will be contractually obliged to supply
these controlled items to the Soviets. There is some
indication that the United States will put pressure on the
Germans to break or to not renew contracts (Interview, Bonn,
September, 1990)
.
The United States ability to persuade the
Germans on this point is questionable, but there will
certainly be demands that prohibitions be placed on
upgrading and modernizing the technology. A United States
official in Bonn said that as a result of these demands he
wondered when "the Germans would have enough and say, stick
your COCOM" (Interview, Bonn, September, 199 0) . The United
States does seem, however, to have COCOM member state
support that the German question needs to be resolved in a
multilateral forum. Some European officials have stated
that they believe the Germans should be reguired to bring
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the GDR contracts before COCOM on a case by case oasis for a
multilateral determination (Interview, London, October,
1990; Interview, Paris, November, 1990).
German officials have stated, however, that the Soviet
Union should not be punished for supporting German
unification. Thus, they would rather see some sort of
comprehensive agreement worked out. One possible solution
is that the Germans might offer a replacement of some type
or some form of compensation if the Soviets agreed to drop
contracts. This might make some sense given the Soviets'
need for supplies of basic goods over highly sophisticated
technology. it is unlikely, however, given Soviet security
interests. in all likelihood most of the GDR agreements
will remain intact for a specified period. This might mean
a situation exists where firms from the former FRG would be
prohibited from trading in certain items while firms in the
former GDR would be allowed to continue to supply equivalent
items to the Soviets. The issue will prove to be an ongoing
source of tension between the United States and Germany.
The Future of COCOM: Survival
r
Mutation, or Dodoism
While all of these issues are at work in ways that
might pull alliance commitments to COCOM apart, particularly
on the industrial list, there are a number of factors that
work to hold the organization together. First, is the
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legacy of the perception of the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. A British Foreign Office official stated that "as
long as the greater proportion of our nuclear arsenals are
Pointed at the Soviets instead of the Polynesians COCOM will
continue to function" (Interview, London, October, 1990).
Despite the extensive changes over the past year and the
transformation in overall East-West relations, officials in
the West continue to perceive the Soviet Union correctly as
potentially posing the greatest threat to Western alliance
security. British MOD and United States DOD officials on
occasion point to what they say are extensive technology
acquisition networks that the Soviet Union continues to
maintain (Interview, London, October, 1990). it is proving
hard to dislodge the image of the Soviet Union as the major
source of rivalry with the United States in Western Defense
and intelligence agencies. Even in light of the evident
reality of economic catastrophe in many Republics, a NATO
official stated that "it is difficult to swallow this idea
of trade promotion particularly with the Soviet Union. No
one is interested in paying for or supplying the technology
that would result in an economic recovery that would benefit
the Communist party" (Interview, Brussels, September, 1990).
The second factor working to hold the multilateral
export control program together is the inertia of the
bureaucratic system as well as the size and nature of the
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bureaucratic systems set up to maintain the East-West export
control program. A11 of the C0C0M states ^
non-COCOM Western states have established agencies or
branches of agencies charged with maintaining and enforcing
the export control program. Responsibility for export
controls, as was pointed out in earlier chapters, is usually
spread out among several agencies including the Ministries
of Economics, Defense, Foreign Affairs, and the Customs
Service. Where greater or lesser responsibility and power
resides depends on each state's distinct administrative and
legal tradition and in some cases on the perceived function
of controls by political leaders.
The United States maintains its own extensive
unilateral export control system. The system involves
numerous personnel in the Defense and Intelligence
community, in the Commerce Department, in the State
Department, and in the Customs Service. All of these
agencies charged for forty years with the responsibility of
vigilance on and controlling the diffusion of Western
nuclear, arms, and dual-use technology, represent a
formidable force (see Long, 1989; Interview, Brussels,
September, 1990)
.
Inertia and standard operating procedures mean that
adjustment to a transformation in the international system
and East-West relations is a difficult task (Long, 1989)
.
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There has been a de.cnstrated shift at the highest political
levels in an attest to bring the centre! prcgran, in line
Wth changed cenditiens. This shift in attitude, hewever,
has yet te seep de„n te the lewer levels ef the bureaucracy
(interview, Brussels, September, 19 90; Interview, Lenden,
October, 1990)
.
A Multidirectional Mnlfn af.n1
Export Cont rol Prnqr^
The final and perhaps the most intriguing factor that
will help hold the collaborative framework on export
controls in COCOM together is the emergence of support for
broadening the gaze of the organization from East-West to
include vigilance on North-South transfers of strategically
significant technologies (Interview, Brussels, September,
1990)
.
COCOM, however, has been specifically designed to
prevent diffusions of particular technologies to Communist
ruled states based on assessments of their technological,
industrial, and military capability (Interview, London,
October, 1990) . Expanding the role of COCOM to include
destinations outside of the former "target states" would
necessitate similar intelligence evaluations for each
controlled destination added to the list (Interview, London,
October, 1990) . So the first problem occurs at a technical
level
.
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The second drawback to this in.u n dea occurs at the
logistical levpl c^k -, .e . such a multidirectional control program
would be undefined by the fact that non-COCOM states and
firms could presumably have the capability to supply
controlled destinations with items on the multidirectional
COCOM lists. The question would be how to alleviate this
foreign availability. The answer might be in resorting to
the compliance rent and surveillance instruments used by the
United States in the past. Compliance could be
theoretically ensured by setting up a network of bilateral
arrangements with Eastern European states and the Soviet
Union for example. Compliance rents could then be offered,
threats of their withdrawal for non-compliance could be
made, and monitoring for compliance through some agreed upon
surveillance mechanism could be carried out. Rents could
take the form of some kind of aid. While in a different
category of goods, bilateral talks have been underway for
some time with Czechoslovakia on establishing tight controls
on the export of symtex. It appears that headway in part
resulted from the West offering what might be called rents,
credits, and special consideration in COCOM, for compliance
(Interview, Europe, October 1990). it would require a
multilateral effort to establish such a system.
The third and more complicated issue occurs at the
political level. Even in times of extreme East-West tension
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full agreement on what destinations should be subject to
control and what items should be controlled has been fragil,
in COCOM. This has had to do with divergences in the
perceived interests of member states in terms of which
"target state" posed what type of threat to whom and what
type of controls on trade were necessary to guard Western
security. The problem of resolving this issue, once COCOM
was broadened in a multidirectional way, would be massive.
The image of the Soviet Union as "the other" in the height
of the Cold War provided an image around which Western
states could legitimate export controls on dual-use
industrial items; but in a period of growing fragmentation
of perceived interest in the international system, forging
consensus on which states to target would be near to
impossible (barring some event similar to the Gulf
situation)
.
In addition, if the list destinations subject to
control is expanded in a multidirectional way then the
possibility of such a two tier system within the European
Community increases. This is due to the divergence in EC
states' positions over which destinations should be subject
to what type of control. In the post Cold War world, once
the coherence provided by the common enemy is removed,
working this issue out becomes very complicated. The
British, for example, have expressed a concern over seeing
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— classes of dual .use goods transferre(j ^
Spam, however, would be unwiilin, to see Argenfcina ^.^
to such controls. This could lead to _^
conflicts between the U.K. and Spain over the re-export of
so,e classes of British high technology items (EC
, Brussels,
September. 1990) Snr-h a ^
•
uc a difference in perception might
lead to conflicts that would adversely affect the 1992
goals
.
Despite all of these drawbacks there is apparently
support in Ambassador Allen Wendt s office for shifting the
gaze of COCOM (Interview, Washington, July, 1990; Interview,
London, October, 1990). Some European members of COCOM have
also expressed an interest in seeing the organization used
as a blueprint for the construction of an entirely new
export control regime (Interview, Bonn, September, 1990).
These officials argue that agreements on controls on the
transfer of missile delivery system technology, chemical and
biological weapons technology, nuclear technology, and
dual-use technology should be brought under one
organization 1 (Interview, Brussels, September, 1990;
.o^l^t „Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) was
Canada^nt n"W .1987; The nenbers are the Uni*ed States?nada, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic ofGermany, Italy, Japan, Australia, Belgium, Luxenbourg, theNetherlands, and Spain.
,
.
"Australia Group" established in 1984 is made up ofthe EC countries, the United States, the European neutralsAustralia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada. It is designed to
control chemical weapons technology diffusion. Targets
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London, October, 1990
, . That organization they claim should
mirror COCOM in the sense that it should not be a formal
treaty organization. it should also incorporate the
organizational structure and administrative procedures used
in COCOM. This type of umbrella organization, according to
these officials, should include all advanced industrialized
states from the East and the West. This would solve the
issue of obtaining compliance from the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European states. The creation of such a regime,
however, would result in some fairly strange arrangements.
The Soviet Union would be, for example, cooperating in an
institution to control the diffusion of certain technologies
South with states that were members of COCOM. Aside from
these types of puzzles, the key issue or drawback once again
would be in reaching agreement on what destinations should
be subject to what types of control. For these reasons many
members of the Western alliance would prefer to see a multi-
directional system evolve at first as a network of bilateral
agreements (Interview, London, October 1990; Interview,
Washington D.C., April 1990).
Finally, there has been some support for dismantling
the COCOM industrial list and creating a new organization
primarily designed to assist in the transfer and diffusion
of Western technology that could speed the process of
include: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
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le
Political and economic reform in Central Europe and th,
Soviet Union (Interview, Brussels, September, 1990 ; see
Bertsch and Elliott-Gower
, 1990) . According to
who support this option, the Key threat to Western security
is not the technological and military capability of these
states, but the potential for chaos and economic
catastrophe. Political reform according to these officials
could be undermined by the inability of progressive
governments to supply and effectively produce goods due to
inefficient technology. "Our security is threatened now,"
stated one officials in Bonn, "by their instability"
(Interview, Bonn, September, 1990).
Conclusions
This chapter has detailed the interaction of the
complex factors that lead to a shift in the United States'
policy stand on export controls. It has also examined the
factors that lead to a restructuring of the COCOM program.
Despite the rapid and radical transformations in the Soviet
bloc the Bush Administration was at first reluctant to alter
the United States policy stand or agree to a significant
restructuring of COCOM. Amid continued Western European
pressure on the United States over the issue of
liberalizations on controls there emerged a compromise
agreement in June 1990 for the reorganization of COCOM. The
four theoretical perspecitves set out in chapter one have
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informed this narrative-hi^nr^^1Ve historical account of the 1989-1991
period. How do thev hpln nc^n y ne p us to account for the shift in the
United States position and the outcome of the June 1990
COCOM talks?
First, multiple-factors came together to produce this
outcome. The change in the East bloc made it obvious to
members of the United States foreign policy community that
the perceptual framework of the absolutist discourse was
implausible. Continuing to adhere to that discourse came to
be regraded by most as counterproductive. Contending
discourse camps that had opposed the economic warfare policy
during the Reagan Administration gained greater power then
as their vision of the appropriate rationale of East-West
trade gained greater plausibility. High technology business
interests drawing on a neo-Kantian discourse pushed for
extensive liberalizations on controls. Their redoubled
pressure on the Bush Administration in 1989 resulted from
the perceived market possibilities in the East. This camp,
supported by the Commerce Department and some members of
Congress, had argued throughout the 1980s that the
extensiveness United States controls was detrimental to
United States interests. As it appeared that Western
European firms were going to gain the advantage in market
entry into the East this camp became even more vocal.
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the
The plausibility of their vision had not only been
enhanced by events in the East, but their position in
intergovernmental power game had been improved. At the
institutional level the power of the Gaining absolutists
was significantly undermined when Stephen Bryant left the
DOD. ho one was brought in to head up DTSA until the su«r
of 1991. This gave the Commerce and State Departments an
opportunity to improve their positions. Both of these
Departments were closely allied with domestic commercial
interests and were in agreement with Western European
officials who favored more immediate liberalization.
Western European officials, under heavy pressure at
home, signaled to the United States with words and deeds
that they were prepared to take unilateral steps toward
liberalizations on East-West export controls. The United
States share of high technology production continued to
erode in the late 1980s. The Bush Administration's more
cautious approach to liberalizations was thus undermined by
Western Europeans willingness to sale. The United States
could have still used recourse to rents and surveillance to
attempt to slow the process down. Rents available were
declining or were becomming more costly, however, and
moreover no one in the Administration seemed prepared to
take such action. The Bush Administration instead tried to
embarrass the Europeans through public display and
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condemnation of ^ ^ -i -> +. •u r Violations of thp pnrnMr rne COCOM agreements. Bush
thus attempted to persuade ^ west£rn
to slow liberalizations on East-West trade controls.
As the Commerce and State Departments regained some
Power in the intergovernmental balance the NSC was able to
put together a compromise policy proposal in early 1990
western European states rejected the proposal. The United
States, net wanting to further strain alliance relations
began working with British representatives to formulate a
workable proposal for the June 1990 COCOM talks. The
outcome was a reorganization that reduced to a considerable
degree the United states power in COCOM. In additon the
negotiation process of the early 1990 period was much less
United States dominated.
So the 1989-1991 period can be assessed from the
vantage point of the four theoretical perspectives in the
following ways. At the structural level during this period
the rents available to the United States continued to
decline. There was some discussion of strengthening the
extraterritoriality provisions of the EAA. This, however,
would not change the fact that the capability of high-
technology production is now more diffused among advanced
industralized countries. Unless patriot missile systems and
other such technology are unusually fungible the United
States will continue to have difficulty in the future if it
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turns to rents and surveillance instruments tQ ^
extract compliance on export controls.
The transformations in the East bloc created the
perception of expanded market possibilities. Most United
States firms came to see the extensiveness of the export
control program as extremely damaging to their commercial
interests. During this period they saw controls as
constraning entrance into Eastern European markets. Western
European firms, however, argued that the Bush
Administrations- refusal to take action on liberalization
was intended to slow down the process so that United States
firms could catch-up with European firms that were posed to
take immediate advantage of the opening in the East. The
pressure of market competition ultimately helped to shift
the United States position toward support for greater
liberalization.
From the institutionalist perspective there was a
significant shift in the United States inter-governmental
power balance in the 1989-1990 period. The Commerce
Department and the State Department, traditionally more open
to the views of domestic commercial interests and to
compromising with the allies, gained ground over the DOD.
This made it that much easier to achieve a compromise
solution as State Department officials worked closely with
the British to solve the impasse of 1989.
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The changes in the East bloc discredited the
absolutist vision and created a strataa rategic opening into which
contending discourse camps rushed. The neo-kantian and
instrumentalist rationales for East-West trade policy gained
greater plausibility. The absolutist camp retreated into
the DOD and intelligence community, but continued to issue
warnings about the danger of placing to much faith in
Gorbachev. Their voice has again gained some ground as
crack downs have occurred in the Soviet Union. There is at
this point a highly contested environment in the United
States where the various discourse camps continue to push
their visions of the appropriate rationale for East-West
trade policy. it is unlikely in this environment and in the
context of the disorder and pace of the new world order that
any coherent long term vision for the purpose of East-West
trade policy can be worked out at the domestic or the
alliance level.
ion
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Accounting for the Dynamic, pf ^oiiaboraM
This project began with two problems and a set of
questions. First
, j wanted to assess the degree to which
export control programs in general and administrative
systems for the enforcement of such controls in particular,
had a linage in the Western state system. To address this
issue I examined past attempts by states to control exports
and analyzed in detail the 19th century British export
control system. The second problem had two parts, (a) to
account for the construction of the post-1945 United States
and multilateral export control system, and (b) to account
for periods of discord and consensus over the terms of the
Western alliance multilateral export control system. In
order to address this problem, I analyzed within four
distinct periods (1949-1964, 1965-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-
1991), (a) How the structural distribution of power and the
nature of United States policy and leadership affected
collaboration on the form, the nature, and the enforcement
of controls; (b) How the nature of global economic
competition affected Western alliance states' collaboration
on in COCOM and Western firms' compliance with multilateral
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control,,. (c) How the nature and the distribution of power
in domestic intra-governmental politics on this issue
affected United states policy and multilateral
collaboration; and (d) How the nature of changing
representations-of security and threats to security
affected United States policy and the nature of multilateral
collaboration.
A goal of this study was to refine theoretical
perspectives by assessing the strength of a variety of
approaches to account for the dynamics of United States-
Western European collaboration on multilateral export
controls. My thesis is, however, that a multi-factor
analysis provides a full and appropriate understanding of
the complex dynamics of alliance collaboration in this area.
In order to conduct such an analysis I drew on all four of
the theoretical frameworks set out in chapter I; modified
structural realism, a market explanation, institutionalism,
and discourse analysis. Thus this project does not end with
a simple solution or an univocal answer to the problems
posed at the beginning. I conclude, however, with a
reconsideration of what I found regarding both the issue of
the genealogy of this practice in the state system. Second,
I reconsider what each theoretical framework allows us to
explain about the dynamics of collaboration within each
period (1949-1964, 1964-1979, 1979-1989, 1989-1991).
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Tn.rd, I show how modifigd structurai reausm
_
^
-ket explanation, institutionalism, discourse ^^^^taken together enrich our understanding of the history of
United States-western European collaboration in this area
These theoretical perspectives are in fact nodes of
interpretation that allow us to tell different stories about
why and how collaboration occurred at this point of
intersection between economic and security policy.
These four modes of interpretation conflict, in
epistomological and ontclogical terms, in a number o£ ways
.
I recognize these conflicts, but believe little is to be
gained from adjudicating between these theoretical
perspectives; to leave silence on one side and on the other
a definitive voice of explanation.
Past work on multilateral export control collaboration
has tended to focus on a single factor and thus has lacked a
fully systematic multidimentional assessment. In this
project I have provided a theoretically informed narrative-
historical reconstruction of the dynamics of collaboration.
In that sense then the project is an example of what
Clifford Geertz once called "thick description." John
Ruggie has argued that "thick description is an essential
tool of all interpretive sciences" (Ruggie, p. 2, 1990).
Thick description provides a more comprehensive picture of
the multiple dimensions of collaboration in this case of
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state interaction in a coordinate policy endeavor. This is
not to deny that there may be more parsimonious paths to
Partial explanation. Such paths might focus on fewef
variables. The parsimonious^ ^ ^
pass by the multiple dimensions that fflake ^^
collaboration. Trying to find the most parsimonious path to
explanation can also reinforce a vision of the enterprise of
international relations theory as a process of establishing
see perspective as having an "infinite versatility of
apparent applications" (Ruggie
, p . 2> 199Q; alsQ ^^
1966, Geertz, 1973 and Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989 on this
issue,
.
This view of international relations theory can
remove us from the terrain of international relations by
allowing us to believe that we can have more than simply
"partial guides to an essentially intractable subject"
(Bull, p. 31, 1966). Thick description serves to ground our
feet in the complexity and dynamic history of international
relations
.
Reading Export Control Programs
The attempt to control the diffusion of material,
instruments or technology perceived to give one state
strategic or economic advantage over another is not new in
the Western state system. While states have attempted, in
various ways to control the diffusion of such items,
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systematic export contro! and enforcement programs did not
exist until the modern era.
The 19th century British control system, including its
administrative structure and enforcement instruments,
resembles the post-1945 United states and multilateral
control programs. The British export control system was
designed to ensure ongoing economic advantage by maintaining
monopoly control of certain classes of machines and certain
types of know-how. m that sense one could argue that the
British system based on mercantilist considerations, was
different in terms of rationale, goals, and function from
the post-1945 Western alliance strategic export control
system. The post-1945 system, particularly since the
economic warfare period of the 1950's, has been designed to
regulate the diffusion of "strategically significant
technology" in order to maintain "lead-time advantages over
the Soviet bloc.
"
My analysis showed, however, that the most revealing
element in the comparison of these systems is the symbolic
value of the categories of items that are controlled or
considered subject to control: what they represent within
the context of competition and rivalry between states. in
order to demonstrate this I employed a semiotic reading of
the texts of debates in the House of Commons in the early
19th century over the rationale of the British control
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system. By reading these texts in *l terms of the language
used to defend the programs and in terms of * h-Ln t e symbols andimages evoked in debates over the tvn6c „n ypes of goods subject to
control, it was possible to * ee!P assess conceptualizations of
Power and advantage at fchis ^^^^^ historicai
Based on this analysis
, argued ^ _ ^ ^ ^the formation of iRt-h18t century export prohibitions can be
explained by a utilization of the notion of the Machine .
This sign . s signification politically, culturally, and
advantage over rivals.
"strategically significant
technology," i maintain, has ha(J g ^^ ^
propelling the formation of post-1945 export control policy
and in legitimating arguments for constructing and ceding
authority to enforcement bureaucracies. Debates over the
function, rationale, and maintenance of export control
systems, in both the 19th century British case and the post-
1945 case, can be read then as essentially clashes of
conceptualizations held by policy elites of the source of
power and advantage over rivals in the international system.
Explaining the nynamics of Post-1945 Alliance
Collaboration on Export Control anrt
Control Enforcement
Following World War II, United States policy on East-
West trade became dominated by a strategy of economic
warfare. This strategy was designed to inflict damage on
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and
es
-et bloc economic develo„ and _^
policy Kas legitimated by ianguag^ ^d^that X defined as an absolutist discourse
. The^
was represented, for example
, as ^ ^ ^
Other intent on disrupting international harmony and on
destroying
"western civilian. - m order to isoiate
weaken this perceived threat the United states adopted rui
and established institutional structures to carry out a
broad export control program. United states officials
sought western European support in this endeavor, both to
ensure its effectiveness and for the broader moral crusade
legitimated by the terms of the absolutist discourse.
Western European officials were reluctant to follow
the united states lead. They were suspicious of Stalin, but
they did not share the image of the Soviet Union articulated
by Kennan or the view of communism held by many members of
the Truman Administration. I have explained this divergence
in terms of the way Western European outlooks were inherited
from and informed by cultural-historical experiences. Most
groups within Western Europe wanted to re-establish
traditional trading ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern
European states. Some Western European officials argued
that East-West trade could have an instrumental value in
manipulating Soviet policy and dividing the Soviet bloc. I
explained this view in reference to an instrumentalist
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discourse berancoc use the poss ibl lity or accepting such a view
was contingent on certain images ana representations of the
soviet union; that is, seeing it as a traaitionai Croat
power with an interp^t- i n «, • . • .erest in maintaining the status quo and as
a state that would rpart- i« ->eact in a predicable fashion to economic
carrots and sticks.
On the other hand there were Western European
officials who argued that renewed trade ties held mutual
economic benefits and that political and security issues
should be decoupled from questions of trade or commercial
ties. This policy vision was supported in terms of the neo-
kantian discourse. Discourse analysis allowed me to account
for the lack of alliance consensus because it provided the
framework for assessing factors that resulted in a
divergence in the alliance over the purpose that was to
guide East-West trade policy. Clearly, there were
divergences in economic interest as well. Discord, however,
did not arise simply from divergences in readily apparent
economic interests, but these discourses served as the grids
through which officials perceived and understood the
relationship between their economic and security interests.
Despite these divergences Western European officials
agreed to follow the United States lead from 1951-1953 in an
economic warfare program. I accounted for this shift with
three inter-related factors. First, Stalin's aggres:;sive
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-ves in the years immediateiy fonowing ^ ^ ^
outbreak of the Korean war weakened the immediate
Plausibil ity of symbols and images Q£ the instrumentalist
and neo-kantian discourses in Europe, western European
officials became iess sanguine about the potentia! political
or economic benefits of trade with the East.
Secondly, the United States expressed its willingness
to use preponderant economic capability to attempt to bring
western European states and firms in line with its more
restrictive position. United states instruments for
leverage to ensure compliance took several forms. I
demonstrated the relationship between these instruments
through a micro-economic model of contested exchange. At
one level the United states used rents in the form of
Marshall Plan and economic aid, military assistance, and
government procurement contracts to obtain compliance. The
threat of the withdrawal of these rents was embodied in
legislation requiring the executive to cut off all
assistance to states that violated the United states'
restrictive position. At another level the United States,
through the ECA and Battle Act, instituted an export
licensing system with extraterritorial application. This
allowed the United States to use access to specific items
and technologies that it controlled as rents for Western
firms' compliance with controls. The United States could
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w.thdraw these rents by denying ^ ^^^^ exp^t^
applications, thus impeding access to relatively scarce
goods and technology. This system alsQ ^
elaborate surveillance program for vigil ance on West-West
and East-West transactions and trade flows to gauge
compliance and to establish blacklists of f irms and
individuals that violated controls. The micro-economic
contested exchange model allowed me to explain the
relationship between these instruments in United States
compliance and enforcement efforts.
The third factor that helped to enlist Western
European collaboration was the way in which State Department
officials worked to accommodate some of the concerns of
alliance officials in COCOM. state Department officials
helped to ensure that some exception mechanism would be
built into the COCOM structure so that particular Western
European states would not be cut off from access to Eastern
bloc raw materials. At the inter-governmental level in the
United States there were then divergences between the States
Department, the Commerce Department, and the Department of
Defense positions' over the appropriate strategy to ensure
Western European states' and firms' compliance. The inter-
governmental conflict that emerged in this period was to
characterize the next forty years of United States policy in
COCOM.
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After 1953 the nature of Western alii,
collaboration on multilateral export oontrols shifted
western European demands for a less restrictive multilateral
export oontrol strategy re-emerged. At the intra-allied
level the United states concede, to these demands resulting
in a series of relaxations in COCOM in the late 1950' s j
explained this transformation by showing how the death of
Stalin and the end of the Korean war resulted in the
resurgence of instrumentalist and neo-kantian discourses in
Western Europe. m the United states, however, the
absolutist discourse was still preponderant in debates over
East-West policy and thus the United States continued an
economic warfare strategy through its own export control
program. The Western European demands for relaxations arose
in the context of declines in Marshall Plan aid and in the
context of a global recession. Thus I showed how structural
level factors also helped produce the shift in the Western
Europeans' position.
The united states' willingness to concede to Western
European demands was a result of two factors. First,
American officials expressed a belief that it was not in the
interest of the United States to risk an open diplomatic
rift with the allies over this issue. This appeared to be
based, in part, on the second factor: The United States,
through controls on access to its technology and goods, via
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the export Uce„sing program
, ^^^ ^
SUrVSillanCe ™ ™nue to impose its more
restrictive position on Western firms regardless of
relaxations in COCOM. After imj n.1954 the rationale for alliance
-Iteration in COCOM shifted a„ay from economic warfare to
maintaining a forum for coordinating efforts to control the
now of strategic goods and strategically significant
technology to tne Soviet Moo. The micro-economic contested
exchange model, however, helps identify the instruments
through which the United States attempted to maintain
enforcement on a more restrictive control program.
in the 1965-1979 period I showed how the United
States- shift, beginning in the late 1950-s, away from
economic warfare to economic diplomacy in East-West trade
policy was bound up in the erosion of the authority of the
symbols and images of the absolutist discourse. This shift
was initiated by officials in the executive who came to
believe that the United States could use access to its
economic and technological advantages as carrots and sticks
in extracting concessions from the Soviet Union. This
policy stand was legitimated and made possible by the rise
of an instrumentalist discourse based on a shift in
representations and perceptions of the nature of the Soviet
threat.
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intensified West-West economic petition and an
the west, resulted in a rapid expansion .„ ^^ ^
Western and Unitpd qf afoc, ^ •u e st tes flrms „lth interests in deveioping
Eastern markets. Attempts by the executive during this
Period to oontrol and coordinate trade linkage program were
underlined either by members of Congress who adhered to a
less refined notion of economic diplomacy as a series of
sticks to bludgeon the Soviets into altering domestic
policies while others, voicing competitive commercial
concerns, wanted to forego linkage and institute and East-
West trade policy based on more neo-kantian considerations.
The united states executive's instrumentalist position,
whether in the form of Nixon-Kissinger or Carter-Huntington
linkage, was also undermined by allied officials' reluctance
to play linkage with the Soviets on the United states terms.
United states policy during this period became confused.
The increased number of domestic commercial groups with
interests in East-West trade policy and the contending
discourses that emerged resulted in unpredictable policy
outcomes. In COCOM the United States used exception
requests liberally and restrictiveness in the export
licensing program abated. This state of affairs was a
direct consequence of intensified West-West economic
competition and the erosion of a common understanding of the
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appropriate relationship between East.„est^
security in the united states foreign poacy estabushment
_
Following the invasion of Afghanistan ^ ^^States policy on East-West trade sMfted
_ ^ ^
period I explained this ahifts , away from economic diplomacy
and trade expansion and hack toward economic warfare, as a
result of the re-emergence of the absolutist discourse as
the guidepost for East-West trade policy strategy. ! used
the four interpretative frameworks to account for the United
States attempts to reinvergerate domestic and multilateral
controls and to account -For-f the complex dynamics of alliance
collaboration.
First, I demonstrated how officials within the Reagan
Administration articulated a conceptualization of the nature
of the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet threat that
was clearly expressive of the absolutist discourse. This
conceptualization legitimated an economic warfare program.
It also reinforced these officials' determination to roll
back detente and to silence other discourses and
conceptualizations of the appropriate relationship between
East-West trade and Western security. These hard-line
unilateralist officials in the Administration believed that
allied officials could be persuaded to collaborate in a
reinvegeration of the multilateral export control program.
If persuasion failed, however, they were willing to turn to
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ng
e
er £°rms of le—
•
« ~ «« this reason that these
officios embarked on a massive expansiQn strengtheni
of the instruments that the United states had used in th
past to ensure compliance with its
.ore restrictive
position.
Secondly, I showed how these officials, in the DOD
under Richard Perle and in the Commerce Department under
Lawrence Brady, were able to gain the upper hand in intra-
governmental struggles for control of not only United states
Policy on East-West trade, but over strategy to be used to
bring the allies along. The consequence of this inter-
governmental power shift was intensified pressure on
alliance states and firms.
Third, through the contested exchange model I
demonstrated the relationship between the instruments that
the Reagan Administration used to attempt to ensure Western
firms' compliance with restrictive controls and in an
attempt to extract concessions from allied states in COCOM
negotiations. Some Executive officials believed that a
combination of rents, compliance surveillance, and the
threat of rent withdrawal for non-compliance could be used
to achieve their policy ends. This strategy not only
failed, but it had some extremely negative consequences.
I showed that at the level of issue specific
capability the United States relative economic power and its
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are of gl obal high technology
^ »7.... United states disproportionate Qf
edge technologic.! production was eroded in . number of
areas. „ rents are defined ^^ ^ ^^
ana states relative^ free access to United states lading
edge technoiogy considered to have strategic significance
then we can say that the rents available to the United
States declined. In addition the CQst q£ offering ^^
rent, such as economic aid rose.
I showed that in this context Reagan Administration
officials strengthened surveillance systems for both East-
West and West-West technology transfers. This increased
surveillance included a closer monitoring of export license
applications and an increase DOD role in the review of
license applications. it also involved greater resource
outlays for data collection and special intelligence
operations to map technology transfers. This increased
vigilance enhanced the United States capability to detect
violators of the COCOM and its unilateral export control
program. In addition to this step the Executive branch also
increased its ability to withdraw rents by reaffirming
extraterritoriality in the EAA and by gaining more authority
to impose sanctions for violations. The Reagan
Administration hoped that this threat of rent withdrawal and
the higher risk of detection would result in compliance from
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was set
Astern firms and states. This WM ,
strate
as not a c°st minizinggy. The x desire ,xred compliance was
upon endogenously from an »•y t assessment of an optimal
combination of available rents and surveillance, but
exogenousiy under the
— « the absolutist discours;
<™er the terms of the absolutist apprQach as^
available declined th6 budgetary outlays ^
and the intensity of simmin,X surveillance increased. This strategyhad two conscience, (a) Western firffls
cost for compliance and thus where possible began to try todesign around United states technology. This accelerated
the fan of rents availafcle tQ ^ ^
firms turned to next best alternative suppliers., (b) This
strategy also began to entail high diplomatic costs as
western European leaders puhlicly reacted to the ieverage
strategy. The fourth part of the analysis of this period
showed that the lesson of the potential competitive costs of
such an extensive surveillance and export control program
was not lost on domestic interest groups. The Reagan
Administration helieved that the terms of the absolutist
discourse would be able to silence domestic opposition to
economic warfare. This, however, proved not to be the case
as business interest groups proved unwilling and perhaps
unable to absorb the potential cost to West-West trade of
such a restrictive stand on East-West trade.
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In the 1989-1991 nerioH r
. .
P °d 1 Messed the dynamics thatlead to a shift in the United
controls and to a restructurin ,g of COCOM. The four
theoretical perspectives set out in chapter : informed this
narrative-historical account.
Despite the rapid and radical transforations in the
soviet bloc the Bush Ministration was at first reluctant
to alter the United states policy sta nHd or to agree to a
significant restructuring of COCOM. Amid continued Kestern
European pressure over the issue of liberalizations there
emerged a compromise agreement in June !990. Several
factors came together to produce this outcome.
First, the changes in the East bloc made it obvious to
members of the United States foreign policy community that
the perceptual framework of the absolutist discourse was
implausible. Continuing to adhere to that discourse camp
came to be regarded by most as counterproductive.
Contending discourse camps that had opposed the economic
warfare policy during the Reagan Administration gained
greater power as their vision of the appropriate rationale
for East-West trade policy gained greater plausibility.
Changes in the East bloc reacted a strategic opening into
which contending discourse camps rushed to try and gain
control of United States East-West trade policy. High
technology business interests drawing on a neo-kantian
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course pushed for extensive llberaiizations ^ ^^^^Other groups, in the state ^^^^^ fche ^^^^^^
P-hed for a slouer deUberate ^^^^^ ^
"
continued reforms mi,«j -, .S
-
Th61r po11^ vis i°" was legitimated in
terms of the instrumentalist discourse.
During the 1989-199! period the plausibility of the
neo-kantian and instrumentalist discourses had not only been
enhanced by events in the East, hut their positions in the
inter-governmental power game had been improved. At the
institutional level the power of the remaining absolutists
in the DOD was weakened with personnel changes in 1989. No
one was brought in to head up DTSA until the late spring of
1989. This gave the Commerce and state Department an
cpportunity to improve their positions in the inter-agency
power struggle. As these Departments gained greater power
ever the formulation of policy, the NSC, working with the
British representatives, was able to produce a workable
proposal for the June 1990 COCOM meeting. The DOD, however,
was critical of the reorganization, particularly the
agreement to renegotiate the COCOM list from scratch.
At the alliance level Western European officials,
under heavy pressure at home signaled to the United States
with words and deeds that they were prepared to take
unilateral steps toward liberalizations if the Bush
Administration would not alter its position. The
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Administration's more caiHH
was thus h
aPPr°aCh t0 lib
-^i-tions
undermined bvy the growlng willingness
European states to allow »-k .0W thSlr flrms to sell. The unitedStates could have turned t-o i
to .
0 leVera9e instruments to attempt
slow liberalizations. The rent, tks the Administration oouldhave used, however, were few In ad(3^.tBW
- dition, no one in theBush Administration was Willi™ *w ling to advocate such a clearly
counter-productive strategy. Instead ^
tried to pressure the Europeans through public displays and
condemnations of export control violations.
At the market level United states high technology
business interest groups redoubled their pressure on the
Bush Administration as they perceived market possibilities
xn the East. This camp was supported by the Commerce
Department and some members of Congress. These interest
groups had argued throughout the 1980
-s that the
extensiveness of the United States controls harmed
commercial interests in West-West trade. As it appeared
that western European firms were going to gain the market
entry advantage in the East, due to their governments
willingness to liberalize with or without the United States,
domestic interests pressure on the Bush Administration
increased. The present state of allied and United States
policy on East-West trade is thus rather divided as these
discourse camps continue to try and gain control over policy
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by establishing th
policy purpose.
e most plausible concentn.i pp ual framework for
This case study has alloued me ^ ^
explanatory strength of fouf
accounting for the dynamics Qf
Taken together, these perspectives provide us a oict^ V a p ure with
sufficient detail to account for the creation .n of and shifts
xn alliance collaboration. The factors that these
perspectives focus on interacted with each other to make
collaboration possible and to alter the terms of
collaboration in various periods. The historical narrative
of the 1949 - 1964
,
1964 . 1979( 19?9 . i989 ^ i989 _ ig9i
»as made possible by the edified structural realist,
market, institutional ist and discourse frameworks.
I used the micro-economic contested exchange model to
account for the role of the distribution of issue specific
capability as a factor in the dynamics of alliance
collaboration. At this level I showed how the erosion of
United States capability preponderance over time altered its
ability to extract compliance from alliance states and
Western firms for its preferred policy position. Using this
model I showed in a systematic fashion the relationship
between United States compliance extraction instruments.
These instruments are embedded in the United States export
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control institution framework thafc _
1949.
he contested exchange model is an effective
aUOWing US t0 eXPlai" „eans by which the United
States attested to ensure compliance with economic warfare
in the 1949 - 1964 period and during fche f . rst Rea^
Ministration. In order to establish the COCOM program and
to ensure the integrity of controls the United States drew
°n a combination of enforcement rents, compl iance
surveillance and the threat of rent withdrawal for non-
compliance. ftt the outset of the COCOM program the United
States had access to an extensive mix of rents such as aid,
access to leading edge technology and government procurement
contracts. m the 1949-1953 period, compliance with the
United States policy vision was relatively easy to obtain
because United States rents were more attractive to Western
States than recreating economic ties with the East. The
threat of rent withdrawal was also effective because Western
firms did not have alternative suppliers.
In 1953 as Marshall Plan aid declined, as the global
economy contracted, and as the Soviet Union moved into the
post-Stalinist period the United States ability to use the
aid rent was constrained or became more costly. The United
States, in the face of strong Western European pressure,
agreed to some liberalization in COCOM, but resorted to
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strengthening its unii^.v n
Rents, •
to
— comp i iance
.
orms, however, the united states strengthened
to Wlthdrawal
, free access to ieading ^^^^ ^
strategically significant technology This was »yy- ln accomplished
through extraterritoriality claims and the expansion of
licensing systems and other surveillance systems to gauge
compliance
.
in the early 1980 .s when members of the Reagan
Administration wanted to establish policy coordination with
its economic warfare policy they turned to strengthen these
instruments. While these instruments were embedded in the
administrative and legal framework of the United states
export control system they had been neglected during the
trade linkage 1964-1979 period. The attempt to revive
economic warfare, legitimated through the absolutist
discourse, and to obtain alliance compliance failed in part
as a result of the shift in the distribution of issue
specific capability. The rents that were available to the
United States for leverage had declined and those available
were less attractive because of next best alternative
suppliers. The attempt to strengthen this leverage system
by increased surveillance and more extensive monitoring and
by expanding Executive authority to withdrawal rents was
counterproductive with the Western Europeans. It had the
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three following consequences- it in4 . l increased government
resource allocation cost- if « *." , t entailed costs for the
competitiveness of united high.technoiogy interests
BeSter
"
fi™S *™ -—rnative suppliers; and it
rr
dipiomatic
°°
sts as u s—
—
—
-less patriot missUe ^ other ^ ^
P-ves to be extremely fungible as rents ^ united
wUl oo„tinue to incur such costs ^ ^ ^ ^^to these instruments in an atte.pt to extract Western
European compliance with a preferred polioy position on
export controls determined exogenously.
Through a market explanation I was able to account for
west trade and that shaped the nature of collaboration on
multilateral export controls. During the 1949-1964 period
business interest groups in the United States, for a number
of reasons, were not inclined to challenge the restrictive
export control program. The incentive to pursue market
possibilities in the East was minimal and thus most domestic
groups did not see the United States program as imposing
significant costs. In addition, because Western firms did
not have next best alternative suppliers for leading edge
technology United States firms did not see the licensing and
surveillance systems as a hindrance to West-West trade or as
a factor that could damage commercial competitiveness.
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Significant domestic intersterest groups in Western
Europe, however, did see ^ ^^P-gra, as imposing costs by closing ^ ^ ^ ^
Eastern European market. Opposition tn^ o the economic warfarepolicy became particularly c h->-P r strong as Marshall Plan aid
end of the Korean war created an opportunity for interest
groups in Europe to vreimro *-v, •v p ssu e their governments for
liberalization. Support for the movement away from economic
warfare came from both the right and the left in Western
Europe
.
The market perspective provides a particularly
effective framework for explaining policy shifts and the
dynamics of collaboration in the 1964-1969 and 1989-1991
periods. During these periods business interest groups in
the united States, with allies in the Commerce Department
and Congress, were able to pressure the Executive to move
toward liberalizations. In both the 1964-1979 period and
the 1989-1991 period the Executive sought to maintain
control over East-West trade policy. In the case of the
1964-1979 period the Executive's preferred trade linkage
policy was undermined by commercial pressures. As global
economic competition increased, Western European states were
more inclined to sell East on their own terms rather than
play linkage on the United states' terms. Business
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s and gover_ officiais beiieved
them
: oin then," policy i ine .
in the 1989-1991 period changes , n ^
the possibility and intense economic competition
-entive for lntensified domestic ^
to alter East-West- t-r-=>^ ~ -, •trade poUcy. In the United States high-
technology business interest groups ^ ^
extensive pressure on the Bush Administration to Unerase
controls. Throughout the I9sn'= f ky n 1 80 s these groups had opposed
the extensive United states surveillance systems and
intensified monitoring of West-West and East-West trade.
High-technology interest groups saw that these extensive
programs hurt their commercial competitiveness as Western
firms, rather than bear increased costs, turned to
alternative suppliers. m the face of a situation were
Western European officials, due in part to domestic pressure
by commercial groups, indicated a willingness to liberalize
without the United States these groups intensified pressure
on the Executive through Congress and the Commerce
Department.
The institutional perspective allows us to understand
how the nature of inter-governmental power games affected
United States policy and the dynamics of collaboration.
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Western European officials from „
Foreign Affair, k
"tries of Economics and
state
"WayS reSP°nSible «*
co t i
P0Slti0nS
"
neg0tiati0
"S
-
—ral export
n rols. The state ^^
-.mate in setting the terms of the United states p0sition
-COCO.. Kesponsibility for United states export controi
Policy, however, has always been spread out among tne
commerce, the state and the Defense Departments. The
Commerce Department has bv and l,™oy arge supported a minimalist
Position on controls while DOD has advocated strict
controls. ln sorae instances> ^ ^
alliance between Defense officials and Commerce officials
has been forged. This was the case in 1949-1953 and in the
-rly 1980 ... The c_ce Department , s ^
DOD in such an alliance has been based in part on the idea
that if a restrictive control system is to guide policy then
the Europeans should be brought into line. The reasoning
for this position being that United states firms should not
experience lost sells as a result of Western firms non-
compliance with controls. Competition between the DOD, the
Commerce Department and the state Department to define the
purpose, the nature and the scope of export control policy
has been constant since 1949. The dynamic context of
shifting Soviet-United States relations has been the
background for this competition. Soviet foreign policy
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e DOD
export control policv ThicP Hey. This was the case in the 1949-1953period and after iQ7a c-1979. soviet moderation has provided the
opening for the Commerce or state n.n, <-DePartment to push theirpolicy vision.
The state Department has oft^n k0n t e been more inclined totry and find pragmatic workable solutions on th. ,uo e nature and
extent of export control coooer.Hnn ^peratio by agreeing to
c™ ses with their~erparts in the western European
Ministries of Foreign A«airs
. The^
been, in some instances, willing to strike compromises^
Western European officials f>, afP tucia that ran counter to the position
advocated by Congress or other United states government
Departments. This was particularly the case in the 1949-
1964 period. During the early 1980-s the State Department's
position in the COCOM negotiation process was undermined as
the DOD gained the upper hand in the inter-governmental
power struggle over defining the terms of East-West trade
policy. The consequence was that DOD officials in bilateral
and multilateral talks intensified pressure on Western
European Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs officials. m cases where the DOD was unable to
persuade these officials of necessity of economic warfare
DOD officials were less inclined to compromise and more
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likely to advocate or m,,threaten leveraqe non h„ •
inter-governmental
d°m
— «"
C°ntr01 haslead to discord at the all iance levelxc x. This discord result-*?
IT r "™ —— - -
—
relationship between East-West tr,^ „w ade and Western securitydiverges from the DOD.
Discourse analysis allowed me to show how policy
choices are legitimated through constructed understandings
of interests. Discourses simultaneously^ ^
these understandings making possible some policies and
precluding others. In this case ! showed how particular
-ages of the Soviet Union, representations of technology
and trade in relation to security, and the image of the
nature of threats to security constituted particular
policies as legitimate. Economic warfare, trade linkage,
and trade liberalization are all East-West trade policy
options. Each of these options is made plausible by a
vision of purpose that is constructed and given meaning
through a particular discourse. I showed here how the terms
of the absolutist discourse legitimated economic warfare,
how the instrumentalist discourse legitimated trade linkage,
and how the neo-kantian discourse legitimated
liberalization.
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AH of these discourses h»„= u
the hi -
PrSSent th"U9houtstory of post-1945 debates on United Stat
-port control pol icy Tnes , .
^ "*^
P ic . h e discourse camps, both in the
— states and in Western EuroPe, have coated to
establish the purpose of their states. East-West trade ande^ort control Policy
. Soviet ^^
experiences, and the qh,f 0 */ uu n state of overall Western ain-w alliance-East
>1°= relations affects the persuasive power of the images
and representations of these discourses. Collaboration on
export controls has taken place within a dynamic context
where discourse congruence between alliance officials has
Produced greater cooperation while incongruence has produced
greater discord.
By reconstructing a theoretically informed narrative-
historical account of alliance interaction in this policy
area I have shown how collaboration is made possible by
multiple factors. Accounting for the dynamics of discord
and cooperation in this case requires that we draw
simultaneously on several different theoretical frameworks.
Thus I do not claim that discourse analysis surpasses other
perspectives in its ability to account for policy formation
or alliance collaboration. Its main function in this case
has been to help us to understand how policies are made
possible by particular visions of purpose (see Der Dervan,
1990; Klein, 1990; Shapiro, 1990; Chaloupka, 1990; Weber,
408
199
°)
•
The institutionalist frain. „St amework allows us to exol^n
to explain whose vision can hold swavy at any given time
among the allies t*w>„ 4.ue
-
Taken together rhoo« *y n t ese frameworks help usto understand the mulUple factors ^^^^ ^ ^dynamics of western aluance coUaboration ^ expQrt ^
policy.
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